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 Purchasing Organisation structure and its 
impact on supply relationship 





With the financial crisis, it becomes more and more difficult and 
expensive to obtain funding for infrastructure projects. Public sector 
procurement is undergoing major changes. Drastic cuts in government 
budgets re-ignited the debate of centralisation versus decentralisation that 
was last debated after the oil crisis of 1973. In the traditional marketing and 
purchasing literature, the relationship between Buyer and Seller has long 
been at the centre of the purchase interaction. Organisations have chosen 
close long-term relationships instead of “playing the market” in the name of 
cost reduction and increased revenues. The objective of this study is to 
identify the particular constraints on relationship building in the public 
sector, and to assess whether or not these constraints make standard 
efficient management practices inapplicable to the public sector. Several 
organisations from the Irish public sector were interviewed about their 
relationships. The qualitative data collected from the interviews were 
combined with the current related literature of business to business 
relationships, public procurement and organisational buying behaviours. It 
is argued in this research that it is extremely difficult to establish a 
collaborative relationship with suppliers when mandatory rules and 
procedures create formal and centralised buying behaviours. In conclusion, 
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Chapter One Introduction and Rationale 
With the financial crisis and resulting cuts in government budgets, the 
debate about developing projects in-house or outsourcing them has been 
reignited (Warner, Gelinas et al., 2011). In other words, public 
organisations are back to the old market versus hierarchy dispute. In 
contrast, private organisations choose close long-term relationships instead 
of “playing the market” in the name of cost reduction and increased 
revenues (Cao, Vonderembse et al., 2010). Thus the relationship between 
buyer and seller is at the centre of the purchase interaction. 
In the recent past public organisations did try to develop a long term 
approach to public procurement by emphasising Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). By moving public procurement away from traditional arm’s length 
relationships, partnerships had the potential to build social capital by 
establishing networks and developing long-term relationships with private 
sector suppliers (Steane and Walker, 2000). Thus public organisations had 
an opportunity to exploit the project management knowledge and efficiency 
of private organisations. They had an opportunity to achieve a better service 
of the population at a lower cost. 
Indeed, studies in the private sector show that when an organisation 
needs to gain access to resources outside its own boundaries, a partnership 
is a sensible choice. Grant (2004) confirms that partnerships are more 
efficient than hierarchy or market in the application of knowledge. In this 
case, “knowledge application points to a form of knowledge sharing in 
which each member firm accesses its partner’s stock of knowledge in order 
to exploit complementarities, but with the intention of maintaining its 
distinctive base of specialised knowledge,” (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004, 
p.64).  
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But then the financial crisis struck: “PPPs are under siege on both sides. 
Once the flagship of the building boom, public-private partnerships are 
being strangled by funding shortages” (Kehoe and Burke, The sunday 
Business Post, 24th May 2009). Most PPPs are suspended and with them 
the attempts toward partnerships. 
1.1 Research Problem 
As a result of PPPs’ suspensions, public organisations in the European 
Union (EU) rely on contractual governance to manage the relation with 
their suppliers. Embedded fairness and transparency of tenders and 
contracts encourage competition in price, quality and service. This 
embedded fairness helps to prevent political interference and open the 
markets right across Europe. 
Nevertheless contractual governance is not adaptable to all situations. 
Greater strategic and tactical consideration should be given to the proactive 
management of relationship to foster collaborative working, in essence a 
shift from contracting to relationship management principles (Smyth and 
Edkins, 2007). Relational governance mechanisms based upon shared 
resources, information exchange and social processes like trust and 
commitment, provide an opportunity to access the skills and resources of 
partners, to coordinate activities, to co-operate on projects and divide tasks 
within the two organisations according to their respective strengths, abilities 
and cost structure. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to assess if relational 
governance and standard procurement practices are applicable to public 
organisations. It is crucial for business success that participants, involved in 
business activities between public and private sectors, make an informed 
choice about the proper relationship management approach. Participants 
have to be aware if particular constraints exist on relationship building 
between public and private sector organisations. Strategic choices need to 
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be made in term of structure, resource allocation, goals, or managerial 
orientation. Without an understanding of the relationships between public 
and private sectors, an accurate fit of the strategy is not possible. The lack 
of understanding generates gaps and approximations detrimental to the 
benefits of the relationship. Ultimately, the general public becomes the 
victim of any mismanagement caused, as the mismanagement impacts the 
quality of the services provided. 
To contribute to the understanding of public to private relationships, 
relational governance should be accurately defined from the business to 
business (B2B) literature. In particular, the relationship building process has 
to be understood and specified. 
• Question 1 What are the important factors of a buyer-supplier 
relationship building process? 
Then, a background study of public procurement is needed to 
understand the supply relationships between public and private 
organisations. While partnerships and strategic alliances between private 
organisations are already well documented in the B2B literature, there is 
only a limited understanding of public to private relationships. The 
particular constraints on relationship building between public and private 
sector organisations need to be identified.  
• Question 2 What are the constraints (contingency variables), both 
internal and external, on procurement in the Irish 
public sector? 
The literature on public procurement mainly concentrates on the 
tendering process, in other words the contractual aspect, and neglects the 
relational aspect of the relationship. Public procurement relies for its 
operations, on rules and regulations. In other words, for the understanding 
of public organisation buying behaviours, centralisation and formalisation 
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may be non negligible factors. This is consistent with Webster (1972) 
model of organisational buying behaviour where the characteristics of an 
organisation structure must be defined in order to understand the buying 
decision and the buying centre behaviours. 
• Question 3 What is the Irish public procurement organisation 
structure? 
Once the characteristics of the Irish public procurement organisation 
structure are characterised, then the buying behaviours of public buying 
centre should be determined and conclusions drawn. 
• Question 4 What is the buying centre position and how does it 
affect the management of procurement? 
These conclusions then should be tested and validated by comparing 
them to current practices. 
• Question 5 How are buyer-supplier relationships currently handled 
at executive level in the Irish public sector? 
Finally, an assessment as to whether or not the identified constraints 
make standard efficient management practices inapplicable to the public 
service need to be carried out. 
• Question 6 What can be concluded as to the applicability of 
private sector based organisation practices to the Irish 
public sector? 
This study adds to the existing research on general public procurement 
by shedding new light on relationship processes. It firstly summarises the 
knowledge available on buyer-supplier relationship characteristics from the 
private sector and then extends it to the public sector. It identifies a range of 
enabling and impeding factors in a relationship, in particular the influence 
of the organisation structure. The study presents an alternative model for 
examining relationship settings and understanding the process mechanisms. 
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It highlights areas for policy intervention, practice improvement and future 
research. 
1.2 Methodology: Overview and Limitations 
First, conceptual understanding of buyer-supplier relationships, public 
procurement and organisation structures was gained through a review of the 
literature. Then, research material was gathered through a series of three 
semi-structured interviews with procurement managers. This is consistent 
with a multiple-case study methodology. The analysis of these three 
interviews raised further questions and incited further review of the 
literature. Findings were tested with a second series of four interviews. 
Therefore, the research process can be described as an iterative process. It 
went back and forth between theory and practice as the study evolved.  In 
total, seven case studies were developed and analysed. 
A constructionist epistemology with an interpretivist perspective 
informs this research. The behaviours and actions observed were interpreted 
to understand the underlying mechanisms influencing the buyer-supplier 
relationship. This qualitative approach “provides a narrative of people’s 
view(s) of reality and it relies on words and talk to create texts” (Gephart Jr, 
2004, p.455). It is an exploratory research which emphases understanding 
rather than explanation (Charmaz, 2006). An exploratory study is a valuable 
means of finding out “what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask 
questions and assess phenomena in a new light (Saunders, Lewis et al., 
2007, p.133). The object is to detect patterns, define problems and suggest 
hypotheses. 
However, as the events reported are interpreted by the researcher, 
cautions are necessary to avoid subjectivity in the deductions. The research 
process offers some protection against such subjectivity. Results were 
submitted to constant questioning. The research is grounded in the existing 
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literature and key theoretical ideas. The process followed a gradual 
narrowing-down of research questions and problems. 
Regarding the research method, the choice of a qualitative exploratory 
multiple-case study, rules out direct applicability on other cases or a 
representative sample for statistical purposes. However, the findings of 
qualitative research are used to deepen the understanding of a theory rather 
than to generalise characteristics to populations. Qualitative research aims 
to discover connections between the different conceptual ideas emerging 
from the data. Even the uncommon connections, that can’t be extended to 
the whole population but shed light on the process mechanisms, can be used. 
Geographically the study is limited to Ireland. Only Irish organisations 
were investigated. 
A more thorough description of the research perspective, research 
design and limitations are given in Chapter Three on research process. 
1.3 Definitions of Key Terms 
Precise, coherent and distinct definitions of the terms used in this model 
need to be presented. It will facilitate the subsequent development of valid, 
useful and comparable results. 
1.3.1 Relationship 
In this study, relationship needs to be understood as it is commonly 
used within the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) school of 
thought. A business relationship is normally viewed as a connection, an 
interaction between two organisations.  
Its scope covers the entire continuum between market and hierarchy. 
For a given relationship, the exact position in the continuum depends on the 
intensity of various parameters (see Section 2.1, p12), characterising the 
exchanges between involved entities. 
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1.3.2 Partnership 
Partnership relations constitute a sub-range of the relationship 
continuum. All parameters of the exchanges are at a high intensity level. 
Partnership relations are arrangements where entities agree to cooperate to 
advance their interests. Partners co-labour to achieve and share profits or 
losses. 
1.3.3 Public Sector and Private Sector 
The public sector is a part of the state that deals with the production, 
delivery or allocation of goods and services by and for the government or 
its citizens, whether national, regional or local/municipal. 
As to the private sector, it is that part of the economy which is run by 
private individuals or groups, usually as a means of enterprise for profit, 
and is not controlled by the state. 
1.3.4 Purchasing and Procurement 
The differences between purchasing and procurement can be 
summarised from a debate opened to professionals by Rae (access date: 25 
May 2010, http://blog.procurementleaders.com/). 
In the traditional sense, the term purchasing is more restrictive than the 
term procurement.  Purchasing is an administrative function, linked to order 
management and price bargaining. It merely reflects the act of acquisition. 
As to procurement, it steps away from the transactional side and is seen 
as more of a strategic function. Depending on the circumstances, it may 
include some or all of the following: identifying a need, specifying the 
requirements, vendor sourcing and evaluation, negotiation, purchase orders, 
logistics of the material, ensuring compliance, paying and managing 
supplier relationship before and after the purchase. 
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Nevertheless, the awareness of financial benefits has pushed 
organisations towards achieving supply chain integration. As a result, the 
distinction between supply, purchasing and procurement has almost 
disappeared. In daily activities, the terms are used interchangeably. 
In this study, both terms are considered equivalent. Purchasing will 
preferably be used for the private sector due to the IMP influence. 
Procurement will preferably be used for the public sector as traditionally 
done. 
1.3.5 Strategy 
This study applies the IMP definition of strategy.  
“Strategy is what a company actually does in order to achieve its desired 
performance. It is all the choices, small or big, made by anybody in the 
company to adapt to what happens in the world around and to react to the 
behaviour of other companies, customers or suppliers. Strategy 
management is about influencing and setting a direction to these choices” 
(Ford, Gadde et al., 1999, p.64).  
This study also considers that strategy is enacted through the shaping of the 
organisation structure. 
1.3.6 Organisation Structure 
This study adopts the view of Mintzberg (1983) about organisation 
structure (Section 2.3, p35).  
“The structure of an organisation can be defined simply as the sum 
total of the ways in which its labour is divided into distinct tasks and then 
its coordination is achieved among these tasks”(Mintzberg, 1983, p.2).  
The three main characteristics considered are centralisation, 
formalisation and coordinating mechanism. 
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1.4 Outline of the Study 
This study is divided into five chapters: 
Chapter One introduced the general problem and issues under 
investigation. It presented a rationale and a purpose for examining the topic. 
The research questions form the base of the research strategy. 
Chapter Two reviews selected literature. It represents the extensive 
knowledge fundamental to this dissertation regarding business to business 
relationship, public procurement and organisational buying behaviours. It 
lays the theoretical foundation for this dissertation and proposes, based on 
the literature, an integrated model of organisational purchasing relationship. 
Chapter Three presents the methodology and includes the research 
perspective, research design, sample selection, data collection tasks, data 
analysis procedures and some limitations of the study. The nature of the 
research process is characterised as having an iterative approach. 
Chapter Four lays out the data gathered from the interviews. The 
empirical material is presented as it has been analysed. It provides some 
necessary structure and facilitates the cases comparison. 
Chapter Five contains the discussion of the empirical material and 
presents the study’s findings and major results.  
Chapter Six outlines the conclusions and implications of the study.  It 
discusses how the aim was fulfilled and the research questions answered. It 
also discusses the contributions of the study for both theory and practice 
and proposes avenues for future research. Finally, some criticisms are 
directed towards the study. 
Chapter Two  5BLiterature Review 
Chapter Two Literature Review 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research and assess if relational 
governance and standard procurement practices are applicable to public 
organisations, information has to be gathered about relational governance, 
public and private procurement practices and organisation structures. The 
literature review focuses on the academic literature that provides 
background knowledge to the research. The adopted process for selection of 
relevant publications is given in Appendix A (p163) 
The approach to the literature is illustrated in Figure 2-1. The research 
was started with two centres of interest. Firstly, the purchasing / 
procurement function of an organisation, or more accurately, the 
interactions in the dyad buyer / supplier and the resulting relationship and 
second, the differences between public and private sectors. 
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Figure 2-1: Approach to literature review 
Three main streams of literature were identified to enlighten these 
centres of interest: B2B literature for the discussion on relationships; the 
Public Procurement literature for the specificity of Public organisations; and 
the organisational buying behaviour literature for the influence of the 
organisation structure on the buying centre. 
The review starts Section 2.1, with an analysis of the relationships 
between buyers and suppliers in an industrial environment. It identifies the 
parameters characterising a relationship. 
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Then, Section 2.2 (p25) introduces public procurement. Principles and 
regulations ruling the supply contracts and public private partnerships are 
discussed. 
The search for the origin and raison d’etre of those principles and 
regulations incited a study of organisation theory and organisational buying 
behaviour in Section 2.3 (p35). The parameters characterising an 
organisation’s structure are exposed. The influences of contingency 
variables, such as the external environment or the technical system, on the 
structure adopted by the organisation are explained. This leads to the 
contingency theory and the need of integration of the buying centre 
behaviour into the whole organisation strategy. 
Finally, in Section 2.4 (p48), a synthesis of all the findings brings the 
three streams of literature together. The phenomenon to be studied is 
identified and narrowed down to a more specific problem that can be 
formulated into a research question. Three possible configurations for B2B 
relationships are defined and elements are provided to strategically select 
the most adapted configuration according to circumstances. Consequences 
of public procurement principles and regulations on the development of a 
public - private relationship are then examined. Finally an integrated model 
of organisational buying behaviour is proposed. 
2.1 Business to Business Relationships 
A business relationship may be viewed as a connection, an interaction 
between two organisations. By definition, in a business market, each 
organisation exists with a number of different relationships with both 
suppliers and customers (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999). These are the 
relationships necessary for acquiring and selling the materials, parts, 
services or knowledge at the origin of the organisation’s activities. The 
processes involved can sometimes be easy and fast, for example ordering 
off-the-shelf products from a catalogue. Other times these processes are 
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complex and require long interactions for example, subcontracting parts for 
car manufacturing.  
Managing in these circumstances is a complex and difficult task. Firstly, 
it requires an understanding of the relationship nature and an accurate 
characterisation of their parameters (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999). Then, 
different configurations of those parameters can be defined to match 
specific circumstances. Finally, all these elements may help the 
organisation to choose the nature of its relationships and to decide their 
management. 
A review of the literature on B2B relationships shows that published 
articles study different sets of relationship’s characteristics and their 
interactions. Those characteristics can be gathered and classified under five 
main categories: links, communication, power, atmosphere and dynamics; 
as illustrated in Table 2-1. 
 Table 2-1: B2B main relationships characteristics Chapter Tw
o 






(Anderson and Narus, 1990; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Ford, Gadde et 
al., 1999; Ford and McDowell, 1999; Jap and Ganesan, 2000) 
Tied resources Sharing, Adaptation and Specialisation 
(Hallen, Johanson et al., 1991; Dyer, 1996; Ford, Gadde et al., 1999; Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000) Links 
Bonded actors Trust and Commitment 
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Mayer, Davis et al., 1995; Doney and Cannon, 
1997; Harrison, Dibben et al., 1997; Geyskens, Steenkamp et al., 1998; 
Selnes, 1998; Ford, Gadde et al., 1999; Harris and Dibben, 1999; Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000; Johnsen, Angeli Arab et al., 2003; Stanko, Bonner et al., 
2006) 
strategy Frequency, Direction, Modality and Content 
intimacy Degree and Information nature Communication
Quality Accuracy, Timeliness, Adequacy and Credibility
(Frazier, Spekman et al., 1988; Mohr and Nevin, 1990; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Lamming, Caldwell et al., 2001; Johnston and Clark, 
2005; Robson, Spyropoulou et al., 2006; Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006) 
Intensity Dependence, Power and Influence Power 
Balance Symmetry , asymmetry 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990; Mohr and Nevin, 1990; Hallen, Johanson et 
al., 1991; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Johnsen and Ford, 2001; Cox, Watson 
et al., 2003) 
Atmosphere  Satisfaction, Insecurity and Conflict 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Chew and Lim, 
1995; Attridge, Berscheid et al., 1998; Lin and Germain, 1998; Murray, 
Ellsworth et al., 1998; Selnes, 1998; Fey and Beamish, 1999; Fey and 
Beamish, 2000; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Robson, Spyropoulou et al., 
2006; White Iii, Joplin et al., 2007) 
Relationship 
dynamics Phases 
Building, Stability and 
Dissolution 
(Dwyer, Schurr et al., 1987; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Jap and 
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2.1.1 Links 
The IMP group has greatly contributed to the understanding of the links 
between organisations. They conceive an organisation as being part of a 
complex network (interconnected relationships) of customers and suppliers. 
In these circumstances, management requires an understanding of the 
nature of relationships and networks, and of what happen in them, and how 
they can be influenced and changed (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999). The IMP 
group identifies three different types of links: in activities, in resources and 
in actors.  
2.1.1.1 Links in Activities 
Ford (1999) explains that relationships link the activities of suppliers 
and customers to each other. They provide a degree of activity coordination 
between the companies, thus giving the chance to rationalise some of the 
operations that are important for their success, but are beyond their own 
boundaries and within their customers and suppliers. Activity links are the 
basis of ideas such as just in time and total quality management. 
Therefore links in activities develop coordination and co-operation, 
defined as sets of complementary actions taken by organisations to achieve 
mutual outcomes. Anderson (1990) and Mohr (1994) have shown the 
beneficial effects on satisfaction, trust and sales.  
They also develop participation, the extent to which partners jointly 
engage in planning and goal-setting. Mohr (2000) studied the positive 
influence of participation on sales and long-term commitment. 
On the other hand, Jap (2000) has shown that using explicit contracts to 
link two organisations together does not yield beneficial results, except 
during the decline phase of a relationship. It may even be detrimental at an 
early stage, on the supplier commitment, as it may be interpreted as a signal 
of distrust. 
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2.1.1.2 Tied Resources 
The main resource constituents of a organisation are its physical assets 
(machinery, tools), human resources (willing employees), knowledge or 
skills (patents, procedures, know-how), and location (proximity of suppliers 
or buyers) (Dyer, 1996). By their nature, resources in an organisation are 
fixed and cannot be modified in the short term. Nevertheless organisations 
can extend their resources by sharing the resources of other organisations 
through a relationship (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999). In such a process, these 
resources are likely to be oriented towards a specific use. 
This adaptation to the partner’s needs is to be expected in an exchange 
relationship. Both protagonists may adapt product, processes and 
procedures to the capabilities of their partner. The adaptations are partly 
made unilaterally as a consequence of imbalance in the inter-organisation 
power relation, and partly as reciprocal demonstrations of commitment and 
trust in the relationship (Hallen, Johanson et al., 1991). 
A further step to strengthening the relationship consists of transaction 
specific investments (TSI). For example, a specialisation in physical assets, 
(e.g. customised machinery, tools) allows for product differentiation and 
may improve quality by increasing product integrity and reducing defects 
(Dyer, 1996). Moreover Jap (2000) has shown that TSI are powerful signals 
of long-term commitment intentions.  
In conclusion, all these authors agree that the investments made in inter-
organisation resources sharing, adaptations, and specialisation, work to tie 
the organisations together as these investments often cannot be transferred 
to other business relationships. In doing so, they send a strong signal of 
long-term commitment. These investments become elements in a trust-
forming social exchange process. 
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2.1.1.3 Bonded Actors 
A relationship implies important interactions between the actors of both 
organisations. The individual actors will learn about each other; they will 
invest in their relationship; and social exchange between them will increase 
their knowledge of each other and build up a certain trust (Ford, Gadde et 
al., 1999). Trust is probably the most studied characteristic in B2B literature 
(Mayer, Davis et al., 1995; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Harrison, Dibben et 
al., 1997; Geyskens, Steenkamp et al., 1998; Selnes, 1998; Harris and 
Dibben, 1999; Johnsen, Angeli Arab et al., 2003). Mayer (1995, p.712) 
defines trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party”. 
For example, the work realised by Doney (1997, p.37) summarises well 
the trust-building processes:  
• Calculative trust: “Trustor calculates the costs and/or rewards of a 
target acting in an untrustworthy manner”. 
• Predictive trust: “Trustor develops confidence that target’s behaviour 
can be predicted”. 
• Capability: “Trustor assesses the target’s ability to fulfil its promises”. 
• Intentionality: “Trustor evaluates the target’s motivations”. 
• Transference: “Trustor draws on proof sources, from which trust is 
transferred to the target”. 
Trust is important in a relationship, as it reduces the perceived risk more 
efficiently than other available mechanisms (Selnes, 1998). If the level of 
trust surpasses the threshold of perceived risk, then the trustor will agree to 
take risks and engage in the relationship (Mayer, Davis et al., 1995). 
Another important characteristic that develops through the interactions 
is commitment. Commitment refers to the efforts and short term sacrifices 
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the actors are willing to provide, in order to develop and maintain a stable 
and long term relationship (Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Jap and Ganesan, 
2000; Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006).  Commitment indicates that the actors 
will strive to make the relationship work, resulting in relationship 
satisfaction (Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Selnes, 1998; Jap and Ganesan, 
2000). Moreover, the long term orientation implied in commitment 
encourages the participants to create efficient interaction procedures (for 
example ordering, purchasing, delivery or servicing processes), that reduces 
costs and increases revenues (Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006). 
Other characteristics that can be found in the literature include: 
solidarity, emotional intensity (Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006), and 
benevolence (Mayer, Davis et al., 1995). But they are mainly forerunners of 
both trust and commitment. 
2.1.2 Communication 
The links and ties that bring the organisations and the people together 
have been explained. The next step is to make explicit the communication 
processes that allow them to exchange information, coordinate activities, or 
make common decisions. Inter-partner communication is crucial to 
achieving satisfactory performance (Robson, Spyropoulou et al., 2006). 
2.1.2.1 Communication Strategy 
Mohr (1990) theorises that optimum communication strategies are 
dependent on the nature of links between the organisations, and their 
balance of power. These strategies are differentiated by their degree of 
frequency, direction (unidirectional / bidirectional), modality (formal / 
informal), and content (direct / indirect). Mohr further describes two 
extremes: collaborative communication strategy (high frequency, 
bidirectional, informal mode and indirect content) and autonomous 
communication strategy (low frequency, unidirectional, formal mode, and 
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direct content). An embraced relationship favours and obtains enhanced 
results with a collaborative communication strategy; whereas an arm’s-
length relationship favours and is best matched, with an autonomous 
communication strategy given costs/benefits considerations. 
2.1.2.2 Intimacy 
Communication strategies accurately define how information flows 
from one organisation to another, but do not provide insights into the nature 
of the information flow. Examples of information that may be shared by 
partners are plans, strategies, profits, or cost, but these data differ from one 
organisation to the next, and are not the object of this discussion. However, 
the extent to which this information is shared is dependent on the nature of 
the relationship between organisations. It is referred to in the literature as 
intimacy (Johnston and Clark, 2005; Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006) or 
transparency (Lamming, Caldwell et al., 2001). There is a difference 
between the definitions generally associated with these two concepts, but it 
is a difference in communication strategy. Intimacy is preferably associated 
with a collaborative communication strategy, and transparency is preferably 
associated with an autonomous strategy. 
Intimacy does not imply a permanent and total (transparent) sharing of 
information. Rather, some is only partially exposed (translucent) and some 
is kept opaque, as described by Lamming (2001). Each organisation has to 
determine, as a function of its particular circumstances, an adequate degree 
of intimacy applied to each of its relationships. One must not forget that the 
idea behind intimacy is to provide to the partner the information necessary 
to increase creativity, joint problem solving, opportunity identification, and 
efficiency (Stanko, Bonner et al., 2006).  In these circumstances, 
information about supply, technology, inter-organisation and cost 
(Lamming, Caldwell et al., 2001) are valuable. Indeed, information on 
logistics and supplies may enable delivery of the exact quantity of materials 
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and parts on a precise timetable, thereby reducing warehousing and 
inventory costs. The transfer of technological and managerial skills between 
the organisations serves to exploit synergies and leverage distinct 
competencies in each partner (Frazier, Spekman et al., 1988).  
The knowledge of who-does-what and who-knows-what in each 
organisation allows the parts/material to be designed in a creative, joint 
effort between both organisations. And finally, cost should be reconsidered 
as “total cost of ownership”. The per-unit price is less important than the 
costs associated with inspection and re-inspection, handling, warehousing, 
inventory, scrap, and rework (Frazier, Spekman et al., 1988). Therefore, 
pushed to its extreme, intimacy becomes Just-In-Time (JIT) exchange 
relationships, whose objective is to eliminate waste of all kinds from the 
production and delivery systems. 
2.1.2.3 Quality 
When the strategy and the level of intimacy have been decided, it is 
important to determine how well they are applied. Communication quality 
defines the parameters to monitor. Quality includes such aspects as the 
accuracy, timeliness, adequacy and credibility of information exchanged 
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
2.1.3 Power 
The balance of power in a relationship between two organisations is 
determined by the dependence and influence of each organisation.  
2.1.3.1 Dependence 
Anderson (1990) conceptualised dependence on the working 
partnership as the overall quality of outcomes (economic, social, and 
technical) available to the organisation, compared to the one achievable 
from alternative relationships. In working business relationships, an 
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organisation adapts to a partner to the degree that it is dependent on that 
partner (Hallen, Johanson et al., 1991). The organisation with greater 
relative dependence has, by definition, relatively greater interest in 
sustaining the relationship, and one way to do so is to be more receptive to 
requests and amenable to changes suggested by its partner organisation 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990).  
2.1.3.2 Influence 
Influence is the capacity to induce desired actions by the partner 
organisation. The organisation with lesser relative dependence can use its 
superior position to request changes of its partner that it believes will either 
mutually increase the outcomes of both partners, or singly increase its own 
outcomes from the relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1990). 
2.1.3.3 Balance of Power 
Rather than independently evaluating the absolute dependence and 
influence of each organisation, it is contested that the relative balance 
between both partners is of greater interest. It is generally referred to in the 
literature as symmetry or asymmetry (Johnsen and Ford, 2001; Cox, 
Watson et al., 2003). 
This balance considerably impacts the closeness of the relationship. 
Indeed Johnsen (2001) argued that neither asymmetrical customer-
dominated relationships nor supplier-dominated relationships fits with the 
concept of compatible, collaborative relationships. The weaker partner is 
obliged to make adaptations and investments geared towards the benefit of 
the stronger one. One-sided investments (Jap and Ganesan, 2000) provide 
little incentive for the dominant partner to be committed to the relationship 
in the long run. This is negatively perceived by the weaker partner and 
undermines the relationship. Mohr (1990) has also shown that in 
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circumstances of asymmetry, communication assumes an autonomous 
strategy pattern, reducing the effectiveness of the relationship. 
 Moreover for Cox (2003) the power structure determines how the 
surplus value will be shared in the relationship. The surplus value is the 
extra-profit made, compared to the reasonable profit margin expected from 
any business. The dominant partner will obtain all the surplus value. Only 
in circumstances of interdependence (symmetry) – that is, where both 
organisations are highly reliant on one another – will the surplus value be 
shared, as the two organisations are able to negotiate from a position of 
relative strength. 
2.1.4 Relationship Atmosphere 
2.1.4.1 Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is achieved when expectations are fulfilled (Selnes, 1998). 
In this case, this would mean that an organisation is satisfied with its 
relationship with its partner when its expectations in terms of relationship 
characteristics (links in activities, tied resources, bonded actors, 
communication and balance of power) are fulfilled. For example, Mohr 
(1994) has shown that as communication quality, and participation increase, 
satisfaction with the partner increases. Demonstrating commitment also 
increases satisfaction of the partner (Selnes, 1998; Jap and Ganesan, 2000). 
Satisfaction is therefore an important indicator of the relationship health, 
as satisfied partners are more trusting (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) and more 
motivated to continue the relationship and enhance its scope (Selnes, 1998). 
2.1.4.2 Insecurity 
Robson (2006) defines relationship insecurity as an organisation's 
concerns about the continuance of the alliance. Insecurity is negatively 
correlated with relationship commitment, satisfaction, trust, communication 
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quality and favours conflicts (Attridge, Berscheid et al., 1998; Robson, 
Spyropoulou et al., 2006). 
 Insecurity is naturally associated with dependency. Without 
dependence there is no reason to worry about the loss of a relationship; and 
in a situation of dependency, the dual perceptions that the relationship 
satisfies many important needs, and that few alternative means of 
satisfaction are available, might raise security concerns (Attridge, Berscheid 
et al., 1998). Nevertheless, dependence is necessary but not sufficient to 
generate insecurity. In some circumstances, an organisation can be highly 
dependent without feeling any insecurity. For example, this occurs when 
the dependence is mutual. The trigger is trust. When one individual has 
doubts about his/her partner; for example, when the dependence is not a 
mutual factor (asymmetry), or due to low self-esteem (Murray, Ellsworth et 
al., 1998), then dependence generates proportional insecurity. In contrast, in 
established relationships (married couple or joint ventures) where trust is 
high, at least due to calculative trust, the more dependent a partner, the less 
concerned it is about potential abandonment (Attridge, Berscheid et al., 
1998; Robson, Spyropoulou et al., 2006). 
2.1.4.3 Conflict 
Fey’s (2000) results indicate that conflict and performance are highly 
correlated. It provides evidence for the importance of monitoring and 
attempting to minimise inter-organisation conflict to ensure superior 
performance (especially long-term success or survival). For Anderson 
(1990), conflict represents the overall level of disagreement in the working 
partnership. As such, conflict is determined by the frequency, intensity, and 
duration of disagreements. White (2007) attributes these conflicts to the 
perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the partners current 
aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. A survey of literature (Fey 
and Beamish, 2000), shows that the most commonly cited causes of conflict 
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are: (1) competition for scarce resources; (2) desire for autonomy; (3) goal 
divergence; and (4) perceptual incongruities / cultural differences.  
Therefore, Fey (1999) believes that some disagreement is inevitable in 
inter-organisation relationships. An important question then becomes, how 
is it best to manage these disagreements to avoid the generation of conflict 
and minimise their detrimental effects? Disagreement resolution is 
characterised by multiple strategies, including reliance on problem-solving, 
compromising, forcing one's position, legal strategy and avoidance (Chew 
and Lim, 1995; Lin and Germain, 1998). 
2.1.5 Relationship Dynamics 
Two key conceptual publications have been written by Dwyer (1987) 
and Ring (1994) about the development of relationships. These publications 
were recently compared and some of their propositions tested by Jap (2007). 
The consensus in these three publications is that relationships evolve 
through three main phases: building, stability, and dissolution. 
2.1.5.1 Building Phase 
The building phase is characterised by the development of congruent 
norms about each other's prerogatives and obligations, of joint expectations 
about their motivation, possible investments, work roles and sales and 
profits objectives. Communication is established for the exchange of critical 
information and the handling of issues. The other’s trustworthiness is 
assessed. In this phase, the use of explicit contracts has an undermining 
effect on commitment. Explicit contracts signal distrust and are often 
complex, which reduces flexibility and may subsequently lower relationship 
performance. 
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2.1.5.2 Stability Phase 
The stability phase is a positive, working relationship marked by trust, 
mutual dependence, bilateral idiosyncratic investments, and a willingness to 
take risks. As the relationship broadens, the level of investment becomes 
higher. 
2.1.5.3 Dissolution Phase 
The dissolution phase will occur when the organisations have lived up 
to their promises and when the deal is completed. Dissolution can also 
occur when one organisation privately evaluates his or her dissatisfactions 
with the other organisation, concluding that costs of continuation or 
modification outweigh the benefits. In the dissolution phase, the use of 
explicit contracts and relational rules is a powerful safeguard. Contracts 
carry legal penalties for opportunistic termination, and rules signal a 
willingness to manage the dissolution process constructively (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000). 
Jap’s results (2000) also show that even if some relationships can cycle 
between the phases, relationships that have gone all the way into dissolution, 
before being pulled back to build-up or stability, carry over some of the 
negativity of their dissolution phase. The scars incurred in this phase heal 
slowly and affect subsequent overall performance evaluation in the 
relationship. 
2.2 Public Procurement 
The B2B relationship’s characteristics described can not be transferred 
to public-private relationships without prior understanding of public 
procurement. A background study of public procurement is needed. This 
can be found in the literature under the heading “public procurement” and 
also more recently and in a narrower extent “Private Public Partnerships” 
(PPP).  
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This section of the review will concentrate on the Irish public 
procurement. It is very similar to other European Union (EU) countries due 
to EU treaties and their regulations, but might differ significantly from non-
EU states. For PPPs (Appendix C), most of the literature studies UK 
contracts, few examples exist for other EU states. 
At present, procurement within the Irish public sector is heavily 
decentralised, with public bodies largely purchasing independently (IT 
Business Services Unit, 2006). For public organisations, it is very important 
that the public procurement function is discharged honestly, fairly, and in a 
manner that secures best value for public money. Contracting organisations 
must be cost effective and efficient in the use of resources while upholding 
the highest standards of probity and integrity (National Public Procurement 
Policy Unit, 2009). Therefore, a double objective of probity and efficiency 
can be distinguished. Probity is defined through several principles. Legal 
requirements enforce those principles and define rules and procedures to 
standardise the procurement process. 
2.2.1 Public Procurement Principles 
Essential principles, to be observed in conducting the procurement 
function, include equal treatment, transparency, proportionality and mutual 
recognition (Enterprise Ireland, 2006). 
2.2.1.1 Equal Treatment 
The principle of Equal Treatment requires that all suppliers be treated 
equally and with the utmost fairness at every stage of a contract award 
procedure. 
2.2.1.2 Transparency 
The principle of transparency requires that information, regarding 
forthcoming contracts above certain financial threshold, is readily available 
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to all interested candidates (Section 2.2.2.3, p33: Advertising Contracts). 
This is achieved by publication of three types of notices in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities: periodic indicative notices (PIN), 
invitations to tender, and contract award notices (CAN). 
The principle of transparency also requires that candidates be informed 
of the rules that will be applied in assessing their applications for tender 
lists and the criteria to be used in the evaluation of tenders. 
The principle of transparency serves two main objectives (Bovis, 2009): 
first is to introduce a system of openness in the public purchasing of the 
Member States, so potential discrimination on grounds of nationality should 
be eliminated; secondly, transparency in public procurement represents a 
substantial component for a system of best practice for both the public and 
private sectors, a system which could introduce operational efficiencies 
within the relevant markets. 
2.2.1.3 Proportionality 
The principle of Proportionality requires that the criteria of selection for 
suppliers should be both relevant and directly related to the contract being 
awarded. In particular, they should not be excessive in order to allow 
smaller or younger organisations a chance to tender if they have the 
capacity to meet the contract. 
2.2.1.4 Mutual Recognition 
The principle of Mutual Recognition requires that all the standards, 
specifications and qualifications in use throughout the EU should receive 
equal recognition, on condition that the products or services are suitable for 
their intended purpose. 
To achieve compliance to those principles, the public procurement 
regime has been built with legal requirements and procedures to be 
followed by most public organisations. 
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2.2.2 Public Procurement Legal Requirements 
A line of demarcation, between public procurement and its private 
partner, is that public sector organisations are required to comply with 
national statutes and other regulations. These regulations describe, often in 
great detail, how public sector organisations should behave when procuring 
goods and services (Waara, 2008). 
Ireland being a member of the European Community (EC), Government 
Departments and other public bodies and utilities are responsible for 
ensuring that they observe EC treaties and their regulations. For public 
procurement the main legal obligations include (Davis, 2004): 
• EC Treaty and other international obligations, such as the WTO 
Agreement as implemented in Irish legislation or by virtue of direct 
effect 
• EC Procurement Directives as implemented by Regulations made by the 
Department of Finance in Ireland 
• Government Guidelines 
• Contract and commercial law in general 
The Directives impose legal obligations on public bodies in regard to 
advertising in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) and the 
use of objective tendering procedures for contracts above certain value 
thresholds (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2009). The thresholds 
vary depending on the type of contract and whether the contracting entity is 
a Central Government Department, a Government Agency or a Utility. 
Most government bodies have extended these rules to contract under the EU 
thresholds. Nevertheless, it should be noted that most of the bodies have 
less formal rules for very small contracts (generally under €25,000) (Davis, 
2004). 
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Following EU directives, procurement is a complex process. A flow 
diagram adapted from Procurement Innovation Group (2009a) is given in 
Figure 2-2.  
 29 
Chapter Two  5BLiterature Review 
 
Figure 2-2: Tendering process for open procedures adapted from Procurement 
Innovation Group (2009a, p.5) 
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Two main phases can be identified in the tendering process. The first 
one concerns the exact definition of product or service required in function 
of the budget available. This is an internal operation of the public 
organisations. Once the product or service is agreed internally and the 
purchase decision is reached then the tender phase is initiated. This second 
phase must follow the EU procurement directives. The legal obligations for 
each step of the process are explained in the following points. 
2.2.2.1 Tendering Procedure Selection 
The first step is the selection of the tendering procedure. The 2004 EU 
public sector Directives (The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2004) permit four tendering procedures in awarding 
contracts for supplies, works and services. The choice of one procedure 
over the others depends on the immediate circumstances, the existing 
markets, or the public organisations own in-house routines. In all cases, at 
least three candidates should submit tenders to ensure compliance with the 
principles of transparency and equality of treatment. Negotiations with 
suppliers are generally not allowed between the tenderers and the public 
organisation. The procedures are known as the "open procedure", any 
organisation can submit a tender; "restricted procedure", only selected 
organisations can submit a tender; “competitive dialogue” allow some 
dialogue with organisations to define the tender’s specifications and 
"negotiated procedure", exceptional procedure that allows negotiations  
(Davis, 2004; Enterprise Ireland, 2006; National Public Procurement Policy 
Unit, 2009). Details of the procedures are given in Appendix B (p165). 
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2.2.2.2 Design the Tender 
The tender pack will include specifications, terms and conditions, 
selection criteria and award criteria (National Public Procurement Policy 
Unit, 2009). 
The specification should focus on the function of the product or service 
required. It builds the specification around a description of what is to be 
achieved rather than a fixed description of exactly how it should be done. 
For a restricted or a negotiated procedure, the selection criteria have to 
be chosen. Candidate selection criteria fall into three main categories 
(Enterprise Ireland, 2006): 
• Exclusion criteria (Bankruptcy, being convicted for an offence 
concerning professional misconduct, non-payment of social security 
contributions or taxes, misrepresentation in supplying information) 
• Financial and Economic Information (Audited accounts, overall 
turnover for the previous 3 financial years, turnover related to the 
products or services being purchased over the same period, for services 
contracts evidence of risk indemnity insurance) 
• Technical Capacity (product sample, product description, educational 
and professional qualifications, quality control, tools, equipment…) 
For contract awards, there are two alternatives. A contract may be 
awarded either to the lowest tender, or to the tender that is judged to be the 
economically most advantageous on the basis of multiple criteria (scoring-
based competitive tendering)(The European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union, 2004). The multiple criteria may include in addition to 
price, various other criteria including running costs, servicing costs, level of 
after sales service, technical assistance, technical merit, environmental 
characteristics and delivery date. The terms of the selected criteria chosen 
for the contract in question should be laid out in descending order of 
importance (Davis, 2004). It is increasingly rare for a contract to be 
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specified in terms of the lowest price (Enterprise Ireland, 2006).  The 
criteria for contract award should always be stated in advance of tendering. 
They should be included in the advertisement or in the tender documents 
supplied to the tenderers (The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2004). 
2.2.2.3 Advertising Contracts 
Depending on the value of the contract, the tender will be notified 
directly to suppliers, or through notices published in Ireland on the E-
tenders website or in the press. For contracts above EU thresholds, public 
bodies are required to advertise their contracts by publishing notices in the 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) (The European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union, 2004).  
For non-EU contracts, public bodies must advertise in the local media 
or use in-house tender lists. 
2.2.2.4 Candidate Selection Criteria 
As described in (Enterprise Ireland, 2006), in restricted or a negotiated 
procedure, the selection criteria determine the candidate’s ability to fulfil 
the requirements of a specific contract. As such candidates will be 
requested to complete a questionnaire or provide the information listed in 
the tender advertisement. This information will then be used to determine 
which suppliers will be invited to tender or negotiate. 
The criteria used are usually very similar and so it is possible to prepare 
standard responses to these requests. 
2.2.2.5 Evaluation of Tender 
Tenders are normally evaluated in two stages and quite often by two 
separate groups within the purchasing organisation. Firstly, a technical 
stage to ensure the product or service will meet the specification and 
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performance requirements. The second stage is the commercial evaluation. 
If a product or service is not technically acceptable, then the tender will be 
rejected and not evaluated commercially (Enterprise Ireland, 2006). 
The evaluation and award process must be demonstrably objective and 
transparent and based solely on the published criteria (National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit, 2009): 
• Where price is the sole criterion, the contract will be awarded to the 
lowest priced bid complying with the specified requirements. 
• Where ‘most economically advantageous tender’ is the basis, the 
contract must be awarded to the tender which best meets the relevant 
criteria. In this case, transparency and objectivity are best demonstrated 
by the use of a scoring system or marking sheet based on the relevant 
weighted criteria, indicating a comparative assessment of tenders under 
each criterion. 
2.2.2.6 Award of Contract 
Once the evaluation has been completed, the successful tenderer will 
normally receive an official purchase order or other formal notification of 
the purchasing organisation’s intention to award a contract (Enterprise 
Ireland, 2006). 
Unsuccessful tenderers for any public contract should be informed of 
the results of the tendering process without delay. A contract is not 
immediately formally awarded in order to allow an unsuccessful tenderer to 
seek a review of the decision if s/he feels that the process has been unfair or 
unlawful (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
2004). 
After the award of a contract certain information must be disclosed (The 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2004): 
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• Any eliminated candidate or tenderer who requests it must be informed 
promptly (within 15 days) of the reasons for rejection and of the 
characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tenderer as well 
as the name of the successful tenderer. 
• Certain information on the contract awarded, including the name of the 
successful contractor(s) and the price, or range of prices, paid, must be 
submitted for publication in the EU Journal not more than 48 calendar 
days after the award. 
2.2.2.7 Contract Management 
Time and resources need to be allocated to managing the contract. It is 
therefore essential to have a robust contract management regime planned as 
early as possible in the procurement process, so that both organisations 
understand their respective obligations (Procurement Innovation Group, 
2009a). 
Managing contract delivery involves monitoring and evaluation – the 
results of which can be used to draw lessons for future public procurement 
procedures, contracts, projects, and policies (Procurement Innovation 
Group, 2009a). 
2.3 Organisational Buying Behaviour 
“Organisational (i.e. industrial and institutional) buying takes place 
within the context of a formal organisation. Many people are usually 
involved in the decision making process and it is influenced by budget, cost, 
and profit considerations. It results in complex interactions among people 
and sometimes generates frictions between individual and organisational 
goals. The organisation itself is influenced by a variety of forces in the 
environment” (Webster Jr and Wind, 1972, p.12). 
It appears from Webster quotation that organisational buying behaviour 
is determined by four classes of variables: environmental (forces in the 
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environment), organisational (formal, budget, cost and profit), social 
(interactions, frictions) and individual (people, goals). The environment 
influences the organisation; the organisation influences the buying centre; 
interactions among buying centre personal influence each individual. The 
buying decision is the result of all these influences and interactions. This 







Figure 2-3: Model of organisational buying behaviour adapted from (Webster Jr 
and Wind, 1972, p.15) 
This study focalises on the buying centre as the object of study. 
Therefore, it will not consider the individual and social influences on the 
buying decision. Alternatively, it concentrates on the organisational and 
environmental influences (Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4: Simplified Model of organisational buying behaviour adapted from 
(Webster Jr and Wind, 1972, p.15) 
Therefore, in order to understand the buying decision and the buying 
centre behaviours, the characteristics of an organisation structure must be 
defined, the contingency variables affecting the organisation exposed and 
the resulting structural configurations need to be explained. 
2.3.1 Characterisation of an Organisation Structure 
Even if a small number of untypical characterisation systems exist 
(Johnston and Bonoma, 1981; Cavinato, 1992), there is a growing 
consensus among organisation theorists and organisational buying 
behaviour researchers that centralisation, formalisation and coordinating 
mechanisms constitute the major dimensions of organisational structure. As 
shown in Appendix D.1, these three parameters are not totally independent. 
2.3.1.1 Centralisation 
When the notion of centralisation is applied to buying centres, it refers 
to buying centres where, regardless of the number of people involved, only 
a few participants hold meaningful influence over the purchase decision 
process (Lewin and Donthu, 2005). 
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The decision process can be depicted (Patterson, 1969) as a number of 
steps, as shown in Figure 2-5 (p38): (1) collecting information to pass on to 
the decision maker, without comment, about what can be done; (2) 
processing that information to present advice to the decision maker about 
what should be done; (3) making the choice – that is, determining what is 
intended to be done; (4) giving the authorisation and (5) doing it – that is, 
executing what is, in fact, done. 
 
Figure 2-5: A continuum of control over the decision process (Patterson, 1969, 
p.150) 
From this framework, two types of decentralisation can be described. 
• Vertical decentralisation (Mintzberg, 1983), also named vertical 
involvement (Lewin and Donthu, 2005): the making of choice is 
dispersed between several people. The decision-making power is 
delegated down the chain of authority, from the top management into 
the middle management. The focus here is on formal power – to make 
choice and authorise them – as opposed to the informal power that arises 
from advising and executing. Several levels of management are 
involved in a particular purchase decision. 
• Horizontal decentralisation (Mintzberg, 1983) also named lateral 
involvement (Lewin and Donthu, 2005): the informal power 
(information, advice and execution) flows to non-managers (analysts, 
support specialists, and operators) outside the direct hierarchy. Several 
departments or other work-related groups are represented in the buying 
centre or are involved in some way in the purchase decision. 
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Centralisation of the supply function allows leveraging of corporate 
purchases across divisions (economies of scale) (Corey, 1978) and 
facilitates standardisation of products and business processes (Pfohl and 
Zollner, 1987). It also favours cost reductions created through opportunities 
to allocate resources efficiently, greater buying specialisation (Corey, 1978), 
coordination of policies and systems and consolidation of requirements 
(Johnson and Leenders, 2006).  
Meanwhile, decentralisation provides the benefits of improved service 
and lower costs by pushing decision making responsibility closer to the end 
user. It promotes closer working relationships between suppliers and end 
users and provides increased opportunities for end users to manage total 
cost of ownership factors (Johnson and Leenders, 2004). It also allows the 
integration of purchase inflows with production schedules (Corey, 1978). 
2.3.1.2 Formalisation and Standardisation 
A second parameter of organisational design is the formalisation, or 
standardisation, of behaviour. Formalisation refers to the degree to which 
the goals, rules, policies and procedures of the organisation’s activities are 
precisely and explicitly formulated and required to be adhered to (Chow, 
Henriksson et al., 1995; Lau, Goh et al., 1999). This parameter represents 
the organisation’s way of standardizing the work processes of its members. 
Behaviour may be formalised in three basic ways (Mintzberg, 1983): 
• By the position, specifications being attached to the job itself, as in a job 
description; 
• By the work flow, specifications being attached to the work; and 
• By rules, specifications being issues in general, as in various regulations 
– everything from dress to use of forms – contained in so-called policy 
manuals. 
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Organisations formalise behaviour to reduce its variability, ultimately to 
predict and control it. The advantages of behaviour formalisation are 
(Mintzberg, 1983): 
• Coordination of activities: everybody knows what to expect from the 
other; 
• Efficient production: formalisation is used to impose the most efficient 
procedures on the tasks; and 
• Fairness to clients 
Through formalisation, a worker’s behaviour is regulated and the power 
over how the work is to be done passes to the person who designs the 
specifications, often an analyst. As a result, the worker merely does the 
work without any thoughts as to how or why (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Formalisation of the buying centre refers to the emphasis placed on the 
use of formal rules and procedures by buying centre participants during the 
purchase process. In more formalised buying centres little, if any, flexibility 
is expected beyond what is set forth by policy within the customer 
organisation (Lewin and Donthu, 2005). 
From the extent that the behaviour is predetermined or predictable, in 
effect standardised, two extreme structures emerge from a continuum of 
standardisation. A mechanistic structure, also named bureaucratic after the 
work of Max Weber, and an organic structure. The bureaucratic structure 
emphasises standardisation (whether or not centralised). While on the other 
hand, an organic structure is characterised by the absence of standardisation 
and the flexible working arrangement (Mintzberg, 1983). 
2.3.1.3 Coordinating Mechanisms 
Five coordinating mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1983) explain the 
fundamental ways in which organisations coordinate their work: mutual 
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adjustment, direct supervision, standardisation of work processes, 
standardisation of work outputs, and standardisation of worker skills. 
• Mutual adjustment achieves the coordination of work by the simple 
process of informal communication. Operators communicate directly to 
one another. 
• Direct supervision achieves coordination by having one person take 
responsibility for the work of others, issuing instructions to them and 
monitoring their actions. The manager tells the operator what they must 
do. 
• Work processes are standardised when the contents of the work are 
specified, or programmed. Operators follow procedures, or work on pre-
defined tasks (assembly lines). 
• Outputs are standardised when the results of the work – for example, the 
dimensions of the product or the performance – are specified. Products 
or services are delivered to specifications and so can be used directly by 
other operators. 
• Skills (and knowledge) are standardised when the kind of training 
required to perform the work is specified. Thanks to their training, all 
operators behave and act as expected of them. 
2.3.1.4 Corporate Coherence and Application to Individual Positions 
Corporate coherence is related to the extent to which the different parts 
of the corporation operate and are managed as one entity. Major differences 
across business units in management style, vision, strategy, culture, and 
structure reflect a low corporate coherence (Rozemeijer, Weele et al., 2003).  
The coherency principle proposes that all the departments of an 
organisation, as subsystems, should reflect the overall organisation 
configuration and strategy. For example, the levels of centralisation should 
be approximately equivalent in the parent system and in the buying centre 
(Wood, 2005). A centralised purchasing function with a central purchasing 
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department does not match with an organisation with a decentralised 
organisation philosophy. Processes should be in line and goals should be 
congruent (Kamann, 2007). 
Organisations following the coherency principle gain in integration of 
their departments. Integration is the degree to which coordination, between 
the various tasks and activities, is achieved across the organisation’s 
departments. Integration is not a property, but rather a product or an 
outcome of the organisation’s structure. It is desired as a means to achieve 
enhanced performance (Chow, Henriksson et al., 1995) through higher 
efficiency in the exchanges between departments. 
In order to achieve integration of the departments, organisations define 
individual positions to reflect the centralisation, formalisation and 
coordinating mechanisms of the whole organisation structure. These design 
parameters are translated into job specialisation, formalisation of behaviour, 
and training and indoctrination (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Job specialisation, as centralisation, can be divided between horizontal 
and vertical specialisation. Horizontal specialisation limits the job’s scope, 
the variety of tasks contained in the job function. Vertical specialisation 
limits the control over the tasks. 
Formalisation of behaviour proscribes the discretion of individual, 
essentially by standardising their work process. 
Training refers to the process by which job-related skills and knowledge 
are taught, whereas indoctrination is the process by which organisational 
norms are acquired (Mintzberg, 1983). 
2.3.2 Contingency Theory and Contingency Variables 
Structural contingency theory has dominated research in the strategy-
structure-performance paradigm within the organisational sciences (Chow, 
Henriksson et al., 1995). The contingency hypothesis postulates that 
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effective organisations shape their design parameters in accordance with the 
characteristics of their environment (Kamann, 2007). Good performance is 
"contingent" on congruence between structural properties and contingency 
variables (Chow, Henriksson et al., 1995), the better the match the higher 
the performance (Miller, 1982). As well as compatibility with their 
situational factors, effective organisations achieve an internal consistency 
among their design parameters, or in other words, a complementary 
alignment among the internal structural elements – in effect, configuration 
(Mintzberg, 1983; Rozemeijer, Weele et al., 2003). Structural elements are 
interdependent and must be matched appropriately to maximise 
organisational performance. Most combinations should not and do not 
occur because they will hurt performance (Miller, 1982). 
The application of contingency theory to the relationship between 
structure and performance requires identification of factors which may help 
explain why certain structures generate better performance outcomes in 
some situations than others. Good performance is "contingent" on 
congruence between structural properties, organisation’s age and size, 
technology, and the external environment (Chow, Henriksson et al., 1995). 
These factors interacting with the organisation structure are named 
contingency variables. 
2.3.2.1 Organisation’s Age and Size 
Buying centre size refers to the number of people actively involved in a 
purchase situation across the various stages of the decision process (Lewin 
and Donthu, 2005). Organisations that differ widely in terms of size also 
tend to differ in terms of scope, complexity and available resources. 
Medium-size and larger organisations rely on features that support 
coordination and integration across the supply chain (Trent, 2004). The 
older and the larger the organisation, the more formalised its behaviour 
(Mintzberg, 1983). 
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2.3.2.2 Technical System 
Simple technical systems that can be broken down into simple, 
specialised tasks, favours the formalisation of the operating work and the 
bureaucratisation of the operating core structure (Mintzberg, 1983). 
The more sophisticated (difficult to understand) the technical system, 
the more elaborate the non-operating structure – specifically, the larger and 
more professional the support staff, the greater the selective decentralisation 
(to that staff), and the greater the use of liaison devices (to coordinate the 
work of that staff) (Mintzberg, 1983). 
2.3.2.3 Environment Predictability 
Predictability refers to the ability of the decision-maker to predict the 
behaviour and expectations of competitors, suppliers (including logistics 
suppliers) and customers (Chow, Henriksson et al., 1995). Lack of 
information, inability to predict outcomes, and inability to predict 
environmental factors will affect success or failure (McCabe, 1987). An 
unpredictable environment results in uncertainty regarding the information 
available to make the best decision and/or the ultimate positive (negative) 
outcome of a decision (Lewin and Donthu, 2005). It can lead to a lack of 
confidence in framing specific rules and procedures which guide buying 
decisions (Lau, Goh et al., 1999). 
By adapting its structural configuration to match the level of uncertainty 
in its environment, a organisation can facilitate the gathering and processing 
of information crucial to its decision making; thereby reducing uncertainty 
to a manageable level (Spekman and Stern, 1979). Faced with uncertainty 
and unpredictability in supplies, or customer demand, the organisation 
cannot rely on standardisation for coordination. It must use a more flexible, 
less formal coordinating mechanism instead – direct supervision or mutual 
adjustment (Mintzberg, 1983) – to permit the free flow of generally novel 
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and non-routine information regarding the environment (Spekman and 
Stern, 1979). In other words, it must have an organic structure. Thus the 
more unpredictable the environment, the more organic the structure 
(Mintzberg, 1983). Static and simple environments do not require 
continuous gathering and processing of such information. Therefore, static 
and simple environments result in more rigid and bureaucratic department 
structures (Spekman and Stern, 1979). 
2.3.2.4 Environment Complexity 
Complexity can refer to the technical complexity of the product and/or 
the complexity of the buying decision or task under consideration (Lewin 
and Donthu, 2005). In a simple environment, one person can comprehend 
the whole situation. This person can make all the key decisions by 
him/herself. In other words, he/she will centralise and avoid the difficulties 
of coordinating with other managers. This however is not feasible in a 
complex environment. One person alone cannot cope with the amount of 
information needed to make all of the decisions. He/she becomes 
overloaded (Mintzberg, 1983). Groups of specialists must be differentiated 
based on the nature of tasks performed. This brings Lau (1999) to define 
complexity as the degree to which procurement activities are conducted by 
specialised departments, committees, and skilled personnel, p576. And 
Mintzberg (1983) to conclude, the more complex the environment, the more 
decentralised the structure.  
2.3.2.5 Market Diversity 
The markets of an organisation can range from an integrated to 
diversified one. Market diversity may result from a broad range of clients, 
products and services, or geographical areas in which the outputs are 
marketed. If the organisation can identify distinctly different markets, it will 
be predisposed to split itself into market based units. Diversification breeds 
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divisionalisation. However, this is possible only if there is no common 
technical system or critical function that cannot be segmented (Mintzberg, 
1983). 
2.3.2.6 Environment Hostility 
An organisation’s environment can range from munificent to hostile. 
Hostility is influenced by competition, by the organisation’s relations with 
unions, government, and other outside groups, and by the availability of 
resources to it. Hostility affects structure especially through the speed of 
necessary response. Since it must respond quickly and in an integrated 
fashion, it turns to its leader to make and coordinate all the decisions (direct 
supervision). It drives the organisation to centralise its structure temporarily 
(Mintzberg, 1983). 
Another form of hostility can be found in Lewin’s (2001) research of 
organisational downsizing. He studied the threat effect of organisational 
downsizing on buying behaviour. Like Mintzberg (1983), he concluded that 
threats lead temporarily to mechanistic structures throughout the 
organisation, as managers seek to consolidate their control until the threat 
abates. 
2.3.2.7 External Control 
The two most effective means to control an organisation from the 
outside are (1) to hold its most powerful decision maker – its chief 
executive officer – responsible for its actions, and (2) to impose on it 
clearly defined standards by means of rules and regulations (Mintzberg, 
1983). The first centralises the structure; the second formalises it.  
The loss of autonomy means not only the surrender of power to the 
external controller but also significant changes within the structure of the 
organisation itself, no matter what its intrinsic needs. The greater the 
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external control of the organisation, the more centralised and formalised its 
structure (Mintzberg, 1983). 
2.3.3 Structural Configurations 
All the structural elements described – centralisation, formalisation, 
coordinating mechanisms and contingency variables – seem to fall in 
natural clusters, or configurations. If these elements are classified (Table 
2-2) in relation to the complexity and predictability of the environment, 
what emerge are two kinds of bureaucratic structures and two kinds of 
organic structures. In each case, there is a centralised structure for simple 
environments and a decentralised one for complex environments. Mintzberg 
(1983) named these structures professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, 
machine bureaucracy and the simple structure (Appendix D.2). He also 
introduced a divisionalised form that takes market diversity into 
consideration. But each division of the organisation adopts one of the four 
other structures. 
Table 2-2: Organisation structure configurations in specific kinds of environments 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p.144) 
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In contrast to this traditional contingency model, support is found for an 
opposing view of the relation between environmental uncertainty and 
buying group structure: “high levels of uncertainty lead to a constriction of 
decision-making authority (i.e., decisions are made at higher levels of the 
organisation by a smaller number of organisational members) and an 
increase in rule-governed behaviour as decision units act to minimise the 
errors often associated with decision making in uncertain situations”, 
(McCabe, 1987, p.89). In other words, uncertainty favours centralisation 
and formalisation. But the difference originates from the point of view 
taken by the researchers. Contingency theorists, in the context of buying 
decision units, generally study the short term decisions affecting the buying 
tasks of the buying centre. On the other hand, support for the view in favour 
of the constriction of authority has been rooted in long term decisions 
affecting the buying strategy. In other words, in an unpredictable 
environment, product differentiation strategies or long term investment 
decisions are centralised at higher levels of the organisation but the 
fluctuations in daily activities are handled by the staff initiatives. 
2.4 Synthesis of Literature Review 
2.4.1 Relationship Configurations 
The various parameters characterising a relationship have been studied. All 
these parameters set up too many variables to be easily handled in a 
research. They have to be aggregated to allow some practical use. The 
following aggregate will be defined and used: closeness, communication 
strategy and power balance configurations. 
2.4.1.1 Closeness 
For the purpose of discussion, an aggregate that include links in activities, 
resources and actors is defined and named closeness. On one extreme, there 
is an arm’s-length relationship: characterised by a low level of cooperation, 
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participation, sharing, adaptation, specialisation, trust and commitment. At 
the other extreme, there is an embraced relationship, characterised by high 
level of co-operation, participation, sharing, adaptation, specialisation, trust 
and commitment. 
2.4.1.2 Communication Strategy 
The aggregate defined by Mohr (1990), communication strategy (2.1.2), 
will be employed to characterise communication. 
2.4.1.3 Power Balance Configurations 
It may be interesting to deduce from the power category review (Section 
2.1.3), all the possible configurations for the balance of power. This can 
easily be achieved with a table (Table 2-3) mapping the dependence (or 
influence) of both partners. 











+ + Balanced Dependent 
 
In Table 2-3, the minus (-) symbol means that the partner is not 
dependent on the relationship. The plus (+) symbol means that the partner is 
dependent on the relationship. As can be seen, four combinations exist, two 
balanced and two unbalanced. Nevertheless, the two unbalanced 
configurations are identical in terms of relationship characteristic. Which 
one of the partners is dependent does not really mater. So, only three 
different configurations exist. In this study they will be named: unbalanced, 
balanced dependent and balanced independent. 
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• Unbalanced configuration: One of the partners is dependent on the 
relationship and is susceptible to be influenced by the dominant partner. 
The dominant partner appears in a favourable position to acquire most 
of the surplus value. 
• Balanced independent: Neither of the partners is dependent on this 
relationship. It means that both can easily find replacements if needed. 
There may not be any need to involve in a relationship as there is 
probably no extra value to gain or share. 
• Balanced dependent: Both partners are dependent on the relationship as 
it generates surplus value. Negotiations probably result in its fair sharing 
2.4.1.4 Relationship Configurations 
Several relationships between these aggregates have emerged from the 
literature, for example, the relationship between an unbalanced power and 
an arm’s length relationship (Section 2.1.3.3). If all these relationships are 
linked together, three different extreme configurations emerge for the B2B 
relationships. They will be named in this study: adversarial, transactional 
and collaborative (Figure 2-6).  
 
Figure 2-6: Relationship configurations 
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Their characteristics may be summarised in Table 2-4. 









Insecurity of dependent partner 














Prone to satisfaction 
No insecurity 
Disagreements, Few conflicts 
These three relationships can be charted to give a visual aid using one 
axis for each characteristic. 
• Power balance: unbalanced (1), balanced independent (2), balanced 
dependent (3) 
• Closeness: arm’s length (1), embraced (3) 
• Communication: autonomous (1), collaborative (3) 
The greyed area (Figure 2-7 to Figure 2-9) represents the atmosphere of the 
relationship. A small area illustrate an adversarial relationship, a large area 
illustrates a collaborative relationship. 
 
Figure 2-7: Adversarial relationship chart 
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Figure 2-8: Transactional relationship chart 
 
Figure 2-9: Collaborative relationship Chart 
The adversarial relationship may be characterised by the unbalance of 
power between the two protagonists. As was explained, in these 
circumstances, only an arm’s length relationship seems possible. The 
communication strategy is probably autonomous and the intimacy of the 
communication likely one sided. The influencing partner might force the 
dependent partner to open his books using his feelings of insecurity. This 
may be a relationship prone to conflicts as the influencing partner might use 
its dominant position to get all the surplus value of the relationship and the 
dependent partner would try to defend its interests. Interpreting the 
consequences of these circumstances on the satisfaction is difficult.  It 
would be too simple to say that the dominant partner is satisfied and the 
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dependent partner unsatisfied. Indeed, there is no way to know the a priori 
expectations of the partners. 
The transactional relationship may be characterised by the low stakes in 
play for both partners and the absence of surplus value to gain from the 
relationship. In these conditions, developing a relationship would likely be 
a waste of time and resources. The relationship may remain at arm’s length 
with an autonomous communication strategy. There is probably no 
dependence to generate any feeling of insecurity. Transactions are simple 
and leave few opportunities for disagreements. In all likelihood, 
expectations are low. For example, the buyer expects products conform to 
the catalogue description and on-time deliveries and the supplier expects 
valid payments. So satisfaction is expected to be generally quite good. 
The collaborative relationship may be characterised by the dependence 
of both partners. The surplus value is probably shared fairly. In these 
circumstances, it would be in their common interest to develop a 
harmonious relationship to generate as much surplus value as possible. So, 
an embraced relationship is expected to develop with a collaborative 
communication strategy. Disagreements are likely solved jointly to avoid 
conflicts. There should not be any feelings of insecurity due to the mutual 
dependence. Both partners know that they are needed. In all likelihood, 
sources of dissatisfaction are resolved through discussion. If a conflict 
cannot be resolved, it probably indicates that the relationship has entered its 
dissolution phase. It will either be terminated or transformed into an 
unbalanced relationship if one of the partners cannot disengage from the 
relationship. 
2.4.2 Strategic Relationship Development 
The development of a relationship with a supplier should be the result 
of decision making process. The pros and cons of a collaborative 
relationship have to be evaluated, because collaborative relationships are 
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both a liability and an asset in achieving effective and efficient operations 
(Ford, Gadde et al., 1999). 
Collaborative relationship assets (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999, p.93): 
• “provide an opportunity to optimise the timing and volume of 
production in both organisations” 
• “allow a division of activities within the two organisations that can 
relate closely to their respective strengths, abilities, cost structure and 
their organisations” 
• “provide access to the skills and resources of partners. Some of these 
may be incorporated into the organisation’s own operations. Others 
may be influenced in the organisation’s own or joint interests” 
Collaborative relationship liabilities (Ford, Gadde et al., 1999, p.93): 
• “restrict an organisation’s autonomy and limit its choice within its own 
operation” 
• “introduce uncertainties about future developments as planning and 
capital investment decisions must be made on the basis of assumptions 
about the intentions of other significant partners” 
• “require resources for handling and may become an obstacle to 
developing new relationships” 
The type of relationship adopted with a supplier is therefore a strategic 
choice. On what elements is based this choice? Kraljic (1983) proposed a 
model to classify supplies (Figure 2-10), into four categories according to 
the their profit impact (volume purchased, percentage of total purchase cost, 
or impact on product quality or business growth) and risk of supplying 
(availability, number of suppliers, competitive demand, make-or-buy 
opportunities, and storage risks and substitution possibilities). 
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Leverage Items Strategic Items
Non-critical Items Bottleneck Items
Low HighSupply Risk
 
Figure 2-10: Kraljic's product purchasing classification matrix (1983, p.111) 
Each of the four categories requires a distinctive purchasing approach 
(Kraljic, 1983). In particular, strategic items require the development of 
long-term supply relationships. Full purchasing power must be exploited for 
leverage items. Non critical items purchasing must be efficient. Finally, 
further supply sources must be found for bottleneck items as suppliers can 
exert their full power. 
In other words, collaborative relationships can be associated with 
strategic items, adversarial relationship (buyer dominant) with leverage 
items, transactional relationship with non-critical items and adversarial 
relationship (supplier dominant) with bottleneck items. These associations 
are depicted in Figure 2-11. 
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Figure 2-11: Buyer-supplier relationship classification matrix adapted from (Kraljic, 
1983, p.111) 
The purchasing group hold a predominant role in determining the 
organisation’s supply strategy both to exploit its purchasing power vis-à-vis 
important suppliers and to reduce its risks to an acceptable minimum 
(Kraljic, 1983). Buyers and purchasing executives determine the supply 
risks, analyse the information provided by other departments about profit’s 
impact and assess the company’s situation in terms of these two variables. 
They finally apply with each supplier the pre-determined strategy, using the 
appropriate relationship type (Figure 2-12). 
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Procurement strategy




Figure 2-12: Strategic relationship development 
The purchasing group appears as the interface window for all 
relationships between organisations. It manages transactional and 
adversarial relationships and channel through collaborative relationships 
towards concerned departments (i.e. production or research departments). 



































































Figure 2-13: Purchasing group role in organisations’ relationships 
2.4.3 Public to Private Relationship 
, public and private organisations 
are 
Once the contract has been attributed
interacting and a relationship develops. What are the characteristics of 
this relationship when the public procurement’s principles, rules and 
regulations influence each step of the process? 
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2.4.3.1 Promising Resource Sharing 
Rangan (Rangan, Samii et al., 2006) explains that resources can be 
categorised into core resources (investment, know-how, time, materials, 
etc.) and governance resources (the ex-ante searching, negotiating, and 
contracting and the ex-post coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing). Public 
organisations tend to possess greater authority and legitimacy, thus 
reducing their governance costs compare to private organisations. On the 
other side, for certain projects, the private sector can have lower core 
resources costs thanks to its efficiency. In this case, co-operation benefits to 
both of them, especially if the public benefits are large and the private 
benefit uncertain. Therefore the idea of sharing resources between public 
and private sectors appears promising. 
2.4.3.2 Lack of Bond and Trust 
There is a major difference between public procurement and its private 
partner in the development of relationships. In B2B, the relationship 
develops slowly and smoothly by small increments. Unfortunately, when 
the public organisations have to evaluate the tender and award the contract, 
the organisations do not know each other well. The inter-organisational 
relationships among partners can be defined as interactions among 
unfamiliar actors (Barretta and Ruggiero, 2008). As the actors have little 
information about, or have not established bonds with, one another, 
organisations cannot develop trust on extrapolations from their own early-
life experiences. In other words, a relational trust, derived from repeated 
interactions over time between partners, cannot exist.  
Moreover, the absence of good behaviour enforcement by prospects of 
future business and the complexity of PPP projects also do not help the 
development of trust. Therefore, these conditions favour adversarial 
contractual governance (Zheng, Roehrich et al., 2008). A binding contract 
is a way to increase trust, between partners that never add any interaction, 
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through a calculative process. The partners all know that it is in the interest 
of each organisation to respect this type of contract as any infraction is 
much too costly to bear. 
Nevertheless, Barretta (Barretta and Ruggiero, 2008) shows that the 
pre-evaluation of a PPP which provides an understanding of whether the 
partnership will be mutually beneficial, could also play a pivotal role in 
developing a sufficient level of confidence to take the risk of engaging in a 
relationship.  
Thus, the danger for the public organisations is to pursue the minimum 
level of trust necessary to select the contractor, through overly detailed 
project specifications, contracts and penalties; and to give too much 
emphasis on the procurement process, thus failing to initiate a proper 
relationship. The public sector has to remember that the special purpose 
organisation formed to deliver the PPP project is a commercial organisation 
with business objectives (National Audit Office, 2001).  
2.4.3.3 Contractual Rigidity 
A possible issue is the use of contracts that lacks the necessary 
flexibility to facilitate optimal long-term outcomes and inhibit responses to 
changing circumstances (Sawyer, 2005). The “length of the contract period 
makes it virtually impossible to allow contractually for all of the possible 
changes in circumstances that may arise” (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, 
p.102). By their nature, the contracts require flexibility to ensure that 
appropriate service outcomes are achieved over the full duration of the 
agreement (Clifton and Duffield, 2006). 
For example, rigid contracts limit the scope of innovation in service and 
technical issues due to the difficulties associated with changing the 
agreement (Clifton and Duffield, 2006); and Eaton (Eaton, Akbiyikli et al., 
2006) concluded that to date the ‘claimed’ innovation associated with 
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PFI/PPP is largely unrealised. The National Audit Office (National Audit 
Office, 2001) is not as pessimistic but they also admit that innovation has 
often been limited. 
Sawyer (Sawyer, 2005) also determined that rigid contracts increase 
overall risk rather than diminish it. Appropriate mechanisms to modify the 
contractual agreement need to be created to sustain VfM and appropriately 
manage variations to the expectations of the organisations (Clifton and 
Duffield, 2006). Indeed, there is a strong correlation between the quality of 
change procedures and the relationship between public organisations and 
contractors (National Audit Office, 2001). 
2.4.3.4 Collaborative Relationships’ Feasibility 
Joint projects between public and private sectors have the potential to 
generate successful collaborations through the complementarities of the 
skills and resources. The best proofs are all the successful examples of joint 
ventures exploiting such complementarities in the private sector. 
Yet, public procurement is dominated by rules and regulations. Those 
conditions are not ideal to initiate a collaborative relationship. During the 
procurement phase of the project, the absence of pre-existing trust favours 
the development of adversarial contractual governance with the use of 
binding contracts. This seems difficult to avoid but fortunately, it should not 
be sufficient to completely impede the development of collaborative 
relationships in long term project like PPPs.  
Public organisations have to set up, in these contracts, mechanisms 
necessary to develop the relationship in the next phase. Project managers 
should have plenty of time and possibilities to develop the collaboration 
once the contract is awarded. These mechanisms include flexibility, 
appropriate risk allocation, orientation toward value for money, and 
appropriate performance monitoring. Nevertheless, no documents, or 
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publications, dissecting and analysing the notion of relationship in public 
procurement could be found. Even in long term projects, the emphasis is on 
the procurement process and not on the development of the relationship. 
It leads to the following question: Why are the purchasing behaviours of 
private organisations and public organisations different? This question 
demands an analysis of organisational buying behaviours. 
2.4.4 Hierarchic Influence in Organisational Buying Behaviour 
All the elements described in the study of organisational behaviour can 
be integrated into Webster model. First, the variety of forces in the 
environment influencing the organisation itself has been described in 
section 2.3.2 (p42). These forces are labelled contingency variables by the 
contingency theory and they are summed up in Figure 2-14. 
 
Figure 2-14: Contingency variables 
Then, the formal organisation was studied. The design parameters of the 
organisation’s structure were established in Section 2.3.1 (p37) and the 
resulting structural configurations were outlined in Section 2.3.3 (p47). The 
findings are summed up in Figure 2-15. 
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Figure 2-15: Organisation structure 
The elements characterising the buying centre position are explained in 
section 2.3.1.4 (p41) and summed up in Figure 2-16. 
 
Figure 2-16: Buying Centre Position 
The relationship between environment and organisation is postulated by 
the contingency theory (Section 2.3.2, p42). Good performance of an 
organisation is "contingent" on congruence between the contingency 
variables and the organisation structure (Mintzberg, 1983). The relationship 
between organisation and buying structure is postulated by the coherency 
principle (Section 2.3.1.4, p41). All the departments of an organisation, as 
subsystems, should reflect the overall organisation configuration and 
strategy (Wood, 2005). 
As a result of the contingency theory and of the coherency principle, in 
Webster and Wind’s (1972) model (Figure 2-4, p37) the influence is 
oriented from the top towards the bottom. Reciprocal influences are very 
limited. The buying centre does not influence considerably the organisation 
and the organisation does not influence noticeably the environment. Thus 
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the industrial buying behaviour is influenced in a hierarchical manner (Lau, 
Goh et al., 1999). 
Finally, all those elements can be integrated together into a hierarchic 
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Figure 2-17: Hierarchic influence in organisational buying behaviour 
This vision of organisational buying behaviour challenges the 
conventional view that supply executives have flexibility in matters of 
organisational design. In opposition to the B2B model, the buying center is 
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an integrative part of the whole organisation and not an independent group 
free to choose the procurement strategy. 
Several studies agree with this unidirectional influence. Johnson (2001) 
found that major changes in buying centres were a result of changes in the 
overall corporate structure “In none of the organisations studied was a 
major change made to the supply organisation structure based on 
consideration of what structure might best suit supply” (Johnson and 
Leenders, 2004, p.194). This was confirmed by Lewin (Lewin and Donthu, 
2005) who could not demonstrate, despite his attempts, the influence of the 
purchase situation on the buying centre structure. Only a higher level 
procurement officer, having access to the highest executive levels, can 
implement new design features or other progressive supply strategies (Trent, 
2004). In other words, the buying centre as a subsystem of the overall 
organisation mirrors the organisation’s configuration (Wood, 2005).  
2.4.5 Models Integration 
The comparison of the B2B literature and the procurement literature 
reveals striking differences in their approach to purchasing. While the B2B 
literature emphases the importance of collaborative relationships and the 
role of individual buyers / suppliers at the interface, the public procurement 
literature emphases a standardised and centralised system of rules and 
regulations devised in the higher spheres of European laws. How is it 
possible that the same purchasing function, in public and private 
organisation adopt so radically different approaches? 
Organisations respond to environmental pressure by adjusting their 
configuration and their strategy. Structural contingency theory maintains 
that organisational survival and performance depend on the extent of fit or 
alignment between organisational structures and factors, or contingency 
variables, such as organisation’s age, size and technical system and 
environmental conditions. The coherency principle proposes that 
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organisational structure takes precedence and shapes the buying centre 
structure. Managers have no other choice than identifying the opportunities 
for purchasing effectiveness and efficiency under the predetermined 
functional structure. Since each organisational structure has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, the challenge for managers becomes how to 
capture the maximum benefits of a particular structure option while 
minimizing its disadvantages (Johnson and Leenders, 2001). Nevertheless, 
Webster’s model (1972) does not take into account the supplier influence in 
the buying decision. The logistic literature briefly mentions the role of the 
supplier and promotes its integration to the supply chain. However, it does 
not indicate how to achieve this integration. 
The study of organisational buying behaviour shows that the different 
approaches, taken by private and public organisations for relationship 
management, appear similar to the operating modes of organic and 
bureaucratic structures. It indicates that the organisation structure may 
dictate the operating mode of the buying centre and its subsequent 
relationship with suppliers. A new model (Figure 2-19, p67) is required to 
integrate the models described for the development of strategic relationship 
(Figure 2-13, p57) and in the organisational buying behaviour literature 
review (Figure 2-4, p37). 
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Figure 2-18: Integrated model of organisational purchasing relationship 
The buying centre and selling centre are integrated into the organisation 
to m
What happens inside each organisation can be further detailed (Figure 
2-1
ark that they are not independent departments of the organisation. The 
relationship is the result of influences from contingency variables, 
organisations’ structure and centres’ position. 
9) by integrating into the organisational buying behaviour model (Figure 
2-17, p63) the strategic approach to supply of the B2B research (Figure 
2-12, p57).  
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Figure 2-19: Integrated model of organisational buying behaviour 
In conclusion, different behaviours and different relationships are 
expected from the four organisations structures: simple structure, machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and adhocracy. In other words, the 
contingency variables impact the configuration and strategy of the whole 
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organisation, in particular centralisation, formalisation and coordinating 
mechanisms. These properties are then applied to the buying centre and 
limit the choices of relationships available to buyers and suppliers. Highly 
centralised and formalised organisation may be restricted to transactional or 
adversarial relationships. On the other hand, low levels of centralisation and 
formalisation should let buyers and suppliers free to develop any kind of 
relationship. 
A study of highly centralised and formalised buying centres where the 
relations are exacerbated should facilitate the answer to those questions. 
Examples of such centres are the public sector procurement groups. 
Subsequently, the results can be extrapolated to determine what these 
relations imply for the relationships in each type of organisation structure. 
Chapter Three  6BResearch Process 
Chapter Three Research Process 
This chapter includes the research perspective and the research design 
as well as a discussion of their limitations. The research design informs 
about the methods used in the research, as well as the methodology 
governing the choice and use of those methods. The research perspective 
informs about the theoretical perspective lying behind the methodology in 
question and the epistemology informing this theoretical perspective. So 
there are four elements, epistemology, theoretical perspectives, 
methodologies and methods, that inform one another (Crotty, 2004) as 






Figure 3-1: Four elements of the research process (Crotty, 2004, p.4) 
3.1 Research Perspective 
3.1.1 Epistemology 
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy 
concerned with the nature and scope (limitations) of knowledge. It is a “way 
of understanding and explaining how we know what we know” (Crotty, 
2004, p.8).  
This studies considers that individuals construct a relationship in and 
out of interaction with their partners. Understanding is developed through 
interpretation of partners’ behaviours within an essentially social context. 
 69 
Chapter Three  6BResearch Process 
Without this interpretation process, partners’ behaviours held no meaning 
and cannot simply be described as ‘objective’. Meaning can’t either be 
described as ‘subjective’ in a long term relationship. How can a dialogue 
and understanding develop if meaning is imposed on the acts of the partners 
without considering their intents? 
Moreover in an organisation, employees are taught behaviours, 
conventional responses, rules, procedures and interpretative strategies 
through classes or by simple contact with their peers. Those responses, rules, 
procedures and strategies are part of the organisation culture and precede 
employees. Therefore employees come to inhabit this pre-existing system 
and to be inhabited by it. Thus the organisation culture can be seen as the 
source rather than the result of employees thought. 
In these conditions, analysing the actions occurring and the way they are 
interpreted by the people involved will help a research to comprehend the 
collective generation and transmission of meaning in the relationship 
building process. By definition, this corresponds to a constructionist 
epistemology. Constructionist epistemology holds that observers construct 






Figure 3-2: Research Epistemology adapted from (Crotty, 2004, p.4) 
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3.1.2 Theoretical Perspective 
A researcher, as anybody else, has his own way of looking at the world 
and making sense of it. Inevitably, during the research process, the 
researcher brings a number of assumptions to his work (Crotty, 2004). The 
theoretical perspective exposes these assumptions; it elaborates the 
philosophical stance that lies behind the chosen methodology. It provides a 
context for the process and grounds its logic and criteria (Crotty, 2004). 
As it has already been indicated for the epistemology, this research 
attempts to understand and explain human and social reality. In doing so, it 
will looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of 
the social life-world (Crotty, 2004). This corresponds to an interpretivist 
approach. This research will not seek to identify universal features of 
society that offer explanation and hence control and predictability. Instead it 
will seek to identify some social factors that can influence the behaviour of 
individuals or organisations during the relationship process. Interpretivism 
is a large approach and it has, through history, produced several modes of 
understanding – hermeneutics, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.  
This study aims to discover and understand the mechanisms underlying 
the organisation structure and influencing the relationship building 
processes. It is an exploratory research where these mechanisms will be 
exposed. It is assumed that professionals have a good understanding of their 
practice and a direct collection of the information provided will be 
sufficient for the study analysis. Even if some recommendations will be 
issued, the study’s purpose is not the review of current mechanisms or 
review of their current explanation. It will neither emphasise alternative 
solutions nor test their validity. It means that the assumptions brought to 
this research are those of a symbolic interactionist perspective.  
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Figure 3-3: Research Theoretical Perspective adapted from (Crotty, 2004, p.4) 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Methodology 
“The strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice 
and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to 
the desired outcome” (Crotty, 2004, p.3). 
One of the goals of this study is to describe the influence of an 
organisation structure on the relationships developed with suppliers. The 
research is exploratory which emphasises understanding rather than 
explanation. Exploratory research uncovers, describes, and theoretically 
interprets actual meanings that people use in real settings (Gephart Jr, 2004). 
An exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out ‘what is happening; 
to seek new insights; to ask questions and assess phenomena in a new light’ 
(Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). It is commonly used to generate a list of 
research questions that are worth pursuing further (Voss, Tsikriktsis et al., 
2002). 
A qualitative approach is therefore particularly well suited for this study, 
as a qualitative approach “provides a narrative of people’s view(s) of reality 
and it relies on words and talk to create text” (Gephart Jr, 2004, p.455). 
The sequence, adapted from Bryman (2004) and outlined in Figure 3-4,  
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provides a representation of how the qualitative research process can be 
visualised.  
 
Figure 3-4: An outline of the main steps of qualitative research, adapted from 
Bryman (2004, p.269) 
An unstructured approach to the collection of data is adopted. It allows 
explanations of what is going on to emerge without predetermined format 
(Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). A great deal of descriptive details is 
provided when reporting the data, as these details provide a rich account of 
the context within which the research took place (Bryman, 2004). 
Formerly the research questions are not highly specific. The information 
collected is interpreted from the perspective of the people being studied. 
This is required to grasp their full signification (Bryman, 2004), understand 
the way people interpret their social world (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007) 
and attribute meaning to their environment (Bryman, 2004). Then, 
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gradually through the collection of data, a narrower emphasis is adopted 
and more specific research questions are formulated (Bryman, 2004). The 
loop back in Figure 3-4 illustrates the iterative process between testing 
emerging theories and collecting data. 
This approach offers the flexibility to put emphasis on emerging 
concepts (Bryman, 2004). It entails the generation of theories rather than 
the testing of theories that are specified at the outset (Bryman, 2004). This 
is an inductive approach, in which data are collected and the theory 
developed as a result of the data analysis (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). 
For the collection of data, a multiple-case design is adopted. It entails 
(Bryman, 2004) the collection of a body of data on more than one case and 
at a single point in time. Variation can be established when more than one 
case is being examined. Usually, (Bryman, 2004) researchers employing 
this design will select many cases as they are more likely to encounter 
variation in all of the variables in which they are interested. It improves 
theory building and it helps establish the circumstances in which a theory 
will or will not hold. Nevertheless, this research is conducted at an 
exploratory level and a small sample of subjects was preferred over a large 
number. The object is to detect patterns and not to test a theory. A small 
sample allows the production of detailed cases’ descriptions (Saunders, 
Lewis et al., 2007) as required by the qualitative approach.  
 
 




Figure 3-5: Research process methodology adapted from (Crotty, 2004, p.4) 
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3.2.2 Methods 
“The techniques or procedures used to gather and analyze data related 
to some research question or hypothesis” (Crotty, 2004, p.3). 
In a study using a qualitative approach and a multiple-case study 
methodology, semi-structured interviews appeared as the logical choice for 
the data collection method. They are compatible with the unstructured 
approach of qualitative research and provide rich details about the context. 
For interviews to be successful in procuring researched data, several 
preliminary steps must be completed. Relevant sites and subjects potentially 
rich in information must be selected, research variables must be accurately 








Figure 3-6: Research process methods adapted from (Crotty, 2004, p.4) 
3.2.2.1 Selecting Relevant Sites and Subjects 
There are a limited number of people that have expertise in 
relationships between public and private sector organisations. Therefore, a 
purposive sampling was chosen as method of selection. Certain cases were 
chosen because of their relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2004). 
The subjects were selected based on few criteria: 
• senior representative, managing a section of a public organisation 
• the section should be engaged in a large body of work 
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• the section should deal directly with the suppliers on an individual basis 
• the section should form a clearly identifiable unit 
The university’s executive procurement program was used as the source 
of interview candidates. Possible interviewees were selected, in 
collaboration with the program director, across two cohorts (50 students). 
Seven organisations were eventually selected for carrying out case analysis.  
One interviewee (case 1) was selected from a private organisation to 
compare and contrast the standard practices with those in public 
organisations. In order to compare like with like in terms of scale and scope, 
the Irish division of a multinational service provider was selected for the 
private organisation. Studying a private organisation provides a better 
understanding of the constraints peculiar to the public sector. Moreover, the 
relationship configurations (Section 2.4.1, p48) and the development of 
strategic relationship (Section 2.4.2, p53) were deduced from the B2B 
literature, in other words from private to private relationships. The study of 
a private case consolidates the deductions before extending their application 
to the public sector. Nevertheless, only one private case was studied as the 
main interest remains the Irish public sector.  
The detailed list of studied cases is given in Table 3-1. The cases are 
sorted according to the interviews chronological order.  The domain of 
activity is based, except case 1, on the Classification of the Functions of 
Government (COFOG) defined by the United Nations Statistics Division. 
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3.2.2.2 Research Variables 
Based on the research questions identified for this study and the 
literature review, the study concentrates on two groups of variables: (1) 
interaction factors between public and private organisations and (2) 
structural characteristics of public buying centres. 
In the B2B relationship review, five main characteristics of 
relationships were distinguished: links, communication, power, atmosphere 
and dynamics. For this study, ‘dynamics’ were excluded as they would 
require a longitudinal study. Atmosphere was also set aside, because it is 
seen more as a consequence of a relationship’s characteristics than a 
characteristic on its own. Therefore three variables, links, communication, 
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and power were selected to perceive the level of relationship as seen by the 
public organisations. 
In the organisational buying behaviour review, three main 
characteristics of organisation’s structure were distinguished: centralisation, 
formalisation and coordinating mechanisms. These three variables were 
selected to perceive public buying centres’ structure. 
3.2.2.3 Research Instrument 
The collection of information was done exclusively through interviews. 
This is consistent with the interpretivist perspective. The aim is to 
determine how professionals in procurement interpret their environment 
and how the environment affects their purchasing behaviours. Interviews 
are very effective instruments to collect the thought and ideas of those 
professionals. 
The list of themes and questions to cover was devised from the 
literature review to obtain information on relationships maintained by 
procurement professionals with their suppliers. Two publications from the 
Office Government Commerce (OGC) (Office of Government Commerce, 
2003; Office of Government Commerce, 2007) were also used as references. 
They were originally aimed to help project managers to self-evaluate their 
relationship management. 
The formulation of the questions was not too specific to let the 
possibility of alternative avenues of enquiry to emerge during the data 
collection (Bryman, 2004). Short, simple, mainly open questions were used. 
The questions were ordered under topic areas in a logical order to ensure a 
reasonable flow. The interviews started with general questions (name, 
position in organisation, number of years involved in a group, etc) to 
contextualise people’s answers and to let the respondent build up trust and 
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confidence before seeking responses to potentially sensitive questions 
(Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007).  
Unfortunately for the study of the ‘links’ variable, the word ‘links’ does 
not convey any meaning to most people and thus can not be used directly 
for data gathering. ‘Relationship’ is the closest term in meaning in the 
popular vocabulary, and therefore was used despite its much broader usage 
in the literature. 
In the course of the research, two different versions of the interview 
questions were created (Appendix E and Appendix F). This is consistent 
with the iterative nature of qualitative research and the loop in Figure 3-4. 
Through the analysis of the three first cases, the role played by the 
organisation structure started to appear as a significant factor of the public-
private relationship. Therefore a narrower emphasis was adopted and the 
questions were adapted. The second version of the interview questions is 
more inquisitive about the organisation structure of the buying centre. This 
second version was used for the four remaining cases. 
3.2.2.4 Data Collection Procedures 
Following the first contact with interviewees, interviews were 
scheduled within two or three weeks depending on the availability of the 
interviewee. All interviewees requested the list of questions prior to the 
interview. The list was sent by email systematically one week before the 
scheduled date. All interviews occurred in the interviewee’s private office, 
except for case 1 and case 6 for which the interviews occurred in a meeting 
room. 
During the interviews, open questions were followed by probing 
questions to explore the topic and produce a fuller account (Saunders, 
Lewis et al., 2007). The interviewees were encouraged to use real-life 
examples from their experience instead of abstract concepts.  
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As in any semi-structured interviewing, the interviewee had a great deal 
of leeway in how to reply. Questions did not always follow the exact 
prepared outline, and some questions could be added to follow up 
interesting information given by the interviewee (Bryman, 2004). It may 
lead the discussion into areas that were not previously considered but which 
are significant for the understanding (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). 
However, all the questions were asked and a similar wording was used from 
interviewee to interviewee.  
This flexibility in the process was necessary to catch what the 
interviewee views as important in explaining and understanding events and 
patterns. It allows and encourages the interviewee to expand on topics of 
particular interest to him or her (Bryman, 2004) and gives the researcher the 
opportunity to probe answers, where he/she wants the interviewees to 
explain, or build on their responses. Interviewees may use words or ideas in 
a particular way, and the opportunity to probe these meanings added 
significance and depth to the data obtained (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). 
In case studies, the research protocol should provide a strong foundation 
for documenting the evidence gathered (Voss, Tsikriktsis et al., 2002). 
Hence, the interviews were recorded on tape, and then transcribed. This 
ensured that the interviewees’ answers were captured in their own terms 
and enabled a detailed analysis. Moreover, free from the constraint of 
taking intensive notes, the researcher could be responsive to the 
interviewee’s answers and ask follow-up questions. Nevertheless, some 
light notes were taken as the interview progressed to keep track of ideas and 
reflections induced by the interviewee’s answers. 
 Immediately after the interview, notes were taken to record nuanced 
explanations and the general points of value provided, both to maximise 
recall and to facilitate follow-up and filling of gaps in the data (Voss, 
Tsikriktsis et al., 2002). In addition to the notes from the actual interviews, 
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contextual data (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007) such as the location of the 
interview, the date and time, the setting of the interview, the researcher’s 
immediate impression of how well (or badly) the interview went, or the 
participant reactions were also recorded. Documenting ideas and insights 
that arose during or subsequent to the field visit (Voss, Tsikriktsis et al., 
2002) were also included. 
3.2.2.5 Data Interpretation  
In the analysis of the data, it is important to use a rigorous, well-
developed methodology to systematically, comprehensively, or 
exhaustively review the data (Gephart Jr, 2004). A methodology grounded 
in the data was employed. It is designed to develop a well integrated set of 
concepts that provide a thorough theoretical explanation of the phenomena 
under study (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). It implies two main features. First, 
the concern of developing theory out of data; and second, the back and forth 
motion between data collection and analysis (Bryman, 2004). The analysis 
begins as soon as the first bit of data is collected because it is used to direct 
the next interview and observations (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Each 
concept earns its way into the theory by repeatedly being present in 
interviews, documents, and observations in one form or another-or by being 
significantly absent. 
One of the main tools used during the analysis is the coding of the 
transcripts and observations. This entails a review of the transcripts, notes 
or any other source of data to isolate the basic units for theory. In other 
words, to identify any piece of potential significance or interest for the 
subject studied. Once identified, these components are marked with a label 
(name) to isolate, compare and organise them. Corbin and Strauss (Corbin 
and Strauss, 1990) distinguish between three steps of coding practice: 
• Open coding: Data are fragmented and taken apart. This analytical 
process allows the identification of concepts used as building blocks for 
 81 
Chapter Three  6BResearch Process 
the theory. Individual observations, sentences, ideas, and events are 
given names and then regrouped into sub-categories, which in turn can 
be grouped as categories (Voss, Tsikriktsis et al., 2002). A category may 
subsume two or more concepts. 
• Axial coding: The data gathered during the open coding are re-organised 
and re-assembled in new ways. The objective is to reveal links between 
the various categories, and to identify the patterns of interaction. 
• Selective coding: A core category emerges from the axial coding and all 
the other categories are integrated around it to form a theory. 
These steps can be incorporated into the qualitative research outline 
given in Figure 3-4 (p73). A qualitative approach grounded into the data 
can be more accurately described by the outline given in Figure 3-7. The 
emergence of the core category is the result of several turns on the cycle 
(iterative process). These turns provide the justification of the theory. 
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General research questions
Area of interest
Selecting relevant site(s) 
and subjects
Collection of relevant data
Coding Hypothesis about categories’ connections
Concepts










Figure 3-7: Processes and outcomes in qualitative research, adapted from (Bryman, 
2004, p.269) 
More specifically, the qualitative data analysis was undertaken using mind-
mapping software. “Computer-supported qualitative data analysis allows 
one to systematically, comprehensively, and exhaustively analyze a corpus 
of data” (Gephart Jr, 2004, p.459). It provides facilities for data 
management, for coding and retrieving text, and for theory testing (Crowley, 
Harré et al., 2002). A mind map is a diagram used to generate, visualise, 
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structure, and classify words, ideas, or other items linked to and arranged 
around a central key word or idea. It is based on radial hierarchies and tree 
structures denoting relationships with a central governing concept. Nodes 
represent ideas and passages in documents may be attached if a coding 
approach to analysis is being used. New nodes can be added anywhere in 
the structure to incorporate new ideas. The tree structure can be restructured 
very simply at any time (drag and drop). 
The mind-mapping software was used to organise the mass of collected 
qualitative data into meaningful and related parts or categories (Figure 4-1 
p88 and Figure 4-2 p98). It started with an open coding. Each piece of 
relevant information was attached to a free node. These pieces may have 
been a number of words, a line of transcript, a sentence, a complete 
paragraph or any other chunk of textual data that fits. Typically, the labels 
used for the free nodes were the interviewees own words. As one can 
imagine, this resulted in the creation of an extensive number of nodes. No 
thought was given to the classification of these nodes. “Being forced to 
think where a node ‘belongs’ when you invent it on the fly to code a new 
idea in the text, is very disruptive of the creative rush that coding can often 
be” (Richards, 2002, p.204). 
 The next step was, then, to explore and analyze these data 
systematically and rigorously (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). The idea is 
that a lot of thinking, generating of ideas, and hence further coding are done 
when looking at all the text belonging to a category, collected in one place 
(Richards, 2002). This analysis leads to the creation of concepts and the re-
organisation of the data. It enables the elimination of redundancies, and the 
regrouping of free nodes under a manageable number of meaningful codes. 
These codes were derived from the data or from the literature review. They 
provided the research with an emergent structure (tree node) relevant to the 
research project. This structure was then used to further organise and 
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analyze the data (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007) through several more 
reviews of the transcripts. 
The categories developed initially were essentially descriptive as can be 
expected from a grounded approach. The index (tree) system provided a 
functional infrastructure that maximised the way the data were searched for 
meaning and key themes (Johnston, 2006). Categories were generated and 
data reorganised (axial coding). Research notes and memos were directly 
integrated into the mind mapping and coded as the analysis went on. This 
allowed to work incrementally, and to treat research notes, bibliographies, 
and memos as part of the project along with field notes (Richards, 2002).  
Patterns within the data and relationship between categories were 
visualised an identified (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007) on the mind map. 
Hypotheses could then be developed to test these relationships. Alternative 
explanations were sought and negative examples that do not conform to the 
pattern of relationship were tested (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007). By testing 
the identified propositions, it was possible to move towards selective coding 
and to formulate valid conclusions and an explanatory theory. 
Of course, the analysis was not as linear as described. Qualitative 
research is inherently iterative and several laps on the loop (Figure 3-7) 
were necessary. For example, the first transcripts were coded, both open 
and axial, before the last interviewees were scheduled. It incited the 
modification of the questions and the creation of the second interview 
version. It also obliged a re-coding of the first interviews in the light of the 
new information gathered. Indeed, new categories were developed from the 
analysis of the second set of interviews. It was therefore necessary to 
analyse again (re-coding) the first set of interviews to identify any data 
belonging to these new categories. 
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3.2.2.6 Data presentation 
In qualitative research, there is a difficult balance to be struck between 
telling about the data and not showing it; and showing too much data and 
not interpreting it (Pratt, 2009).  
In this study, the data are the words of the interviewees. To show the 
data, word for word quotations are placed within the body of the study. For 
easy identification, these quotations are written in italics. Modifications and 
cuts are put in square brackets. 
Nevertheless, limiting an analysis to simply describing what one found 
is not likely to be enough to achieve a significant contribution (Pratt, 2009).  
For example, copies of the interviews transcripts can not simply be included 
in the body of the study. Instead, themes are sorted in the data (core 
categories, Figure 3-7) and explanations are given to show how this 
classification scheme leads to new insights. These explanations are written 
in plain characters.  
In the circumstances, Chapter 4 presents a mix of results and analysis, 
each easily identifiable through the font applied. 
3.3 Limitations 
With a constructionist qualitative approach, the validity-reliablility-
objectivity framework commonly accepted in quantitative research can not 
be applied (Erlandson, Harris et al., 1993). These are not qualities of 
constructionist qualitative studies.  
For example, one criticism could be that more cases or more interviews 
for each case should have been included to increase the external validity 
and generalise the study’s findings beyond the immediate cases studied. 
Likewise, the use of two different sets of questions for the interviews also 
reduces the external validity of the study. Only three interviews were 
completed with the first set of questions and only four interviews with the 
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second set. Nevertheless, according to Gummesson (2001, p.35) “a general 
rule for the number of cases needed to draw conclusions cannot be set up; 
anything from one case to several, even hundreds can be justified 
depending on the situation”. Indeed, the objective of a qualitative study is 
not generalisation but understanding of what is going on in the particular 
cases studied. 
Solely resorting to interviews for the collection of data raises reliability 
and objectivity issues. Semi-structured interviews are neither replicable nor 
repeatable. Their analysis is subject to subjectivity and bias as narrated 
events can be misjudged or exaggerated. 
However, the reader should understand that invalid, unreliable and 
subjective studies may challenge, extend or refine current ideas, concepts 
and practices and thus, may also contribute to knowledge. Different 
standards for judging the quality of research are needed. Erlandson (1993) 
proposed four criteria – credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability – for judging the soundness of qualitative research and 
explicitly offered these as an alternative to more traditional quantitatively-
oriented criteria. The reader will hopefully judge favourably the study under 
those criteria. 
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Chapter Four Results and Analysis 
4.1 Relationships in a Private Organisation 
The analysis of case 1, lead to the identification of two core categories: 
relationship characteristics and relationship management. All the pieces of 
information collected can be classified in either of these categories. Figure 
4-1 displays the final mind map resulting from the analysis and 
classification of all the pieces of relevant information. Only categories are 
displayed. Data, notes and memos are attached to each category.  
 
Figure 4-1: Mind map of relationships in a private organisation 
4.1.1 The Context: Case 1 
Organisation 1 is one of the world's leading multinational publicly 
quoted insurance groups. It has the capability to write business in over 130 
countries and with major operations in the UK, Scandinavia, Canada, 
Ireland, Asia and the Middle East and Latin America. Focusing on general 
insurance, it has around 22,000 employees and, in 2007, its net written 
premiums were £5.8bn. 
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In Ireland, this insurance group is one of the leading non-life insurers 
with over 400,000 customers and it provides insurance solutions for 
commercial and personal customers. Their extensive range of general 
insurance products includes tailored packages for Property, Liability, Home, 
Motor, Annual Travel and Special Commercial Insurances. A major 
emphasis is placed on delivering effective risk management and claims 
services to their customers.  
Within Ireland the operational focus of their 450 staff members is on 
commercial and personal lines general insurance. Their business is 
channelled through a nation-wide network of professional insurance brokers. 
4.1.2 Relationship Characteristics 
Efforts are made to be seen as attractive to the suppliers and develop 
relationships. We plan to use, to demonstrate our attractiveness to the 
supplier. We pay properly. We have very few payment issues, and we tend 
to be easy to do business with. […]We have to get close to the market level 
and deliver the most competitive offer that we possibly can. 
Indeed, relationships are valued because when things are put in the way 
of the relationship [and] the relationship isn't as strong as it possibly could 
be, there are potential issues. Lack of focus, unresponsiveness, inadequate 
communication and lack of problem escalation were examples of issues 
mentioned for a particular supplier. These issues are serious enough to 
consider replacing the involved supplier. 
As will be seen from the analysis, there is a willingness to develop  
links in activities, bonded actors, power balance and communication. This 
is apparent from the repeated use of the pseudo subjunctive form “should” 
and conditional form “I would expect/like”. These forms are used to 
express the challenging but achievable objectives pursued by the 
interviewee in all relationships initiated. 
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4.1.2.1 Links in Activities 
There is a will to develop coordination and participation between buyer 
and supplier. There should be one or two people managing the relationship 
in a coordinated way, to ensure that any potential benefit at an operational 
level, such as a supplier coming up with a good idea or a new notion, is not 
lost. Decisions result from a discussion process to ensure that you have a 
consistent approach and both buyer and supplier participate to the planning 
and goal-setting. They are jointly reviewed, commented on and changed 
until agreement is reached.  
All these exchanges and discussions have to be organised between the 
organisations. It doesn't have to be individuals contacting each other on a 
regular basis, it can be channelled through one or 2, or 3 or 4 people 
rather than 10, 12, 13 people.  
Several levels of the procurement hierarchy should be involved to 
strengthen the relationship. It is important that there is interaction on a 
number of different levels to connect each other through a network, a 
supply network. Otherwise, if only one person is involved on each side of 
the relationship, the relation might be lost when one of this person move or 
leave. 
It is insufficient to have frequent and daily contact operationally. I 
would expect a connection at a higher level, I guess managerially, in order 
to commit the organisation to the relationship and not only one or two 
individuals. I would expect to at least be on first name terms with somebody 
either at my level, or at more senior levels in the organisation.  
4.1.2.2 Bonded Actors 
One other factor that would make a good relationship would be mutual 
respect. Both buyer and supplier should respect the qualities of their 
partners. 
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They want to do business with us because we either pay on time 
(predictive trust), we respect the work and quality of service that they offer 
(intentionality trust), and it is easy to be doing business with us (predictive 
trust). 
From a buyer's point of view, we have respect because they are 
competitive in the market place (capability trust), they are quite active in 
terms of innovation (capability trust) and they would be actively looking to 
see how they can improve themselves in the market place (capability trust). 
There are an awful lot of things that the supplier would know about the 
market that I wouldn't necessarily know (capability trust). That would be 
another reason for me to have some degree of mutual respect. 
All the ingredients of trust defined in Section 2.1.1.3 (p17), predictive, 
capability, and intentionality are present. In particular, capability trust is 
favoured, which seems reasonable when selecting suppliers. So trust, or in 
the interviewee own terms “respect”, appears as a predominant factor in the 
development of a good relationship. 
Social exchanges outside the business and friendship are also welcomed 
to develop more contact, more credibility with the supplier and a greater 
channel of communication. 
The frequent interactions and the development of trust result in 
commitment toward the relationship. We would like to fully engage with the 
[suppliers], to offer them that little bit more security in return for some 
other advantages. In other terms, they are willing to develop and maintain a 
long term relationship in order to achieve enhanced results.  
The interviewee commitment can also be seen in the support provided 
to his suppliers against his own organisation. That's a responsibility that I 
have, to try represent suppliers in this organisation. And that's a difficulty, 
that's a big responsibility I think, on the procurement team. The 
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procurement team has a mediator role between both organisations. It has to 
use every effort to find compromise. 
4.1.2.3 Communication 
Communication is also seen as a crucial aspect of the relationship to 
achieve satisfactory performance. In pair with interactions, a structured 
level communication, a structured level contact is expected. So that 
information can be communicated up through the channels from 
operational to senior levels. 
Accurate communication develops understanding and promotes 
information exchange. Communication with suppliers get better […] when 
we are clear about what we want and what we don't want. […] The supplier 
can respond to us, and there is a better management of the information 
flowing between the two organisations. […] There is a crossover. In other 
words, a bi-directional transfer of valuable information can be initiated. 
Timeliness, adequacy, and intimacy are also important factors.      
Suppliers should be responsive at all levels. […] The right information 
should be communicated at the right level. […] They should actively 
provide market information to us and they should be relatively open. 
4.1.2.4 Power Balance 
A balanced relationship is always sought. Obviously the ideal position 
is when there is equal match between [buyer and supplier]. So suppliers 
that would be too highly dependent on the relationship would not be 
selected. For example, we wouldn't engage with a supplier if we were 
commissioning anywhere 40% of their business or revenue.  
Precautions are taken when dealing with organisations of lower 
resources to avoid any domination of the relationship. Certainly that would 
be something I would be mindful of. Whenever you engage in discussing or 
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talking with the partner, you try to create a level playing field as much as 
you possibly can. 
Even if it might, at times, kind of suit tactically to dominate and even 
sometimes work short term if used correctly; using a dominant position to 
influence the supplier is risky. It is a very, very difficult thing to do. It can 
actually go against you quite easily.   
Indeed, there is a risk, to jeopardise a relationship by trying to assert 
yourself through the medium of your organisations. A risk to loose the 
cooperation of the partner and thus a risk to loose all the resources the 
partner was sharing. In particular, suppliers can be very good sources of 
information for the buyer. Although they may be small in size of resource, 
from a knowledge base, a knowledge resource, they are far, far stronger 
than I [the buyer] would be. Everybody brings something to the 
relationship and all contributions are valued. 
So using one dominant position is not a long-term solution to any one 
problem. Settlement through mutual agreement is preferable. 
4.1.3 Relationship Management 
Trying to determine what will happen in any market or business is a 
complex task. The further and further you might go, the more and more 
assumptions that you make. And with any assumption, the risk that 
something goes wrong increase. Therefore, I would say nobody can predict 
what's going to happen beyond the next three years.  
In these conditions, committing an organisation to longer undertakings 
is a hazardous venture. So putting in place something that has an effect of 
30 years, 40 years, 50 years, and in some cases in the states where there 
were management projects that are 70 odd years long for roads… I think, it 
is very, very difficult to do that.  
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The difficulty is even further increased when relationships have a part 
to play, because recognising how the relationship works dynamically is 
very, very difficult. 
Therefore, managing a long term relationship in a rigid system […] 
would be so crazy. Nevertheless, it does not mean that any attempt should 
be forfeited. In certain circumstances, it can work. However, the difficulty 
of the task should be taken into consideration and appropriate measures 
have to be implemented.  
[Projects] need to be very, very tightly controlled and managed and they 
need to have a lot of resources put into, far more than I think anyone has 
ever considered before. Moreover, the difficulty and the amount of work 
involved raise another issue. People don't like doing difficult things. People 
like to do easy things, and they will get the short term way and don't 
necessarily want to comprehend something that may happen. Therefore, 
dedication and commitment of the people involved are essential. 
Difficult, control intensive, resource consuming, dedication are not 
features sought by any individual or organisation. So how does the 
procurement group manage its agreements, specifications and strategies? 
4.1.3.1 Agreements 
The relationship with suppliers is managed informally. [A typical 
agreement] is quite light on details. I am not a great firm believer in a huge 
amount of measures. No detailed contract with minute recordings of roles 
or responsibilities is established to seal the relationship. Actually, it even 
occurs with some suppliers that there are no agreements in place, no formal 
agreement signed. The relationship is built on a code of conduct, or 
informal service level agreement. 
When an agreement is signed, it has only few measures in it, the 
fundamental measures in there for us and them. Most importantly, it has a 
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structure of communication. So it has an escalation path, it has how we 
discuss things, which premises we go to discuss the matter, who is involved 
for what type of discussion and how minutes are completed and written on 
and presented and how quickly they are presented after each meeting and 
so forth. So from a communication standpoint, they are quite detailed. It 
emphasises the importance of communication and exchanges. Indeed, 
without detailed agreement, procedures or specifications, the only possible 
solution to coordinate the activities of both organisations is through 
communication. 
These agreements are simply ratified by a couple of signatures that by 
their very nature involved senior stakeholders in both organisations to 
recognise the importance of the relationship, to give it some grounding. The 
signatures are not seen as handcuffs tying and binding the organisations to a 
contract. Instead, they seal the good will of both organisations towards the 
relationship. 
This informality, built on the good will of the organisations, allows 
flexibility. [Agreements] are something that do get reviewed and changed 
on a regular basis. They can be adapted if flaws appears or the external 
environment change. 
4.1.3.2 Specifications 
In conjunction with informal agreement, no tight specifications are 
imposed to suppliers. Instead we provide the aim, we provide guidelines. 
From a performance standpoint, there are maybe 3 or 4 points that we want 
them to adhere to the basic level, but we are inviting them to create their 
own solutions. There is an emphasis on the results more than on the process. 
The suppliers are let free to handle their tasks in the way they see fit. 
Indeed, if a buyer were to prescribe to suppliers their activities, through 
very specific specifications, in some way you are discrediting the very 
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organisation that knows more about their market place than you. Suppliers 
are specialists in their domain. A buyer cannot reach such level of expertise. 
So it would be misplaced of me to direct a supplier to how to manage their 
business in their industry. Loose specifications give suppliers the 
opportunity to bring to the relationship all their knowledge without 
constraints. Their expertise allows them to met objectives more effectively 
than the buyer could have anticipated. 
4.1.3.3 Strategies 
Another attribute of flexibility is the capacity to modify the relationship 
strategy to adapt to circumstances. There is not a set approach to the 
selection and management of suppliers. Even if a collaborative relationship 
is valued, when a relationship is not successful some competition needs to 
be re-introduced. We don't necessarily want to give them carte blanche for 
a never ending relationship. 
The procurement group wasn't satisfied with the services of one of their 
main suppliers. They had got maybe a little complacent because they are all 
dominant in the market. This was manifested in the lack of support to some 
of the action base they have taken. Therefore, the long term relationship 
was ended, and a service contract was put to tender. The new term 
agreement is a 3 years term. The strategy for this particular service was 
switched from a collaborative strategy to a competitive strategy. It 
demonstrates that each supplier situation is analysed independently and 
appropriate measures are devised. 
The flexibility is even further illustrated by the same example. We 
would probably re-tender it [the service], probably about 2 to 3 months 
before the term. But maybe after a year and a half, 2 years, we may 
reconsider that. The recently tendered contract might be modified to switch 
back to a long term strategy.  We may say, 'Look, we will just rule this 
contract on,' because there may be other priorities in the business. Nothing 
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is written in stone, decisions and strategies have to follow the flow of 
events. 
Questioning regularly the relationship strategy brings several 
advantages. Indeed problems do not necessarily reside entirely with the 
suppliers. Some might reside with the buyer as well. Therefore the 
relationship might greatly improve on both sides from the reappraisal. 
• It forces the reassessment of the organisation needs and brings 
understanding. Before [the reassessment], I don't think this organisation 
really understood what it wanted. So through the process, one of the key 
things was actually understanding. It results in an accurate definition of 
the needs. Understanding what we wanted, what we didn't want. What 
we wanted to pay for and what we didn't want to pay for, more 
importantly. Thus improving focus and clarity of communication. Our 
communication with suppliers probably got better as a result and the 
exchanges enriched. The supplier can respond to us, and there is a 
better management of the information flowing between the two 
organisations. 
• It requires a return to the market to gather information. The market 
information we have about suppliers’ organisations, and about who else 
works in the market, is greatly improved as a result. Standards and 
practices are updated. 
• It improves the buyer credibility. I think that they now understand that 
we understand what we are doing, and therefore maybe our credit in 
their eyes has improved, so that's good. It builds trust and commitment 
in the relationship. 
• In extreme cases, it may bring a rebirth of a relationship that was legacy 
driven and had lost its momentum. I am not even sure how they became 
a supplier to this organisation, so it has been a long, long relationship. 
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Anybody who ever knew how they actually became our supplier, is long 
gone. So it is almost like, like a rebirth almost of the relationship. 
4.2 Public Organisations Procurement 
The analysis of case 2 to 7, lead to the identification of several core 
categories: central procurement unit and business unit roles and 
responsibilities, formalisation, coordinating mechanisms, environment 
complexity and dynamism, external control and supplier relationship. All 
the pieces of information collected can be classified in either of these 
categories. Figure 4-2 displays the final mind map resulting from the 
analysis and classification of all the pieces of relevant information. Only 
categories are displayed. Data, notes and memos are attached to each 
category.  
 
Figure 4-2: Mind map of public organisations procurement 
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4.2.1 The Context 
4.2.1.1 Case 2 
Organisation 2 belongs to the Government education function. The 
Planning and Building Unit is responsible for planning accommodation 
provision, and for managing the capital funding allocated by the 
Government each year to upgrade, replace and expand buildings and 
infrastructure.  This includes the purchase of sites, provision of new 
buildings, (including furnishing and equipping) and extending and 
refurbishing existing buildings.  
The unit is charged with two main tasks: 
• Planning: ensure that there are enough infrastructures, and that the use 
of existing accommodation is optimised.  The planning section process 
applications for recognition of new buildings and applications for capital 
funding.  Planning decisions are based on issues such as building 
rationalisation, optimal utilisation of existing provision, diversity, 
population shift, demographics and best value for money. 
• Building: authorises building projects to commence design, approves the 
appointment of Design Teams and drives projects through the various 
stages of design and construction.  The Building section offers advice to 
design teams on their particular projects.  The Building section also 
deals with applications for contingency funding in respect of emergency 
repair works. 
4.2.1.2 Case 3 
Organisation 3 belongs to the Government economic affairs function. It 
is a commercial organisation operating in natural resources. The 
organisation is a private limited company registered under and subject to 
the Companies Acts 1963-86. All of the shares in the organisation are held 
by the Minister for Agriculture and Food and the Minister for Finance on 
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behalf of the Irish State. The Board of Directors is appointed by the 
Minister for Agriculture and Food. 
The organisation is divided into three divisions with three support 
functions. The three divisions respectively manage the organisation's 
natural resources, manage its by-products and manage a range of auxiliary 
businesses developed from the organisation's core skills and assets. The 
three support functions are Corporate Affairs which provides services and 
supports to the organisation including legal, procurement and public 
relations, Human Resources and Finance. 
The Purchasing Division assists user groups in placing, monitoring and 
reviewing major contracts for all the organisation’s requirements, as well as 
contracts for overhead and professional services. Contractors are central to 
the success of a wide range of operational programs. Organisation 3 is a 
commercial semi-state organisation. So its purchasing procedures are based 
upon the principle of competitive tendering and operate in accordance with 
the Public Procurement Guidelines, the Code of Practice for the 
Governance of State Bodies, and the European Union Directives. 
4.2.1.3 Case 4 
Organisation 4 belongs to the Government general public services 
function. Its collective mission is to help make Ireland a safer and fairer 
place in which to live and work, visit and do business. Its remit stretches 
across aspects as diverse as the protection of life and property; the 
prevention and detection of crime; maintaining and promoting equality of 
treatment between people; the provision of services for the buying and 
selling of property; the management of inward migration to the State; 
supporting integration and providing a Courts Service and other forms of 
investigative tribunals.  
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The primary role of the Central Procurement Unit is the advancement 
and refinement of procurement and purchasing practices/activities within 
the Department, towards best practice. 
4.2.1.4 Case 5 
Organisation 5 belongs to the Government public order and safety 
function. Some of its core functions include the detection and prevention of 
crime; ensuring homeland security; reducing the incidence of fatal and 
serious injuries on Irish roads and improving road safety; and working with 
communities to prevent anti-social behaviour, and improve the overall 
quality of life. 
The Procurement Section has a staff of 18. It buys goods and services 
for the organisation including specialist equipment, furniture and office 
equipment. It also liaises with the Office of Public Works in relation to new 
building developments and refurbishments. 
4.2.1.5 Case 6 
Organisation 6 belongs to the Government economic affairs function. 
Its principal activities are the provision of transport services. The 
Engineering unit manages the maintenance and renewal of facilities, 
equipments and buildings. 
The Engineering unit purchases services such as security services 
nationwide, cleaning services, vehicle engine overhaul and repair services. 
It also purchases high value engine components such as gearboxes or 
cooling systems. 
4.2.1.6 Case 7 
Organisation 7 belongs to the Government health function. It offers a 
number of health related products and diagnosis services to hospitals 
throughout the country. It manages the donation, procurement, testing, 
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processing, preservation, storage and distribution of all tissues (heart valves, 
ocular tissues, cord blood, stem cells). It is also charged with monitoring 
programs and promotion of best practice in hospitals throughout Ireland, 
through advice, guidelines and education. 
4.2.2 Superstructure 
The procurement departments of all studied public organisations are 
structured on similar models. An illustration, provided by case 6, is given in 
Figure 4-3. From organisation to organisation, the positions may be labelled 
differently, for examples Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) (case 5) 
instead of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) case 6, Executive director of 
finance (case 7) instead of Chief Financial Officer (case 6), or 
Superintendent (case 5) instead of Assistant CEO (Case 6). Nevertheless, 
their functions are similar. The number and roles of business units may also 
differ, but each business unit is built on the same model.  
At the top there is a CEO and then underneath there are various 
business units (Engineering, Operation, Transport…). The central 
procurement office comes under the finance and procurement division, 
managed by the Chief Financial Officer. Then there is the Head of 
Procurement and finally the procurement Section. Within the business units, 
the CEO assistant would head up a divisional procurement committee. The 
complexity of the business units’ procurement committee is linked to the 
complexity and amount of purchases. In some cases, only one person 
handles all the procurement tasks (Case 4). In other cases, a whole office is 
set up (Case 6) as illustrated in Figure 4-3. 
 







esults Figure 4-3: Procurement structure of public departments
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4.2.3 Central Procurement Unit Roles and Responsibilities 
A clear distinction appears between the procurement roles and 
responsibilities of the central unit and those of business units. A 
compilation of the roles and responsibilities provided by the interviewee 
results in the following list of functions for the central procurement unit: 
• Formulation and promotion of the corporate procurement plan 
• Ongoing development of procurement policies, procedures and best 
practices for the department with the objective of achieving enhanced 
value for money from procurement effort. 
• Disseminating procurement knowledge and directing the evolution and 
implementation of best procurement practices within the department. 
• Provision of accurate, relevant and timely procurement advice and 
guidance on purchase order requests initiated by business units’ 
procurement staff. 
• Monitoring and enforcement of procurement practice compliance within 
the department. 
• Development and delivery of key category sourcing plans for high value 
products and services. 
• Fostering of strategic collaborative opportunities across the business 
units. 
• Regular procurement performance reporting to finance and business 
units. 
Therefore, the central procurement unit has a mixture of roles (case 5): 
guidance and oversight (case 4) of business units for non-strategic 
purchases and tendering of strategic high spend purchases (case 6). 
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4.2.3.1 Business Units’ Guidance and Oversight for Non-strategic 
Purchases 
We have an oversight role when it comes to monitoring payments made 
[by business units] over a threshold value (case 4). Any expenses above EU 
threshold have to be funnelled through the headquarters procurement 
division. Business units have to come through the procurement division for 
tenders to be processed at the e-tenders and published at the Official 
Journal of the European Union (case 4). So that's to be open and 
transparent (case 5). Business units prepare most tenders themselves but 
the central unit is the one publishing the calls for tender above value 
thresholds. If [business units’] tenders are over 6000 in value, [the central 
procurement unit] publish them on the e-tenders. And every tender over 
125000 is published in the official journal (case 5). Note that not all the 
public departments apply the same threshold limit for publication on e- 
tenders. 
 It’s a sort of compliance role and that gives the [central unit] more 
control than it had previously (case 4). It insures the compliance to the 
rules and procedures. Our role is to make sure they all comply with the 
European directives (case 5). […] We do have the supervisory role, the 
responsibility to monitor all their tender documents to make sure they 
comply with the directives […] and that tender process follows the 
guidelines (case 5). No tender publication is allowed until it conforms to 
rules and procedures. And then, if it is in order we would approve it. 
Therefore, for purchases above EU thresholds, business units would 
draft a tender. They would send it to us [central procurement unit] to be 
proofed.  And we would give them whatever assistance and advice to ensure 
that the tender is in an acceptable format (case 4). […] If ICT wants to put 
a tender in place, we would work with them to make sure the tender 
document was right (case 5). […] We would be suggesting changes to 
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tender documents (case 4). […] We may have directives put into the 
document ourselves.  There may well be several iterations of a document 
until we are getting it right.  And at the end of that process, we arrive at a 
document which is ready for publication (case 4). 
So there is an advisory and guiding role (case 6) involved as well for 
the central procurement unit. Quite a lot of our time is involved with giving 
advice to business units on procurement (case 4). […] We guide them in 
relation to technical specifications, their tendering (case 5). […] If there is 
a problem with a tender, we would advise them maybe to go back to the 
market or maybe to scrap the tender completely and start again (case 5). 
Finally in the evaluation and award process, the central procurement 
unit also guides and oversight the business units. The evaluation and award 
is done by the business unit. They would need guidance in that. And so we 
would often help them. We may be involved directly in the evaluation 
process or maybe stand back and just have an advisory role, but we have to 
insure that the process is done in a proper manner (case 4). 
In conclusion, the central procurement unit holds both a compliance 
role and an advisory role to the business units (case 4). Both roles are 
intertwined. Interviewee report that these roles occupy most of their time. 
4.2.3.2 Strategic Purchases 
The central procurement unit is in charge of the main purchases, any 
critical item for core activities, comes through ourselves (case 7) as well as 
high expenses easily centralised. Hence, the centre spend can be fully 
leveraged on strategic and high spend categories well suited for centralised 
sourcing (case 6). For example in Case 5, Headquarters procurement 
would look after office furniture, uniforms, specific equipment, their pepper 
sprays, their guns, and this kind of stuff.  
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In those cases, the whole procurement process is handled by the central 
procurement unit. We would draft and process the tenders ourselves. […] 
The specification stage and the evaluation of the tenders take up quite a lot 
of time (case 4). Indeed details are reviewed in details. It depends on the 
criticality of product. Where it is critical and a big spend, there would be 
quite a formalised user requirement specifications and testing criteria 
against. For critical items, specifications are very in depth, very formalised. 
And that can be applied to services as well (case 7). Draft and process of 
the tenders are the two biggest areas (case 5). You must set up the tenders 
committee, organise everybody, and make sure that everybody is ready to 
evaluate the tenders with you (case 5). 
Nevertheless, in departments not requiring any specific equipment (case 
4), all the purchases are handled by the Business units. It’s actually very 
rare that we would get involved in any procurement ourselves (case 4). 
4.2.4 Business Units Procurement Roles and Responsibilities 
Business units handle local minor contracts (case 5) under EU 
thresholds, such as cleaning (case 4, 5 and 6), maintenance of local offices 
(case 5), security (case 6) or gardening (case 5). A lot would be just 
sourced locally, maybe getting quotes from suppliers or whatever (case 4). 
There is flexibility with [business units] where they can buy locally (case 7). 
It does not need to go up on e-tenders, so they don't come to us [central 
procurement unit] (case 4). They control those contracts on their own. By 
buying locally, it creates good will towards the organisation (case 7). 
Business units also handle specific requirements above EU thresholds, 
such as specific service level requirements or local regulations, in other 
words non-strategic categories which are not suited to centralised sourcing 
(case 6). Nevertheless, they have to seek approval from the central 
procurement unit which process e-tenders and publications to OJEU. They 
draft the initial tender (case 4). Then they must apply through their ranks, 
  107
Chapter Four   7BResults 
through their structure. You know through their [assistant CEO] basically. 
And then that request comes across to us [central procurement unit] 
(case5). And then that's where we would get involved and try to get the 
tender to such a state that it would be ready for publication (case 4) 
Before a tender’s publication, the business units also have to confirm to 
[the central unit] that they have the necessary budget to perform the 
procurement (case 4). It is coming back to finance now more and more 
(case 5). And that there isn’t a supply arrangement anywhere else in the 
department that they could draw down on, in other words that they are not 
going on with a procurement that's not necessary. Only then the 
procurement division [central unit] publishes the tender (case 4). 
Once the supply agreement has been setup as a result of a procurement 
exercise, the relationship with suppliers is managed locally by the business 
units. [The central unit] role usually ends there (case 5). 
In other words, the business unit procurement team will be responsible 
for (case 6): 
• Lead category sourcing for agreed categories [under EU thresholds] 
• Support cross-business unit category sourcing  projects as required 
• Undertake business unit tenders and procurement activity [above EU 
thresholds] 
• Comply with centre-led policies, procedures and  processes 
• Full lifecycle cost management 
4.2.4.1 Technical Expertise 
Because purchases done by the business units are not strategic, in the 
most part they are done by non-specialists (case 4) with minimum 
knowledge about procurement. These people are not specialist procurers 
(case 5). In other words, procurement to the most part was done by, I called 
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them sort of well meaning amateurs, people who made the best of it, but 
without being fully aware of the processes (case 4).  
Their main function in the business unit has nothing to do with 
procurement. They have another job to do. Their products may from time to 
time involve them in procurement process but their day to day task is not to 
do with procurement (case 4). 
Moreover, there is the relative novelty of the procurement processes. 
There is much more consciousness of the public sector procurement rules. 
[…] And some people have only just discovered there is a public sector 
procurement requirement (case 3). The idea of specialist procurement units 
is a relatively new one (case 4). Processes are not yet totally assimilated by 
the staff and the transition is not without problems. The initial reaction is 
basically around 'let's do the procurement process' [and results in] an over 
concentration on just going through the process (case 3). 
The previous statement needs to be qualified however. The procurement 
function in some business units is much more developed as illustrated in 
Figure 4-3 (p103). Typically, technical units (case 6) require the purchase 
of numerous parts, tools and equipments. The transactions volume can be 
sufficient to justify dedicated staff. 
4.2.4.2 Training 
Purchases might be processed by non specialists, but one of the control 
set we have brought in is that they have to have received some degree of 
training in procurement before they are allowed to proceed with the 
procurement. […] They have to have some sort of training when it comes to 
evaluation as well (Case 4). 
Nevertheless, training is very basic. The civil service training centre 
does it in two days (case 4). We [central unit] provide training courses to 
the business units. We go through the procurement rules with people (case 
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5). The objective is more about raising awareness about public procurement 
rules than procurement training. It's a kind of an overview of the public 
procurement process (case 5). Even if it makes people aware of the issues, 
it remains difficult to master a subject when it is not one's main function, 
and the knowledge is not regularly used. This sort of knowledge is often 
quickly forgotten if people are not using it (case 4). 
Furthermore, processes and procedures are modified regularly. They 
change too often. I am only there over three years, and we've made four 
changes in administration to date (case 2). This constant state of change 
does not favour the development of automatisms. And the confusion is even 
enhanced when the workforce has to juggle with two set of procedures 
simultaneously. At the moment, we are in an interface, so we are dealing 
with two Design Team Procedures (case 2). Without familiarity with the 
procedures, the personal has to focus on them to ensure that they are not 
breaching them. 
Fortunately, business units can develop their knowledge about 
procurement through repetitive interactions with the central procurement 
office while they seek approval for one of their tenders. They are 
interacting with us [central procurement office] and, you know, we are 
passing on our knowledge to them. Moreover within the business units, it 
will probably fall to the same person, who would be involved when it comes 
to procurement (case 4). Therefore they can accumulate their knowledge 
from tender to tender. Moreover in case 7, training is more advanced. I 
would have training twice a year for all staff. 
4.2.4.3 Command of Processes 
Business units are in charged of enforcing all the procurement processes 
defined in the rules and procedures. Nevertheless, their command of those 
processes is insufficient to do it with ease. It results in an overwhelming of 
the procurement group by their daily tasks. There are pools of work which 
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have already been tendered. And in the meantime, there is always another 
pool of work that needs to be tendered. I have to design X, Y, Z and work on 
the tendering (case 3).  Then, the procurement staff does not have the 
option of stepping back to see a bigger picture and aim toward the final 
target. The energy is focused on the particular area which requires a 
procurement process.  It inhibits you from managing the quality of these 
relationships that you have and contacting your relations (case 3). They go 
through their jobs at hand without planning the long-term strategy. It 
certainly uses up your time, your attention, your energy, and you focus on 
that aspect also at the cost of, well, strategically watching what you are 
doing here (case 3). 
4.2.5 Formalisation 
Entrusting all non-strategic purchases to non-specialist raises a question. 
How can non-specialists write tenders? 
4.2.5.1 Process Rationalisation in Business Units 
Tasks are broken down into simple, specialised tasks and set into 
manuals and procedures. The Design Team procedures manual sets out 
series of steps that have to be followed to bring a concept of a school from 
inception to completion (case 2). These manuals are very specific and cover 
all aspects of the project. This is shown in case 2 by the long list of topics 
covered. They give guidance on the appointment of the design, the 
appointment of contractors, the  national procurement rules, EU 
procurement rules, thresholds, what documents are required, what 
contracts are required, requirements for  contract notice, if its above the 
threshold requirements for EU notice and  assessment of contractors, 
assessment of consultants, assessment of specialists under the EU form 
(case 2). 
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Description of project management systematically refers to rules and 
procedures (EU rules, EU thresholds…), everything is organised, 
systematic with milestones (in order stage 1, 2a, 2b and 3) and frameworks. 
Overall, the system appears rigid and inflexible. Under the new procedures, 
you cannot go to the next stage, until you clear the first steps. So everything 
has to be correct here before you proceed (case 2). 
Actually, most of the rules and procedures are defined at a European or 
National level. So, the procurement group has more a role of enforcement 
of procurement rules and regulations than a role of rationalisation. It is 
essentially a legal role. It ensures that the tenders and the contracts are 
respecting the various national and European laws. 
Procurement tasks are standardised. One of the roles of the head 
procurement office is to develop practices and procedures manuals (case 5). 
Procedures precisely and explicitly formulate the steps to be followed. 
Forms and documents are also standardised. We have tender templates 
[…] and standard forms. Sort of standard documents that they can actually, 
just drop their specifications and requirements into (case 4). And to make 
sure that they are correctly filled, there are guides within the template about 
what information they should be putting into it. The template itself would 
tell them the sort of information they need to be putting in at certain places 
within the document (case 4). Thus, variability is reduced. The outlook of 
the tender is always pretty much the same (case 4).  
In conclusion, non-specialist can handle procurement thanks to the 
standardisation and rationalisation of the process into simple steps. In other 
words, public buying centres rely on a bureaucratic organisation. 
4.2.5.2 EU directives in Central Procurement Units 
Central procurement units have to apply EU procurement rules and 
procedures. We are a public sector body, so we have to comply with the EU 
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directives that a private organisation doesn't have to comply with. That 
kind of creates a tension to seek best value for money but very compliance 
driven (case 7). The emphasis is more on the respect of procedures than in 
getting the best deals possible. For example, we have one situation where it 
appears to make economic sense to extend the [contract], from the point of 
view that it will cost us less money; it would be a better economic 
proposition for us to do that. […] But as a public sector organisation, we 
are obliged to go back out to market without respect of whether it makes 
financial sense or not (case 3). Extending a contract is not possible. Even 
for new contracts, having recourse to tenders do not warranty the best prices. 
When I get sealed tenders is that the best market price? I would say, well, 
not necessarily. I can tell you, it might be the lowest price of those tenders 
but that doesn’t mean it’s market price (case 7) 
That’s certainly creates tension because, I wouldn’t have the freedom 
that a purchasing manager in the private sector would have. I must comply 
to certain rules with suppliers (case 7). Any form of discussion or 
negotiation is proscribed. I don’t have a huge amount of flexibility to 
negotiate with suppliers (case7). No strategic management of prices and 
offers is possible. It puts a lot of power in the suppliers’ hands (case 7). 
Public services are obliged to give the contracts to the lowest bidders. We 
do need to pool it, up to tender, give everybody the opportunity at it (case 3). 
There is obligation to tender, even if it is not a strategically viable 
alternative.  
Even though it can mean that the parcels of work the people are getting, 
you would question how economic is it (case 3). For example, we are in 
hard times now. The name of the game is to get the tender. People are 
going at the lowest price; I mean I have prices at the moment which are just 
staggering (case 2). Contractors desperately need some cash flow to keep 
their business running. So they dramatically cut their prices, whatever is 
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needed to secure the tender. Nevertheless, once you get the tender, if you 
have written it down by 10% for instance, you are going to recover that 
10%. You may get you some contractors to cut prices, but you will certainly 
reduce the quality, which has us extremely worried (case 2). 
Despite the awareness of this problem, procurement managers are not 
allowed to develop alternative strategy. It is not easy for us to develop 
specific strategy in the point of view of the public sector.  No deal profitable 
for both organisations can be struck. If it were a totally private business, 
you would certainly look at nearly making a selection process within the 
existing pool [of contractors] and you would be looking at developing 
relationships with certain key ones (case 3). Nevertheless, this is not 
possible in public procurement. We are not a private organisation, we are 
not in a situation that we can have 10 selected suppliers and manage to 
work between them (case 3). The only possibility for the contractor is to 
recur to more control and more thorough quality checks to insure quality 
requirement are met. In other words, resources and time have to be spent. 
I suppose that depending upon what services, there is some kind of 
balance to be struck there about the length of the relationship or the 
contract (case 3). For simple, cheap services whose outcomes cannot be 
modified or improved, the tendering process seems better adapted. For low 
value spending, stationary or minutes for phones, things like that, 
commodities, you won’t be looking at a 5 years contract; you throw them 
out to the market. But if there is any real spend (case 3)… On the other 
hand, for complex services whose outcomes depend on many variables, 
developing a relationship allows joint efforts for the adjustment of all these 
variables and the delivery optimisation. 
4.2.6 Coordinating Mechanisms 
Procurement activities involving several public organisations’ units are 
coordinated through standing committees or cross-functional teams (case 7). 
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We do have committees to kind of, improve communication I suppose. And 
that's made up of the representative bodies. These would be the unions, the 
[department] representative associations, the [CEO assistants], our HR 
people, and the government supplies agency (case 5).  
They would review the previous tenders, and discuss the modifications 
that need to be implemented. Well next time we go to contract, we should 
do a, b and c with [this equipment]. And finally, they would agree on the 
specifications for the next tender. In other words, they give you the 
specifications for the tender (case 5). 
4.2.7 Environment Complexity and Dynamism 
4.2.7.1 Products and Services 
A huge range of products and services are purchased basically to 
support the organisation in its delivery of service (case 7). Most of them are 
simple and stable such as uniforms, vehicles, equipment maintenance, 
security, cleaning, furniture or utilities. A lot of the stuff we buy, 
particularly on the product side, are available off the shelves (case 4). They 
are mainly renewal purchases to replace old and obsolete items. 
In this case, to achieve savings the solution adopted is to increase 
centralisation by joining various public organisations. We cooperate now 
more and more with other departments in relation to common purchases 
like utilities. We have done a few joined tenders in relation to electricity, 
gas, and we are now going to do a join tender with other [Irish public 
organisations] in relation to heating oil (case 5). Case 7 even went further 
afield. We went to tender for [basic health products] with the UK, We are 
the first state body to purchase with another state body outside the 
jurisdiction. Another advantage is an improved support from the supplier. 
Because we are part of a bigger group, when we have a quality issue here, 
it is prioritised. 
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There are also few complex items as well (case 7). And in this case an 
important shift in power occurs. The making of choices (Figure 2-5, p38) is 
transferred from the buying centre to the specialists. Specialists decide what 
products are needed. They are drawing up specifications; they need to 
identify the testing criteria. Because there is no use saying well I want the 
product X that does X, Y and Z if you have no way of testing it (case 7).. It 
explains why they receive more training than business units in other public 
organisations (Section 4.2.4.2, p109). They have a more influent role in the 
procurement process. Training is particularly important because they are 
very quality driven, very interested in their own set of regulations but 
financial regulations are not their main focus. Nevertheless the 
authorisation power remains with the buying centre. When you first ask the 
question people [specialists] tend to put everything as critical. We have to 
push them and say, look think of what your core activity is (case 7). It is 
trying to strike a balance between operations and procurement. 
4.2.7.2 Processes 
The respect of all the European rules and procedures is quoted as one of 
the main difficulties. First, the public organisation’ own procedures have to 
be written in lines with the EU directives. I suppose the challenge is to 
make sure that our packages of procedures are proper, they are in line with 
European directives and that’s a challenge for us (case 4). And second, 
these procedures have to be respected and the tender specifications properly 
written. The difficulty is in making sure the specifications are in accordance 
with the directives. Maybe the reward criteria or the qualification criteria 
are not quite correct (case 5). They must be open enough to give a chance 
to several organisations to tender. In other words, more generics 
specifications because you know, [business units] do have people crawling 
on them, visiting them and saying this product is perfect. And so, they 
would start maybe writing a spec that would be reflecting that 
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organisation’s product. So you have to get them back (case 5). The 
difficulty is therefore in complying with EU directives. 
Moreover, as already mentioned in Section 4.2.4.2 (p109) procurement 
has changed quite radically in the last 18 months. So we are still somewhat 
in a stage of change (case 4). And there is a new remedies directive, just 
signed into, in Ireland and that's going to make it [procurement] harder 
again (case 2). 
Ultimately, when processes become too complex, only specialists can 
handle them. Centralisation and formalisation are not insufficient anymore. 
Our history has been, well a poor, poor practice because we don’t have the 
resources, we don't have the specialist resources (case 4). Then, the 
solution is to minimise the amount of procurement the department does 
(case 4).  
Organisation 7 is aware of the focalisation of other public organisation 
on compliance. If you interview anybody from central government, you may 
get a totally [different point of view], it would be very much compliance… 
That’s because of the culture and the organisation [structure]. Nevertheless, 
organisation 7’s main concern is about selling its products. We are a state 
body right, but we are operating in a commercial environment. We have to 
sell our products. We are fully aware of compliance, we have compliance 
coming out of our ears but we have to manage the compliance to get best 
business decisions (case 7). 
4.2.8 External Control 
Public servants face high accountability for any of their actions or 
decisions.  [In the public sector] if you sign your name to something, you 
are much more liable to critics than you would be in the private sector 
(case 2). This sentiment is deeply rooted in all participants. For example, 
the simple fact of talking against the rules, for an illustrative purpose, 
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immediately brings to the front rules of caution and safeguard. Now, if we 
were a private sector organisation, I would not even be nervous about 
talking to you about this, you know, from the point of view of, some supplier 
or somebody comes in, I could be in breach of the rules (case 3).  
This sentiment of accountability result into the scrupulous application 
of the public procurement principles of equal treatment and transparency. 
Particularly, to avoid charges and claims, everything has to be perfectly 
transparent. You have to be above suspicions. [...] it does not even have to 
be proved. It just has to be an indirect relationship (case 2). 
4.2.8.1 Accountability 
If the rules are not perfectly followed, there is always a risk to be 
attacked in court by an unsuccessful supplier. With the new remedies 
directive in  particular, we are kind of conscious that we need to get that 
process exactly right and we want to minimise the risk for the department 
that an successful  supplier might attack, go down the  legislative  route 
(case 4). Therefore, procurement processes are enforced through 
monitoring and infliction of penalties if they are not respected. I would 
illustrate that with the need for 14 days notice to place a business, and the 
fact that there are penalties associated then with all the communication in 
the public arena (case 3). In these conditions, the workforce carefully 
considers all the rules and procedures to avoid any shortcoming or error. 
Respect of rules and principles is essential. The top hierarchy is held 
accountable for any infraction. There have been a number of highlighted 
cases of non-compliance which have, ended up with, with our secretary 
general being before the public accounts committee. […] It highlighted the 
need for greater controls (case 4) by the central procurement unit. So, we 
[central procurement unit] have that monitoring role now, much more than 
we ever had previously (case 4). Cases go through extensive investigation 
and consideration, in particular cases above EU thresholds. We are more 
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interested in the big payments, […] in the big procurements because that’s 
potentially where the most risk is. And so that's why it has to be going 
through the procurement division for control (case 4). External control 
pushes toward centralisation of the buying centre to enforce procurement 
rules and principles. 
Not only processes, but actions and decisions can also be judged a 
posteriori. In the public service, maybe you have to account in front of the 
public committee even [for decisions taken several years ago] (case 2). In 
private sector, the decision process needs to be efficient to keep up with the 
market. The timing of the decision is capital to catch opportunities.  This 
imposes a part of risk as all possibilities cannot be analysed in the time 
frame imparted, but this risk is accepted. On a particular day, on a 
particular time, at a particular place, on a particular situation, that was the 
right decision. Five minutes later he could be wrong, but in that time, that 
place, that situation that was the right decision (case 2). Managers can only 
weight the risks against the benefits and do the best they can in any given 
situation. If I make a mistake, I build a building and it is wrong because the 
market change, provided that the risk was clearly thought out etc, people 
just move on (case 2). The best decision was taken considering the situation 
and the amount of information available. Nobody could have predicted 
what happened, so no need to linger. It is more urgent to adapt to the new 
situation.  
That does not happen in the public sector. In the public sector the 
emphasis is not on the efficiency or the timing of the decision. The 
emphasis is on the accuracy. The public committee goes back seven years to 
say: you approved this amount of money, why (case 2)? If there is any 
doubt, then the decision must be postponed and more information should be 
gathered. Why did you waste people's money building, why didn't you wait 
until you knew what the market was? Any drawback appearing, even 
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several years after the decision was taken, will be reproached to the 
decision maker for lack of anticipation. You should not have started it, you 
wasted public money (case 2).  
And they wonder why public servants are adverse to risk? This high 
level of accountability pushes civil servants to limit the risks. Safeguards 
are multiplied to ensure that mistakes or errors do not occur in the decision 
process. There has to be ultra-traceability (case 2), to demonstrate the 
decision process and prove that all possibilities were considered in case 
justifications are required. Therefore, an emphasis is given on 
documentation. Everything has to be documented in formulation documents, 
tender documents, pre- qualification documents, conditions of 
engagement…These documents are safeguards built to ensure that decision 
process can be adequately defended if later questioned. Everybody judges 
roles and responsibility (case 2). Public servants protect themselves behind 
procedures and guidelines. They can't be blamed for following the 
instructions that were given to them, whereas autonomy and initiative can 
be reproached. External control pushes toward formalisation of the buying 
centre. 
4.2.8.2 Transparency 
One of the essential differences with private enterprises is that public 
services are driven by the need for openness, transparency and fairness. 
This is vey restrictive, and do not leave much leeway to the procurement 
group to manage suppliers. If you have to be above suspicion, everything 
must be transparent, has to be fair, and has to be open. Your hands are 
absolutely tight (case 2).  
EU procurement rules are in place to enforce the transparency. The most 
economical advantageous tender is chosen. Not any other consideration can 
influence the decision. There is no case by case adaptation depending on 
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circumstances. The rule is the same for all suppliers whatever the product 
purchased. 
Suppliers cannot be selected on their performance. In the private sector, 
while price was important it was not the primary driver.  And if they felt 
somebody could do their work more efficiently with the least disruption, 
especially on the service side, they would say ‘I want those contractors.  
Just make sure they don’t excessively overcharge’ (case 2). This is not 
possible in the public sector. 
Suppliers cannot even be rejected due to their poor records. Within EU 
guidelines, it is very difficult, even if somebody has done a bad job, to keep 
them off the list in a way that is seen as clean transparent and absolutely 
open, without favouritism applied. Why are you keeping me off the list, is it 
because you are friendly with Joe, and he is on the list? (case 2) 
Contract flexibility in a relationship is an interesting feature for 
procurement managers. I think if you can develop a relationship with a 
supplier, unanticipated needs can be asked. There can be flexibility if you 
are missing something that you didn't anticipate when you went into the 
relationship. This perspective is quite useful for me, the contracting entity 
(case 3). In a relationship, you can modify the terms of the service delivery 
by common agreement in function of the circumstances occurring during 
the length of the relationship. 
Nevertheless, in public procurement if you placed business with 
somebody but as you are working along through that, all of a sudden, you 
use this flexibility to change the overall substance and content of the 
contract, that would or could have changed the offering or other service 
providers, you know, there is a genuine dilemma (case 3). It could be 
interpreted as favouritism. Contracts cannot be modified to adapt to new 
circumstances. There are detailed specifications that you required [in the 
tender], expectations in respect to the quality of the goods or products. 
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These specifications can not be modified. It is not an easy thing to 
legitimate within the public sector procurement processes, in  the point of 
view that unsuccessful bidders could complain 'well if I knew  you were 
going to do that, if I knew I had  the flexibility to do that, sure I would  have 
priced something differently' or  whatever (case 3).  
Various case scenarios, corresponding to all the possible unfolding 
events, could be introduced in the contract and procurement process. In 
theory, you can [incorporate flexibility], if you are creative enough, if you 
can anticipate enough (case 3). That would avoid situation of the type had 
we known when we went to market that it might be a good idea…, but four 
years ago nobody would have thought (case 3). And this is exactly the point, 
how can you anticipate events four years down the line, with enough 
accuracy to write it down in a contract?  
These examples show that procurement groups are very limited in their 
decisions and actions. Transparency leaves no leeway to manage the 
relationship. The strategy is built around removing as much risk as possible 
and not around performance. Basically the department’s corporate 
procurement strategy involves really taking as much risk out of 
procurement for the department as possible (case 4). In a less regulated 
context similar to the private sector, what I would be doing is, I would have 
a relationship with [a supplier]. I would manage that relationship for the 
benefit of my organisation as the contracting organisation, you know, as an 
entity it represents (case 2). Procurement managers do not have the 
autonomy to decide the procurement strategy.  
4.2.9 Supplier Relationship 
4.2.9.1 Links in Activities 
Procurement managers agree that developing co-operation does give the 
space for looking at better ways of working. Building a relationship bring 
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the possibility of working on the outcome of the service. Well we might do 
this, do that and it may help them. They will save, optimise our operation 
and you can share savings, stuff like that. There is scope for that (case 3).  
However, interactions with contractors are proscribed. We don't have 
that direct relation […] in order that you can form a one-to-one 
relationship with. We are also precluded from that because of the 
procurement rules (case 2).  
Moreover, public and private organisations cannot co-operate to 
develop specific products or services. Indeed, we have to use generic 
specifications. So the market [any organisation] can look at the tender 
document and say ‘I can reply to that’. And then we would evaluate the 
tenders (case 5). The tender process prevents the public organisation to 
work with a specific supplier. 
In those conditions, little exchanges or cooperation are expected from 
contractors. All we want of them is that their offer meets the minimum 
specifications. And if it does, well then we will score it against the 
standards set in the specifications (case 5). They have to do what they are 
told in procedures and guidelines. Innovation or alternative solutions are not 
sought. To win the market, suppliers have to be as close as possible to the 
specifications defined by the public organisation. Good contractors follow 
the procedures, they follow the guidelines, and they do what they are meant 
to do (case 2). Supplier cannot bring their expertise of the field. 
4.2.9.2 Bonded Actors 
Direct relations cannot be developed with suppliers due to transparency 
concerns. If I start talking to X directly about a project, within a week the 
papers would be saying why is X talking to the Department directly and 
why isn't Y talking to the Department? Is that because X went to a dinner 
for [this political party] 6 weeks ago? So, you are caught. This is a 
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difficulty and an imposition from a procurement perspective (case 2). 
Indeed, it goes against standard understanding of the procurement function. 
I cannot actually work with my supplier to get more out of the situation […] 
in the longer term. This is the major problem (case 3). The task of the 
procurement group is limited to the management of processes. An over 
concentration on just going through the process prevents a longer term 
view of the type of contract and infrastructure that you require over a 3- 
year, 5-year period (case 3). A short term view is adopted instead of long 
term strategic planning. Projects are processed without coming back into the 
stage of defining the need, what exactly is that you need, what shape, what's 
your overall strategy, what do you want to end up with (case 3). 
Public services cannot show commitment towards favourite suppliers. It 
is against the basic principle of fairness required in public procurement. 
This is illustrated in the actual economic conditions where procurement 
manager cannot support specific suppliers to weather the storm or in the 
impossibility to develop and maintain a stable and long term relationship. In 
the private sector you could develop [with efficient contractors] a 
relationship that built over years, years, years. In the public sector the rules 
preclude you doing that (case 2).  
In absence of interactions, the individual actors cannot learn about each 
other and build trust. Public sector is seen as a soft target in my view. And 
that’s because of the structure (case 7). Only calculative trust is possible. 
Trust that the interlocutor will respect the terms of the contract because the 
cost of breaching them is too high. Nothing less than the terms of the 
contract is accepted, but without commitment nothing more can be expected. 
Only what is clearly stipulated in the contract will be done. Therefore, 
contracts have to be very specific and very detailed and lot of care is given 
to their writing. 
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4.2.9.3 Tied Resources 
Public organisations emphasise the contractual, legal and financial 
responsibility (case 2) of all organisations involved in a project in order to 
keep a clear separation of resources. Legally, the public [organisation] is a 
funding agency (case 2), and thus holds a very limited liability in case of 
issues with the project. Functions are isolated to compartmentalise the 
liabilities. [The public organisation] is in contact with the board of 
management and their design team, but has no contractual duty to the 
contractors (case 2). 
4.2.9.4 Communication 
Pre-tender direct information exchanges with suppliers are proscribed. 
We cannot talk to the market, before we go to tender, because we are a 
public sector bodies, we are governed by the procurement rules (case 4). 
Only indirect exchanges are allowed through the e-tenders website. Any 
queries about the specifications or the tender details are dealt with by the 
business unit on the e-tenders website. It is not, it's not through e-mails. It's 
done through the website. There is a questions and answers facility on the 
website and that’s where that's managed (case 4). 
Post tender, even if several liaison persons are specified through formal 
contracts at various levels of the private organisation as an option for an 
urgent issue or a major issue, in reality only one representative (agent) is 
involved. That would be the person that we would always meet with (case 
5).  
Suppliers are called in only when an issue arises. We would call the 
supplier in, and try to identify together what the problem is and resolve it. 
Only items associated to health and safety risks have their contract 
monitored depending on the risk issues on a more regular basis. If it is a 
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high risk contract we would meet with them monthly, two-monthly to keep 
an eye on the development there, and even daily if necessarily (case 5). 
Once again case 7 behaves differently. We [central procurement unit] 
do encourage a liaison. We would encourage our departments as well to 
talk to them. When we are not doing a tender, you need to talk to your 
suppliers. During a tender, communication is forbidden by EU procurement 
rules. Find out what technologies are out there, what’s coming down the 
track, is there going to be a change. Complexity and dynamism of the 
purchased items necessitate regular updates. So there is a huge amount of 
communication from procurement to suppliers and back and even with our 
departments, we don’t have issues with our departments meeting suppliers 
without us. However, only information is exchanged. They are all fully 
aware, nothing can be contracted unless, we [central procurement unit] are 
involved and suppliers have also got that message. It has to be managed 
properly. In the early days, suppliers were going to departments and things 
became a done deal, but the message was pushed out that this can’t happen. 
4.2.9.5 Power Balance 
Public services use their dominant position to obtain a better quality of 
service. We find we get our best service from medium size contractors and 
medium size consultants [...] because their practices are vulnerable if they 
do not get work from us (case 2). Suppliers are in a situation of dependence. 
Their practices would be threatened if they were not getting the contracts.  
Nevertheless, this strategy only works with medium size enterprises.  
Public services lose their dominant position and the associated 
advantages when they deal with big conglomerates. And one of the 
problems with the EU procurement rules is that it forces aggregation. We 
are getting bigger and bigger consultancy practices, they are multi-
disciplinary, they are getting bigger and bigger, they are aggregating all 
the time, and you are not getting the service you get from your medium 
  126
Chapter Four   7BResults 
small contractors (case 2). Suppliers defend themselves against the public 
services dominant position by aggregating together. Thus they reduce the 
competition and can obtain better deals. And the problem is one day we will 
wake up and there won't be any medium or small contractors, we will be 
left with these big conglomerates, and there won’t be competition anymore 
(case 2). This is probably the natural result of over using a dominant 
strategy in supplier relationship. 
4.2.9.6 Supplier Management 
Suppliers management does not appear to be the main concern. We kind 
of know who our main suppliers are (case 5). That's not a definite answer. 
And the lack of supplier management is admitted. I would say that the 
contract management side, supply management side, in the public service 
has been quite weak (case 4). We do need to do a lot more work on 
grouping them towards the Kraljic’s model, where you have them divided 
into four quadrants, four categories (case 5) [Figure 2-10, p55]. That kind 
of categorisation of suppliers and perhaps strategies for each market, we 
are no way near that yet (case 4). 
Nevertheless organisation 7 uses a category management software 
package and basically it pulls in the information and it gives you a model, 
something like the Kraljic’s model. They use it to identify critical supplies. 
That’s how we manage our suppliers that we would give the attention to 
critical products. Some products it is ok if you haven’t got them. People will 
be moaning about it but nobody is going to loose a life. In health services, 
people can literally loose their life on missing supplies. It is therefore not 
surprising that supply management is critical and more advanced than in 
other public organisations. 
However, market analysis and strategy differentiation are not yet part of 
standard practices for most public organisations. The task really has been 
around getting the department compliant. That sort of categorisation of 
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suppliers, interaction with suppliers, if you like market analysis, we are a 
little bit away from that (case 4).  It would require an analysis of what we 
are buying, if they are critical products or routine products (case 5). And 
then it would necessitate (case 5) the adoption of a different approach to 
each one in terms of our strategies, like emphasising tendering for routine 
products or… [Interviewee stopped] We don't because we are a public body 
we don't do with negotiations really; you know because of the European 
procurement directives (case 5). Interviewee stopped his sentence because 
in the Kraljic's purchasing model, long term relationships and negotiations 
are emphasised for strategic items (Kraljic, 1983). However, these 
approaches of supplier management are not allowed to public organisations 
in the EU directives. Well, I think certainly on occasion quality of service 
does suffer, in being unable to focus on managing the quality of that 
relationship (case 3). 
Another issue, brought up about implementing strategic management of 
the suppliers, is the non-specialisation of business units. As long as the 
procurement is happening in business units, that's going to be more and 
more difficult to supply [strategic management]. Because the idea of market 
analysis, these are concepts which they would not be familiar with at all 
(case 4). Strategic procurement is not currently possible, as most of the 
procurement is done by non specialists who only have a basic knowledge of 
procurement. So, it’s definitively a focus on compliance (case 4). It is 
already hard enough to have them compliant to existing processes and there 
are not enough resources available to do anything more than that. Then the 
strategic around procurement, at the moment, more or less doesn't occur 
(case 4). And, until we really arrive at a final structure and have 
procurement done in the [central procurement unit], it's no question (case 
4). In other words, even further centralisation of the procurement process is 
recommended to implement strategic procurement. [Restructuring] would 
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be an ideal but I can't see that happening. In the current climate [economic 
crisis, budget cut], I can't see that happening (case 4) 
However, public organisations are conscious of the issue and try to 
address it. It is slowly changing. That is something that we are trying to 
address (case 4). The solution proposed is to standardise the management 
of suppliers. For instance, we have templates up now for framework 
agreements. A copy of the framework agreement itself is published with the 
tender and a copy of a draft service level agreement [case 4]. Also in case 
2, the interviewee describes his function as: my function is to take a project 
from preliminary, pre-formulation through to completion, to upgrade policy 
and guidelines for issue to the private [organisations], and to make sure 
that the projects are carried out in accordance with our procedures and 
design guidelines (case 2). In other words, the management of suppliers 
through the rationalisation of processes into procedures and guidelines and 
an enforcement of those pre-defined processes. 
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Chapter Five Discussion 
5.1 Buyer – Supplier Relationship Characteristics 
Buyer-supplier relationship characteristics were first studied with a 
review of the B2B literature. It was concluded that the characteristics can be 
classified under five main categories: links, communication, power, 
atmosphere and dynamics. Various relationships between these parameters 
were reported and three clusters were identified. It resulted in the definition 
of three types of relationship named collaborative, transactional and 
adversarial relationships. Finally, the type of relationship maintained with 
each supplier should be the result of a strategic choice (using Kraljic’s 
model for example) made by the procurement group. 
One private organisation was studied to check the previous analysis. It 
was found that the points emphasised by the buying centre with its critical 
suppliers are: 
• Coordination and participation through a network of links at different 
level across the organisation.  
• Trust and commitment toward the partner 
• Structured, adequate, responsive and transparent communication 
• Equilibrium in power and resolution of issues through mutual agreement. 
In other words, a collaborative relationship is favoured. The characteristics 
are illustrated in Figure 5-1 according to the chart introduced in Section 
2.4.1.4. 
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Figure 5-1: Case 1 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
In terms of management, the difficulty of managing uncertainties in a 
rigid system, pushes the organisation to adopt informal agreements, loose 
specifications, and adaptable strategies. In other words, decentralised and 
flexible processes are applied.  
This case is fairly representative of what has been described from the 
B2B literature (Mohr and Nevin, 1990; Ford, Gadde et al., 1999; Johnsen 
and Ford, 2001; Cox, Watson et al., 2003). Collaborative relationships and 
flexible processes are the two fundamental principles driving the 
procurement team’s strategy towards supplier management.  
The buying centre can adapt its strategy and resort to leveraging 
methods such as tendering when it considers it necessary. Nevertheless, the 
studied buying centre appears reluctant to use adversarial strategies even if 
it could make sense in Kraljic’s matrix. There might be a bias for 
collaborative relationships and an oversight of their liabilities (Section 2.4.2, 
p53). A fairly optimistic view of business relationships is also adopted and 
collaborative relationships appear always achievable. The possibility that 
the supplier might use a dominant position to impose an adversarial 
relationship (supplier dominant) is not considered. Another issue, are legacy 
driven relationships that are not questioned. Flexible processes lack 
procedures to enforce systematic review and routine may set in.  
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5.2 Constraints on Public Procurement 
Several contingency variables were identified from the literature review 
(2.3.2, p42): predictability, complexity, market diversity, hostility, external 
control, age and size, and technical system (Spekman and Stern, 1979; 
Mintzberg, 1983; McCabe, 1987; Chow, Henriksson et al., 1995; Lau, Goh 
et al., 1999; Trent, 2004; Lewin and Donthu, 2005).  
 
Figure 5-2: Generic Contingency Variables 
An analysis of the results allows the determination of the variables 
predominantly influencing public procurement. These include  
• The procurement environment: which seems relatively stable 
(predictable) and simple for most of the purchases.  
• The market: which is diversified. Public organisations cover a wide 
range of clients, products, services and geographical areas. Nevertheless, 
while the products and services are split into various organisations 
(subdivisions), the procurement function retains its unity. Each 
organisation includes a buying centre which has to follow the same rules 
and regulations governing the other buying centres. They are all part of 
a unique public procurement unit. 
• Hostility: which might become an influent factor in current economic 
conditions. The Procurement managers did express the difficulty of 
managing the procurement with tighter and tighter budgets. If the IMF 
were to gain some control over Ireland’s budget, it might increase the 
level of hostility under which Irish public procurement is working. 
However, the results did not show any major influence at the time of 
study. 
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• External control: which shows up as the main constraint on public 
procurement. Public scrutiny of procurement decisions has a major 
impact on the procurement function. This scrutiny enforces 
accountability and transparency on all the purchases. 
• Age and size: which did not appear in the results. It might be due to the 
relative small size of the buying centres studied. In particular size might 
have been more apparent if the procurement function had been studied 
higher up in the hierarchy. The number of procurement personal directly 
or indirectly supervised might then have become an issue. 
• Technical system: which is relatively simple. The tendering process can 
be broken down into simple, specialised tasks that can be applied to all 
type of products without adaptations. 





Figure 5-3: Public Procurement Contingency Variables 
The most influencing contingency variable appears to be the external 
control exerted by the public through the scrutiny of procurement decisions. 
As expected from external control (Section 2.3.2.7, p46) procurement 
executives are held accountable for their decisions. As a result, all processes 
are recorded to justify and prove the legitimacy of the actions undertaken. It 
results in the multiplication of documents for ultra-traceability and 
safeguard. Moreover, it results in a culture of risk avoidance. Carefulness 
and caution are promoted. Cases go through extensive investigation and 
consideration to limit as much as possible the occurrence of errors. 
A second effect, non-anticipated, of external control is transparency. 
Processes have to be transparent firstly for the public to allow an easy 
assessment of the situation and secondly for procurement executives to 
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demonstrate and defend their honesty. Thus procurement processes have to 
be open, fair and impartial. Favouritism to any one person or group is not 
permitted. 
5.3 Public Procurement’s Organisation Structure 
 
Figure 5-4: Generic organisation structure 
The cases studied show that accountability and transparency influence 
greatly the structure of the procurement function. They also explain the 
establishment of the public procurement principles and legal requirement 
outlined in Section 2.2 (p25) (Davis, 2004; The European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, 2004; Enterprise Ireland, 2006; Waara, 
2008; Bovis, 2009; National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2009; 
Procurement Innovation Group, 2009b). Public organisations achieve 
transparency by imposing clearly defined standards through rules and 
regulations. Thus, they can ensure that procurement processes are open, fair 
and impartial. Moreover, as procurement executives are accountable for any 
error occurring, they hold the decision power to be in control of critical 
events. They also emphasise a strict enforcement of the rules and 
regulations to standardise the work of their subordinates. It results in 
vertical centralisation and formalisation of the procurement function. 
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5.3.1 Centralisation 
Purchases simultaneously low in cost (under EU threshold) and non 
strategic are handled by business units with minimum oversight of the 
central procurement unit. Purchases simultaneously high in cost (above EU 
threshold) and non strategic are still handled by business units but the 
tender are controlled by the central procurement unit. Strategic purchases 
are completely handled by the central procurement unit. The involvement of 
the central unit increases with the importance of the purchase. Cases are 
sent up the hierarchy until they reach the appropriate level of authority. 
In other words, non-specialists do the bulk of the work (draft of tenders), 
then supervisors control and correct details or non standard items. If the 
decision process analysis depicted by Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983) (Figure 
2-5, p38) is applied, it can be concluded that the central unit retains the 
powers of advice, choice, and authorisation. It decides if the tender should 
be done, advises on its preparation, authorises it when all the pieces are 
confirmed and controls its execution. The business units only control 
information and execution. They inform the centre about their needs, and 
they write all the paperwork.  
You see we are very much centralised procurement (case 4). Indeed, the 
central procurement unit retains much of the decision process; formal 
power is concentrated in the upper reaches of the line hierarchy. Work 
intensive tasks, requiring low skills, are delegated to the bottom of the 
hierarchy. And all the strategic decisions are fully handled by the top 
hierarchy. As a result, the structure is centralised in the vertical dimension. 
Even in the most developed business units, the centralisation of decision 
making prevails. The only difference is the higher number of hierarchic 
levels and a more detailed categorisation of the purchases. Each category is 
then handled by the appropriate level in the hierarchy. 
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5.3.2 Formalisation 
The results show that accountability and transparency result into a 
rationalisation of the processes and the creation of rules and procedures. 
The procurement process itself becomes the centre of focus. Respect of 
rules and procedures is monitored and enforced. In other words, the work of 
the procurement group becomes rigid, standardised and formalised. It has 
no freedom to manage the budget, staff, workload or policies. It is a 
bureaucratic structure (Mintzberg, 1983). 
5.3.3 Coordinating Mechanisms 
Various coordinating mechanisms are used in public buying centres. 
Business units apply three main coordinating mechanisms: 
• Standardisation of work processes for low cost purchases: the contents 
of the work are specified. Business units follow procedures and work on 
pre-defined tasks. 
• Standardisation of outputs: tendering documents produced by business 
units have to follow pre-defined formats. 
• Direct supervision for high cost purchases: the central unit takes 
responsibility for the work of the business units, issuing instructions to 
them and monitoring their actions. 
Central procurement units follow two main coordinating mechanisms: 
• Standing committees are used as liaison device between public 
organisation units for mutual adjustment. Middle management of 
various units meets to discuss issues of common interest, such as the 
specifications of tenders concerning all of them. 
• Standardisation of work processes for interactions with private 
organisations. Central procurement units have to work within the rigid 
frameworks laid down under the EU directives. 
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Among these coordinating mechanisms, the high formalisation of work 
processes appears to be the primary driver of both business and central 
procurement units. 
5.3.4 Structural Configuration 
Public procurement’s organisation structure is characterised by 
centralised decision making, formalised procedures, proliferation of rules 
and regulations, standardisation of work processes and direct supervision. 
All these elements indicate (Section 2.3.3, p47) that the procurement 
function has adopted a machine bureaucracy organisation structure. 
 
Figure 5-5: Public Procurement's Organisation structure 
5.4 Public Buying Centre Position 
It has been shown that public procurement adopts a machine 
bureaucracy structure but how does it impact job specialisation, behaviour 
formalisation, training and indoctrination in the buying centre (Section 
2.3.1.4, p41)? 
 
Figure 5-6: Generic Buying Centre Position 
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5.4.1 Job Specialisation 
A distinction can be seen between business units and the central 
procurement units. 
Central procurement units appear to perform three main tasks: (1) direct 
supervision of the business units to ensure procurement rules and 
procedures are applied, (2) incorporation of the directives and their 
standards down into the business units’ manuals and procedures, (3) 
tendering the products and service at the core of the organisation activity in 
line with EU directives. All the time is spent on day-to-day administrative 
work. Central procurement units have no time to review or evaluate 
services provided. Market analysis and strategy differentiation are not yet 
part of standard practices for most public organisations. Instead of being 
pro-active, adapt to what happens in the world around and to react to the 
behaviour of other organisations, customers or suppliers (Ford, Gadde et al., 
1999), the central procurement unit is struggling to keep the tendering 
process in line. 
In business units process are standardised. Tasks are broken down into 
simple, repetitive tasks and set into manuals and procedures. The 
complexity and the amount of work involved in the process monopolise the 
whole attention of the procurement team. The buying centre is 
overwhelmed by processes. This over concentration on processes is 
amplified by its relative novelty. It has not been totally assimilated by the 
staff in place. The pressure is on respecting all the rules and regulations to 
avoid penalties. This leads to narrowly defined jobs, specialised both 
vertically and horizontally – and to an emphasis on the standardisation of 
work processes for coordination. 
Thus, the vertical centralisation of the procurement results in a vertical 
job specialisation in the buying centre. All decision power has been 
removed. 
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5.4.2 Behaviour Formalisation 
The results show that the public procurement legal requirements (EU 
directives) dictate the buying centre’s behaviours. Formalisation removes 
any leeway in the selection of suppliers, in the management of contracts and 
in the development of strategies to manage suppliers. EU directives have to 
be applied and procurement managers have their hands tied. 
Through formalisation, the public centre behaviour is regulated and the 
power over how the work is done passes from it to the people who design 
the regulations. 
5.4.3 Training and Indoctrination 
The job specialisation result into simple and repetitive operating tasks, 
generally requiring a minimum of skill and little training (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Indeed, it was seen that business units are non-specialists who receive only 
a basic training. Only the Head of Procurement in the central procurement 
unit is a trained and educated procurement specialist. 
Procurement personal is indoctrinated with public procurement 
principles. Fairness, openness, and impartiality are values instilled in all 
their behaviours and actions. 








Figure 5-7: Public Buying Centre Position 
The development of strategic supplier management practices are limited 
by the rules and regulations, by the lack of expertise and the lack of 
resources. In other words, the procurement function becomes a clerical 
bureaucratic function. 
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5.5 Relationship Management in Irish Public Organisations 
 
Figure 5-8: Generic Buying Behaviours 
5.5.1 Procurement Strategy 
ur different categories, non-critical, leverage, bottleneck and strategic 
item
Nevertheless, it has been shown that strategic management practices are 
lim
For leveraged items, it is recommended to exploit full purchasing power 
to o
Fo
s were identified (Kraljic, 1983). Buying centres were expected to 
select for each supplier a different purchasing strategy in function of the 
items’ position on Kraljic’s matrix (Figure 2-10, p55). 
ited in public organisations. Buying centres prioritise the procedures 
over the management of suppliers. Rules and regulations prescribe 
interactions with suppliers and prevent co-operation between organisations. 
The relationship with suppliers is impeded and with it the long term 
perspective of the projects’ management. In those conditions, the 
development of long-term supply relationships necessary to the 
management of critical items is not possible.  
btain best prices and conditions. This is what attempts the tendering 
process by creating competition between the tenderers. Nevertheless, it has 
been said that it was not sufficient to obtain the best prices. The negotiation 
ban is a major disadvantage to exploit purchasing power. The same could 
be said about openness and fairness. Therefore, the legal requirements and 
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procurement principles are limiting factors for public buying centres to 
exploit their purchasing power. 
Moreover, the inability to develop collaborative and adversarial (buyer 
dominant) relationships, prevents public buying centre to manage 
appropriately the suppliers classified into the leverage or critical categories 
of the Kraljic’s matrix (Figure 2-10, p55). This is particularly annoying as 
these two categories are those with high profit impact. 
5.5.2 Relationship Configuration 
The study’s results were presented using a thematic approach. For each 
theme, the data collected from all cases were grouped. However, if the same 
data are studied on a case by case basis, the following charts (Figure 5-9 to 
Figure 5-14) can be drawn to characterise the relationships of each case. 
 
Figure 5-9: Case 2 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
  141
Chapter Five  8BDiscussion 
 
Figure 5-10: Case 3 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
 
Figure 5-11: Case 4 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
 
Figure 5-12: Case 5 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
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Figure 5-13: Case 6 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
 
Figure 5-14: Case 7 Relationship Characteristics Chart 
Generally, no relations can be developed with suppliers to get more out 
of the relationship. The supplier is not expected to provide any surplus 
value. The task of the procurement group is limited to the management of 
processes. A short term view is adopted instead of long term strategic 
planning. It implies that vendors are favoured over suppliers. 
The buying centre cannot commit toward specific suppliers and it 
cannot build predictive, capability or intentionality trust. Only calculative 
trust is possible. Therefore, contracts have to be very specific and very 
detailed and lot of care is given to their writing. Contract rigidity prevents 
buying centres adapting to evolving environments. Any need not 
anticipated thus cannot be fulfilled.  
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Resources are kept apart and individual liabilities are emphasised. 
Autonomous communication strategy is the standard form of 
communication. 
All of these elements prevent the creation of a collaborative relationship. 
Only transactional and adversarial relationships are possible depending on 
the power balance. Moreover, the buying centre is not in a position to 
exploit its purchasing power. Therefore, it cannot establish power 
dominance on its suppliers and initiate a buyer dominant adversarial 
relationship. The only two relationships available to buying centres are 
transactional relationships and supplier dominant adversarial relationships.  
 
Figure 5-15: Public Buying Behaviours 
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Figure 5-16: Public organisations' buying behaviours 
From the cases studied, it appears that public procurement managers are 
perfectly aware of the possible advantages (and disadvantages) that a 
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collaborative relationship may bring. Numerous examples were given 
during the interviews and quoted in this study.  
Nevertheless, the public scrutinises procurement decisions. It requests 
transparent processes and holds accountable the procurement executives 
who carry out these transactions. Transparency and accountability both 
formalise and centralise the public procurement function. This results in an 
aversion to risk and impedes decision making by the buyers themselves. 
Constrained to follow procedures and overwhelmed by daily processing 
tasks, procurement groups have neither the leeway to take initiatives nor the 
time and the hindsight to plan long term strategies. In other words, the 
procurement function becomes a clerical bureaucratic function. 
In turn, formalisation and centralisation prevent the formation of close 
relationships. Indeed, interaction and co-operation are not allowed. Trust 
and commitment cannot develop. There is seen to be little or no discussion 
with suppliers. Buyers are seen to be tied up in paperwork. They are unable 
to use current practices in procurement and seem to have an inability to 
negotiate with suppliers. Negotiation is frowned upon, co-operation or 
partnership with suppliers ruled out. In other words, formalisation and 
centralisation result into arm length, transactional relationships. It appears 
that legislation heartily favours vendors and that suppliers are mistrusted. 
Of course, a collaborative relationship is not desirable in all 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the issue is that a perfect observance of public 
procurement’s rules and principles appears to lead to a transactional 
relationship even if procurement managers would prefer a collaborative 
relationship. In contrast, the studied private organisation’s approach to 
relationships is the one typically described in the B2B literature. The 
procurement group has the flexibility to adapt its strategies to encountered 
situations and collaborations are favoured for the exchanges with critical 
suppliers. 
Chapter Six  9BConclusion and Implications 
Chapter Six Conclusion and Implications 
6.1 A Recapitulation 
This study started out from the observation that public organisations in 
the European Union (EU) rely on contractual governance to manage the 
relation with their suppliers. Contractual governance improves transparency 
and competition in price and prevents political interference. On the other 
hand, relational governance as described by the IMP group for private 
organisations, allows coordination of activities, allocation of tasks and 
sharing of resources between two organisations. More effective working 
conditions create some surplus value that the organisations can share. 
Therefore, the choice of governance is strategic. The issue was to determine 
if developing relational governance is workable for public organisation as it 
is in private organisation.  
Firstly, the study defined the notion of relationship between 
organisations. Relationships can be characterised using five main categories 
of parameters: links, communication, power, atmosphere and dynamics. In 
particular, parameters of the links, communication and power categories 
have been shown to be related. They form three extreme configurations 
named adversarial, transactional and collaborative relationships (Table 2-4, 
p14). These three configurations are particularly well adapted to the four 
distinctive purchasing approach recommended by Kraljic for strategic 
procurement (Figure 2-11, p56). Buyers and purchasing executives 
determine each supply’s position in the matrix and apply the appropriate 
strategy and the matching relationship. The purchasing group manages 
transactional and adversarial relationships and channel through 
collaborative relationships towards concerned departments (Figure 2-13, 
p57). 
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Secondly, the study analysed Irish public procurement to isolate any 
possible particularities that could influence public-private relationships. 
Public procurement is dominated by the public procurement principles 
(equal treatment, transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition) and 
the public procurement legal requirements issued from EU treaties, EU 
directives and Irish Government guidelines. The requirements impose legal 
obligations on public bodies in regard to advertising in the Official Journal 
of the European Union (OJEU) and the use of objective tendering 
procedures for contracts above certain value thresholds. Following EU 
directives, procurement is a complex process. A flow diagram adapted from 
Procurement Innovation Group (2009a) is given in Figure 2-2 (p30). The 
analysis of public procurement has shown that public and private 
organisations own complementary resources suitable for cooperation. Yet, 
public procurement is dominated by rules and regulations. Even if rigid 
contractual conditions are not ideal to initiate a collaborative relationship 
and develop bond and trust, collaborative relationships should be possible 
post-tenders. However, the first set of data gathered was showing that the 
public organisation structure might be an issue to such relationships. 
Thus, organisational buying behaviour was studied and Webster’s 
approach (1972) was adopted. Organisational buying behaviours (Figure 
2-4, p37) depend on the buying centre position, the organisation structure 
and the environment. The environment is traditionally described by the 
contingency variables: predictability, complexity, market diversity, hostility 
and external control. The age, size and technical system of the organisation 
are further contingency variables. The organisation structure (Mintzberg, 
1983) is characterised by its centralisation, formalisation and coordinating 
mechanisms. From these three parameters, four different structural 
configurations were identified: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, 
professional bureaucracy and adhocracy. The contingency theory holds that 
the each contingency variable pushes and pulls the organisation toward one 
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of the four configurations. The organisation structure is the result of all their 
influences. 
According to the coherency principle, the buying centre should reflect 
the overall organisation configuration and strategy through jobs 
specialisation, behaviours formalisation, training and indoctrination. 
Overall, the hierarchic influence in organisational buying behaviour is 
represented in Figure 2-17 (p63). 
The organisational buying behaviour model (Figure 2-4, p37) indicates that 
the organisation structure may dictate the operating mode of the buying 
centre and its subsequent relationship with suppliers. Therefore this model 
disagrees with the strategic purchasing model used in the B2B literature 
(Figure 2-13, p57). A new model (Figure 2-18, p66) was developed to bring 
both approaches together. The buying centre and selling centre are 
integrated into the organisation to mark they dependence on the 
organisation structure. The relationship is the result of influences from 
contingency variables, organisations’ structure and centres’ position. What 
happens inside each organisation can be further detailed (Figure 2-19, p67) 
by integrating into the organisational buying behaviour model (Figure 2-17, 
p63) the strategic approach to supply from the B2B research (Figure 2-11, 
p56). In this new integrated model, the environment and organisation 
influences on the buying centre result into a limitation of the available 
procurement strategies. Both the purchasing model of the B2B literature 
and the public procurement model can be represented. This model was 
tested through the study of seven cases (Table 3-1, p77) selected through 
purposive sampling. Machine bureaucracy structures were preferentially 
selected in order to analysis the influence of the formalisation and 
centralisation on the buying behaviours. 
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6.2 Relationship of Results to Research Questions and 
Theory 
The general objectives of this study as stated in the beginning were 
firstly to identify the particular constraints on relationship building between 
public and private sector organisations, and secondly to assess whether or 
not these constraints make standard efficient management practices 
inapplicable to the public service. The specific research questions were: 
6.2.1 Question 1 - What are the important factors of a buyer-
supplier relationship building process? 
The results obtained from the private case study are in good agreement 
with the literature. Links, communication and power are main 
characteristics of the relationship. Private organisations adapt their purchase 
strategies and their relationships with suppliers in function of the supplies 
purchased. For critical purchases, private organisation attempts to develop 
collaborative relationships characterised by their closeness, collaborative 
communication strategy, intimacy and balance of power. 
6.2.2 Question 2 - What are the constraints (contingency 
variables), both internal and external, on procurement in 
the Irish public sector? 
The main constraint identified on procurement in the Irish public sector 
is the public scrutiny of decisions (Figure 5-3, p133). This scrutiny enforces 
accountability and transparency on all the purchases and result in: 
• Multiplication of documents for ultra-traceability and safeguard. 
• Culture of risk avoidance. 
• Open, fair and impartial procurement processes. 
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6.2.3 Question 3 - What is the Irish public procurement 
organisation structure? 
Accountability and transparency impose a formalisation of procurement 
processes through rules and regulations (EU directives) and a vertical 
centralisation of decision making. Coordination is achieved predominantly 
though standardisation of the work processes. The organisation is obsessed 
with process’ control. Respect of rules and procedures is monitored and 
enforced. Therefore, the Irish public procurement organisation presents all 
the characteristics of a machine bureaucracy (Figure 5-5, p137). 
6.2.4 Question 4 - What is the buying centre position and how 
does it affects the management of procurement? 
The buying centre’s tasks are narrowly defined and broken down into 
simple, repetitive tasks. All decision power has been removed and the time 
is spent on day-to-day administrative work without considering strategic 
issues. In other words, jobs are vertically and horizontally specialised. 
Behaviours are standardised through the procurement legal requirements. 
Irish public buying centres have no leeway in the selection of suppliers, in 
the management of contracts and in the development of strategies to 
manage suppliers. They are manned by non-specialists lightly trained and 
indoctrinated with the procurement principles (Figure 5-7, p139). 
6.2.5 Question 5 - How are buyer-supplier relationships 
currently handled at executive level in the Irish public 
sector? 
Formalisation, centralisation, lack of competencies and indoctrination 
all contribute to limitations into the strategic management of suppliers. 
Public buying centres cannot develop collaborative relationships or 
adversarial (buyer dominant) relationships. Then, critical and leveraged 
approaches are not possible. Irish public buying centres can only follow 
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transactional approaches or be submitted to bottleneck approaches (Figure 
5-15, p144).  
6.2.6 Question 6 - What can be concluded as to the applicability 
of private sector based organisation practices to the Irish 
public sector? 
Public procurement managers are perfectly aware of the possible 
advantages (and disadvantages) that a collaborative relationship may bring. 
Nevertheless, it was shown that the public scrutiny of decisions activate a 
chain of reactions (Figure 5-16, p145). It generates accountability and 
transparency which result in centralisation and formalisation of the 
procurement structure. Constrained to follow procedures and overwhelmed 
by daily processing tasks, procurement groups have neither the leeway to 
take initiatives nor the time and the hindsight to plan long term strategies. 
In other words, public buying centres are unable to use current practices in 
procurement. The procurement function becomes a clerical bureaucratic 
function which favours vendors and mistrusts suppliers. 
6.3 Implications for Practice and Recommendations 
It has been said that EU directives are to give suppliers and contractors 
across Europe an equal chance of competing for and winning business. As 
such public organisations are required to use procurement procedures that 
are open and fair. And it is true that the European Union has been seen to 
deliver some Benefits / Opportunities, these include (Davis, 2004): 
• Opening up bigger markets that may have been closed in the past 
• Creating a greater Opportunity to win business right across Europe 
• Providing buyers with a wider choice of goods and services 
• Encouraging competition in price, quality and service 
• Helping to prevent political interference 
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Nevertheless, EU directives limit the strategic choices available to 
procurement executives. Rigid regulations and rules to ensure financial 
probity and competitive tendering have centralised and formalised the 
buying centres. It turned them into a machine bureaucracy averse to risk 
and thus restricted the development of closer supply relations. Constrained 
to transactional relationships, public organisations lose possibilities, such as 
increased access to resources and information, reduced transaction costs, 
improved co-operative actions, and adaptability to quickly evolving 
environments, offered by collaborative relationships. This suggests that 
there are advantages and disadvantages to EU directives and the 
procurement outcome depends on the circumstances. Several 
recommendations can be given to achieve a better balance between 
transparency, formalisation, centralisation and the development of 
relationships with private suppliers in order to realise the benefits of the 
collaboration and guard against negative outcome. 
Firstly, accountability and the associated regulatory procedures need to 
be reviewed to return some decision power to procurement executives and 
reduce centralisation. It should allow buying centres to move toward 
professional bureaucracy structures. Thus, public buying centres should 
operate more freely and have the opportunity to manage suppliers 
strategically.  
Secondly, the establishment of professional bureaucratic structure 
requires the presence of highly trained and skilled professionals. Therefore, 
the skills and expertise of procurement staff need to be enhanced, with 
training and career development programs. They should be able to 
overcome the complexity of supply chain management and deal effectively 
with suppliers, create flexible contracts, ensure financial probity and 
operate within a strict regulatory environment. 
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6.4 Critical Remarks 
Despite the contributions the research has made, a few critical 
comments should be raised. 
6.4.1 Conceptualisation of Relationship 
First of all, a limitation arises as a result from having collected data only 
on the side of the public buying organisation. Although the interviewees 
were asked to illustrate their talk with examples, the private suppliers 
themselves have not been involved in data collection. Consequently, the 
presented patterns of interaction represent the buying public organisations’ 
views of public-private relationships.  
When designing the study, a trade-off had to be made between basing 
the study on one-sided data collection, thereby enabling the study of more 
cases, and involving private suppliers, resulting in a limited number of 
cases to be studied. Involving private suppliers in the study was expected to 
complicate the identification of patterns. Indeed, private suppliers have 
certainly constructed their own interpretation of the public organisations 
buying behaviours. While their interpretations may provide interesting ideas 
and concepts, as any interpretation they are not fully reliable and objective. 
It was therefore preferred to have more cases rather than a limited number 
of cases based on two-sided data collection.  
However, it remains to be seen how the private suppliers view the 
relationships that now have been mapped. Do they perceive these 
relationships differently, and if so, in what way? Do they perceive 
opportunities for further improving the relationship? Including the private 
supplier in future data collection efforts may result in additional insights 
regarding the public buyer’s behaviour. 
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6.4.2 Determination of the Public Procurement Organisation 
Structure 
The public procurement organisation structure was determined from the 
information collected in the literature and the buying centres studied. While 
these sources shed light on the structure and provided very useful data, the 
inclusion of a case study of the National Public Procurement Policy Unit 
(NPPPU) would have strengthen the analysis. The NPPPU is responsible 
for procurement policy, national procurement guidelines, EU directives and 
the Government Contracts Committee. It is the unit directly responsible for 
the Irish public procurement structure. Eventually, the study could also 
have been push up to the European Commission as it is at the origin of the 
EU directives. 
6.5 Implications for Further Research 
The integrated model of buying behaviour was only tested in 
organisations applying a machine bureaucracy structure. Further studies 
should pursue the research into the other forms of organisation structure and 
test the model applicability to simple structures, professional bureaucracies 
and adhocracies. 
Future research could also address the limitations of this present study, 
which is solely based on qualitative data. Some quantitative analysis could 
test the validity, reliability and objectivity of the results. 
6.6 Concluding Remark 
While the study concentrated on public-private relationships, it might be 
possible to extend the developed model of organisation buying behaviour to 
B2B relationships. The type of organisation structure used by both private 
organisations may determine the type of relationship possible. In particular, 
procurement managers should be advised against attempting to develop a 
collaborative relationship with highly centralised and formalised 
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organisations, even if the supplied items belong to the critical category. 
Instead, the buying centre should work toward moving the items 
classification toward the leverage category by locating or developing 
alternative sources of supply and maybe even starting in-house production 
if no alternative is available. 
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Appendix A  11BSearching and Selecting Publications 
Appendix A Searching and Selecting 
Publications 
A critical analysis was used to select publications included in the 
literature review. This was done in three phases: (1) preliminary appraisal, 
(2) content analysis and (3) synthesis of the information. 
In Phase 1, the preliminary appraisal, information relevant to the study 
was collected from as many different sources as possible. This was 
conducted using Business Source Premier, Emerald, and the Journal 
Storage (JSTOR) databases. International Purchasing and Supply Education 
and Research Association (IPSERA) conference proceedings were also 
searched. The selection process was in two stages. The first involved using 
database search engines to identify articles with various search terms (Table 
A-1) in the title or the abstract. The second stage involved analysing the 
abstracts of the selected documents to determine their relevance to the 
themes. Two criteria were used: year of publication and the number of 
times the article was referenced by other articles, to narrow the relevance. 
Further weight was given to recent articles and to highly referenced articles.  
In Phase 2, content analysis, the works selected in Phase 1 were read 
and summarised. Relevant references provided in these works were sourced 
and added to the pool of documents of Phase 1.  
In Phase 3, the information collected was synthesised, and emerging 
themes were identified. Summaries of the articles and publications were 
sorted into corresponding categories. The emerging themes were then used 
as seeds for further searches on the databases search engines, and relevant 
works were added to the pool of documents in Phase 1. This process was 
pursued until saturation of the information gathered; where no new themes 
or ideas were uncovered from the works studied. An example of search 
terms is given in Table A-1 for the B2B literature.  
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Table A-1: List of Main B2B Search Terms 
Original Search Emerging Themes 
Relationship Alliance Trust Communication 












B2C Insecurity Power 
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Appendix B Tendering Procedure Selection 
B.1 Open Procedure 
In the open procedure, any and every supplier, meeting the minimum 
financial, economic and technical standards set by the organisation and 
wishing to participate in a tender process is entitled to receive tender 
documents and to submit a tender. No negotiation is allowed between the 
tenderers and the public organisation (National Public Procurement Policy 
Unit, 2009). 
B.2 Restricted Procedure 
In the restricted procedure, only the few organisations selected by the 
public organisations can submit a tender. Therefore, this is a two-stage 
process (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2009).  
• First, the interested organisations submit the required information with 
respect to their professional or technical capability, experience, 
expertise and financial capacity to carry out the project. The potential 
tenderers are then selected according to the advertised selection criteria. 
• Then, only those selected organisations receive the tender documents 
and are invited to submit tenders. 
B.3 Competitive Dialogue Procedure 
The competitive dialogue procedure was introduced in the revised 2004 
Directives (The European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2004), designed to provide more flexibility in the tendering process 
for more complex contracts, for example public private partnerships (PPPs). 
Contracting organisations must advertise their requirements and enter 
dialogue with interested organisations, (pre – qualified on the same basis as 
for restricted procedure). Through the process of dialogue with a range of 
candidates, a contracting organisation may identify arrangements or 
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solutions which meet its requirements (National Public Procurement Policy 
Unit, 2009). 
In conducting the dialogue, contracting organisations must ensure 
equality of treatment and respect for the intellectual property rights of all 
candidates. When satisfied about the best means of meeting its requirements, 
the contracting organisation must specify them and invite at least three 
candidates to submit tenders (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 
2009). The most economically advantageous tender will then be selected. 
The competitive dialogue procedure should provide the necessary 
flexibility to discuss with the candidates on all aspects of the contract 
during the set-up phase, while ensuring that these discussions are conducted 
in compliance with the principles of transparency and equality of treatment 
(Davis, 2004). 
B.4 Negotiated Procedure 
The negotiated procedure is an exceptional procedure, which may only 
be used in complex projects when the overall price cannot be determined in 
advance or when an Open, Restricted or Competitive Dialogue procedure 
has not resulted in a contract award. Participation is limited only to those 
suppliers who, having been consulted, are invited to negotiate the terms of a 
contract (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
2004). 
Appendix C  13BPublic Private Partnerships 
Appendix C Public Private Partnerships 
Originally seen as a solution to the borrowing limits imposed by the 
European Union on National Governments (Smyth and Edkins, 2007), and 
as a necessity to reverse the legacy of under-investment in the public 
service infrastructure (HM Treasury, 2003; Sawyer, 2005), PPPs have 
evolved towards a search for value for money through an optimal sharing of 
risk between the private and public sector. The private sector offers project 
management skills, more innovative design, and risk management expertise 
resulting in substantial benefits (HM Treasury, 2003). This has led to a 
body of literature focusing on the procurement process. Nevertheless, very 
little has been written regarding the management of established 
relationships in spite of the fact that to achieve real value, there must be an 
active and ongoing management of contractual obligations (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004). The Treasury itself (HM Treasury, 2003, p.20) recognises 
that although “there are now a large number of PPP projects operational; 
they are all in an early stage in their operation of what are typically 20 to 
30 year contracts. The operational performance of PPP contracts, and in 
particular their ability to maintain a consistent quality of service over the 
long term, will need to be assessed”. 
C.1 Definition 
The term “Public Private Partnership” describes a business venture 
which is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one 
or more private sector organisations. It involves a contract between a public 
sector organisation and a private organisation, in which the private 
organisation provides a public service or project and assumes substantial 
financial, technical, and operational risk in the project in exchange for a 
share in assets and revenue. 
  167
Appendix C  13BPublic Private Partnerships 
Typically, a private sector consortium forms a special organisation 
called a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV) for the contracted period. 
Governments select the consortium through a tendering process 
(competitive dialogue). The terms of a 20- to 30-year contract can include 
design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a specific 
service infrastructure such as schools, hospitals or prisons by the 
consortium, in exchange for a series of government payments. So the 
government pays for services from revenue rather than capital or debt 
(Smyth and Edkins, 2007). An example of a typical PPP would be a 
hospital building financed and constructed by a private developer which is 
subsequently leased to the hospital organisation. The private developer then 
acts as landlord, providing housekeeping and other non-medical services 
while the hospital itself provides medical services. 
Poor private sector performance or lack of availability within the PPP is 
penalised by payment deductions. The private consortium is paid only on 
delivery of a consistent quality of service as measured, by the 
administration, against desired contractual outputs. Deductions are then 
made via a defined unitary charge penalizing poor private sector 
performance or lack of availability (HM Treasury, 2003). Indeed, only if 
revenue is at risk, will the private organisation assure the quality of each 
step of a process. Thus it has both control over cost and obtains validation 
and payment of the service provided (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
The PPP procurement process is similar to that as described in Figure 
2-2 (p30). It follows the same principles (Section 2.2.1, p26) and the same 
legal requirements (Section 2.2.2, p28). The tendering procedure is the 
“competitive dialogue” procedure. This procedure was created in the 2004 
directives (The European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2004) to give a legal framework to PPP projects. 
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Nevertheless the stakes are much higher in terms of for example, budget, 
complexity, size, or time scale. The procurement stage of a PPP deal is very 
important, not only in negotiating a deal which represents value for money, 
but also in establishing a basis for good relations between the public 
organisation and contractor for the contract period (National Audit Office, 
2001). “Indeed, it is the conversion of the contract into delivery of the 
outputs that is essential to meeting the overall project objectives”, (Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2004, p.102). 
Hence, much more care is taken in the preparation and procurement 
phases in setting up the project. In particular, an important part of the 
preparation phase is the evaluation of risk. The main differences between a 
PPP and a standard contract are illustrated in the following paragraphs. 
C.2 Preparation Phase 
Once the desired service is clearly identified, several alternative 
approaches are evaluated (refurbishment, reconfiguration, new assets) and 
their various impacts, including financial consequences and risks, are 
analysed. Clifton (Clifton and Duffield, 2006) classifies the various aspects 
of the project to be considered in five categories: commercial (agreement 
conditions), financial (costs, revenue…), technical (planning, technology, 
efficiency, safety…), service (performance, maintenance) and social 
(benefits, equity).   
In order to compare public and private alternatives, a cost-benefit 
analysis is compiled via a Public Sector Comparator (PSC). It is used as an 
indicator, a public sector benchmark. The PSC sets out how public bodies 
might design, fund, construct and deliver the project, if they were to 
undertake it without the private sector participation. General costs and risks 
need to be quantified. The PSC is then used during the selection process to 
benchmark the quality of bids received from the private sector. Thus, net 
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public benefit of competing alternatives can be established. PSCs are 
generally categorised into four core elements (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004): 
• raw PSC: this includes an estimate of all costs in delivering the same 
volume and level of performance publicly, including service and 
residual asset value which would be required from the private sector 
under the PPP alternative 
• transferable risks: this are the risks transferred to private sector and 
deducted from the PPP cost 
• retained risks: these are the risks added to PPP cost 
• competitive neutrality: competitive neutrality adjustments remove any 
net competitive advantages that may accrue upon a government business 
by virtue of its public ownership.  
Therefore the risks involved in the project need to be assessed. They 
vary greatly depending on the nature of the goods or services to be acquired 
(Lawther and Martin, 2005) but there needs to be an optimal sharing of risk 
between the private and public sectors. There are certain risks that are best 
managed by Government and to seek to transfer these risks would be either 
nonviable or would not offer value for money for the public sector. The 
benefit flows from ensuring that the many different types of risk are borne 
by the organisation who is best placed to manage them (HM Treasury, 
2003). Efficient risk allocation reduces risk premium costs, as the 
organisation best positioned to manage a particular risk should be able to do 
so at the lowest price (Bing, Akintoye et al., 2005). Hence project costs are 
reduced by preventing a organisation pricing a risk that is outside their 
direct control (Clifton and Duffield, 2006).  
Typically, the government retains demand risk, definition risk and 
business risk. Risk retained must be carefully monitored during the contract 
management (National Audit Office, 2001).  
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• Demand risk (Lawther and Martin, 2005) correlates with service needs 
quantification. If the needs have not been correctly evaluated, and the 
service provided is not used as much as expected over the life of the 
contract, Government would be still obliged to continue paying the same 
unitary charges whatever the usage of the service may be. On the other 
side, if the demand was underestimated, the Government will have to 
bear the costs of expansion (HM Treasury, 2003).  
• Definition risks are linked to the service standard set by the Government 
in its specifications (HM Treasury, 2003). If the service is not correctly 
defined, the public might not perceive the service delivery as accurately 
or reliably as expected even when the contractor respects specifications 
to the letter (Lawther and Martin, 2005).  
• Finally, business risk cannot be transferred to the contractor because if 
the contractor fails to deliver the specified project, the public sector is 
still responsible for delivering the required public service (National 
Audit Office, 2001). 
The main risks transferred to the private sector are: 
• Design risks: the design of the service must meet required standards of 
delivery (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004); 
• Cost overrun risks during construction (HM Treasury, 2003); 
• Timely completion of the facility (HM Treasury, 2003) as the public 
sector provides no funding during the construction phase (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004); 
• Service delivery risk: if services are not provided at the standard 
specified contractually by government, provision would normally allow 
for an abatement of payment and an obligation to cure the problem 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004); 
• Availability: the contract will define of what is meant by a service being 
available. This is generally associated with the quantity and quality of 
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the service and the frequency with which it is provided. Payment will 
usually depend directly on availability, by basing a service charge (or at 
least part thereof) against a measure of available service (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004); 
• Asset and operating risks (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004): the costs of 
maintaining and operating the facilities are born by the private 
organisation. Therefore, they must remain under control during the life 
of the project, otherwise they will diminish the private organisation 
expected return. 
All partners should participate prior to contract award and throughout 
the partnership experience to identify risk, find solutions, and monitor and 
control their evolution (Lawther and Martin, 2005). However, this task is 
generally handled by the public sector alone, without private sector 
involvement, despite the challenges faced by program manager and 
procurement officials to identify and assess the most relevant types or 
categories of risk for each given acquisition. As a consequence there is 
some disagreement between contractors and public sector officials on 
whether risks have been allocated appropriately or not (National Audit 
Office, 2001). 
C.3 Design the Tender 
Once the PSC has been compiled, project resources are assembled 
(steering committee, project director, probity auditor, procurement team), 
and a project plan is created. At this stage, all project specifications are put 
in writing. To control quality and to facilitate biding price comparisons, the 
public sector moved from written specifications in terms of input, to output 
specifications which establish performance criteria (Clifton and Duffield, 
2006). Key performance indicators (KPIs) are specified to ensure 
requirements are met over project life cycles (Smyth and Edkins, 2007). For 
example, instead of specifying the size of, say, hospital wards and the 
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number of beds, the specification will indicate how many patients the 
hospital should be capable of treating simultaneously. It is then up to the 
private bidder to propose the best solution to achieve this target when the 
public sector calls for private tender.  
C.4 Bid Preparation 
Proposed tenders should include (National Audit Office, 2001) adopted 
organisational structures (consortia and association arrangement), service 
delivery procedures, and service monitoring and evaluation procedures. 
C.5 Evaluation of Tender 
The procurement group then analyse the adequacy of the technical and 
organisational structures. Confirmation is required that the proposed service 
delivery fits the required specifications. A background check of the private 
organisation is also carried out: quality certification, past experiences, and 
economical aspects (Ancarania, Capaldob et al., 2003).  
The PSC is then used to compare the tenders’ proposals against the 
public solution (Ancarania, Capaldob et al., 2003), using a value for money 
test (Clifton and Duffield, 2006). The VfM test includes assessments of raw 
cost, innovation, risk (transferred and retained), improved asset utilisation 
and service outcomes and management synergies (Clifton and Duffield, 
2006). It also estimates if the contract will maintain its value during the 
entire contract period. For example it ensures, through benchmarking or 
through market testing, that the agreed future payment price will not exceed 
future market prices for such services. It will also take into consideration 
some mechanisms for profit sharing where the public body shares in profits 
made by the contractor (National Audit Office, 2001).  
Some concerns were raised about this value for money comparison 
(Spackman, 2002; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Shaoul, 2005). The difference 
in value between public and private solutions proposals is often small and 
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reliant on uncertain risk transfer calculations which are included in the PSC. 
Discount rate methodology is also subject to fierce debate. 
C.6 Award of Contract 
If a private solution proposal is found to give more value for money 
than a public one, then final negotiations occur (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
A balance needs to be found between the financial return expected by the 
private sector participants and the value for money expected by the public 
sector. Very low returns could affect contractors' performance on a given 
project and could deter them from bidding for future PFI projects. Very 
high returns could affect the organisation's perception of value for money 
and their approach to future procurements (National Audit Office, 2001). 
The contract includes the allocation of risk, the quality of service 
required, value for money mechanisms and other working arrangements. It 
should also take into account the period after the contract has run its full 
term or cases of early termination, and specify the quality of the assets to be 
transferred to the organisation, the treatment of intellectual property rights, 
the arrangements for contract re-tendering if appropriate, and in cases of 
early termination, the levels of compensation payable by either organisation 
taking into account the reasons for early termination. These decisions, made 
during the contract procurement phases, have an impact on how well a 
successful partnership can be achieved (National Audit Office, 2001). 
C.7 Contract Management 
The contract management phase includes service delivery and service 
monitoring and evaluation (Ancarania, Capaldob et al., 2003). The activities 
involved are shared between the various constituents of the conglomerate. 
Procedures for service monitoring and evaluation are implemented. 
Public entities and contractors have inherently different objectives. The 
public entities expect value for money in the form of cost effective, reliable 
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and timely services at agreed prices and to agreed qualities. Contractors 
expect the PPP to yield a reasonable return. There is a need to reconcile 
these differing aims if their long term relationship is to be successful. This 
is possible only if the public entity and contractor approach the endeavour 
in a spirit of partnership and base their relationship upon a sound 
contractual framework. It requires a flexible and co-operative approach 
where roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. Good communication is 
essential, as are opportunities for innovation, and procedures for reviewing 
the relationship so that improvements can be identified (National Audit 
Office, 2001). In other words, a relational governance is needed to ease 
tension, facilitate the enforcement of obligations (Barretta and Ruggiero, 
2008), (Zheng, Roehrich et al., 2008) and to enhance VfM through better 
risk transfer, innovation and management skills (Clifton and Duffield, 
2006).  
C.8 Anticipated Closure of Contract 
Once the contract is signed, the public sector has very few alternatives 
if the contractor fails to live up to its responsibilities, whether due to 
equipment problems, lack of appropriate personnel or bankruptcy. Indeed 
what would happen if a service delivery is underperforming or interrupted? 
Of course the government will attempt to limit this risk in several ways, 
including checking past contractor experiences, monitoring and approving 
changes in key contractor management personnel (Lawther and Martin, 
2005). Penalties can also be applied as set out in the contract. But 
unsurprisingly, problems arise from the 'too big to fail' syndrome (Sawyer, 
2005).  
Under most circumstances, the government is unable to walk away from 
the consequences of a troubled PPP contract as it remains responsible for 
the risk of service interruption (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004), (Lawther and 
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Martin, 2005). Effectively, the onus of risk associated with non-delivery of 
the service rests with the public sector (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  
Moreover, “where a trust wishes to terminate a contract, either because 
of poor performance or insolvency of the private consortium, it still has to 
pay the consortium’s financing costs, even though the latter is in default. It 
would otherwise have to take over the consortium’s debts and liabilities, 
given that the lending institutions make their loans to the consortiums 
conditional on public guarantees”, (Sawyer, 2005, p.238). 
C.9 Normal Closure of Contract 
This has not yet been seriously studied for obvious reasons. Most 
contracts run for the following twenty years, so their termination looks like 
a very distant prospect and no data are available to allow an analysis. 
Nevertheless, one can anticipate a situation similar to the one seen in the 
B2B partnerships where contracts and norms take a preponderant position 
in exchanges between partners.  
Another important point to consider is the decision regarding service re-
tendering or its transfer to the public organisation. Indeed, with the 
infrastructure already in place, the private partner cannot justify an 
efficiency advantage in designing and building a premise. Thus it may lose 
value for money comparison to the PSC. Nevertheless, the public 
organisation must acquire knowledge of daily management routines of the 
service some years before the end of the contract; otherwise, it will have no 
choice other than keeping the private partner in position until the end of the 
contract in order to avoid an interruption or a decline in quality of the 
service delivery. The replacement team has to be trained and ready before 
the end of the contract. One can expect tension between partners on this 
subject in the last few years, but it must be solved to allow the public 
organisation choice on the method of service delivery. 
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Appendix D Organisation Structure 
D.1 Relationships between Centralisation, Formalisation 
and Coordinating Mechanisms 
D.1.1 Coordinating Mechanisms and Centralisation 
The coordinating mechanisms form a continuum (Figure D-1, p177), 
with direct supervision the most horizontally centralising and mutual 
adjustment the least, and with the three forms of standardisation – first work 
processes, then outputs, and finally skills – falling in between (Mintzberg, 
1983). 
 
Figure D-1: The coordinating mechanisms on a continuum of horizontal 
decentralisation (Mintzberg, 1983, p.108) 
With direct supervision, the decisional power is concentrated in the 
hands of a single individual, the manager at the top of the line hierarchy – 
namely the chief executive officer. The chief executive retains both formal 
and informal power, making all the important decisions himself and 
coordinating their execution by direct supervision (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Standardisation of work processes constitutes a limited form of 
horizontal decentralisation. Only few analysts receive some informal power 
to design the system. Simultaneously, standardisation of work processes 
serves to centralise the organisation in the vertical dimension, by reducing 
the power of the lower-line managers relative to those higher up (Mintzberg, 
1983). 
With standardisation of skills and the development of experts, selective 
decentralisation seems to occur concurrently in both the horizontal and 
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vertical dimensions. Experts are consulted about their field of expertise 
gathering informal power. They can even share decision making power with 
managers. 
D.1.2 Coordinating Mechanisms and Formalisation 
Mutual adjustment and direct supervision achieve coordination without 
formalisation. They are employed in organic structures. Whereas 
standardisation of work processes, outputs, and skills by definition 



















































Figure D-2: Coordinating mechanisms on scales of decentralisation and 
bureaucratisation (Mintzberg, 1983, p.139) 
D.2 Structural configurations 
D.2.1 Simple Structure 
The simple structure is characterised by its straightforwardness. It has a 
small managerial hierarchy and little formalisation of behaviours. The chief 
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executive officer centralises all important decisions and he/she manages an 
organic operating group through direct supervision. 
This is the starting structure for many new organisations until they 
elaborate their administrative structure. Many small organisations, however, 
maintain the simple structure when the environment is simple and dynamic. 
Their small size means that informal behaviour and informal 
communication are convenient and effective. Also, the low repetition of 
work means less standardisation. 
Another variant – the crisis organisation – appears when extreme 
hostility forces an organisation to centralise, irrespective of its usual 
structure. 
D.2.2 Machine Bureaucracy 
Above all, the operating work is routine, most of it rather simple and 
repetitive. This results in highly standardised work processes, with a 
proliferation of rules and regulations. It allows large-sized units at the 
operating level and a relatively centralised power for decision making. 
Communication is formalised throughout the organisation and the 
administrative structure is complex with a large managerial hierarchy. 
The machine bureaucracy is a structure with an obsession for control. 
Firstly, attempts are made to eliminate all possible uncertainty, so that the 
bureaucratic machine can run smoothly, without interruption. Secondly, it is 
a structure prone to conflicts and the control systems are required to contain 
it 
Many of the support services can be purchased from outside suppliers. 
However, this would expose the machine bureaucracy to uncertainties and 
disruptions in the delivery flows it so intently tries to regulate. So it 
“makes” rather than “buys”, which leads to the proliferation of support staff 
in these structures (Mintzberg, 1983). 
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Machine bureaucracies are found, above all, in environments that are 
simple and predictable. Another condition often found within many 
machine bureaucracies is external control, as in the public machine 
bureaucracy. Many government organisations are bureaucratic not only 
because their operating work is routine but also because they are 
accountable to the public for their actions (Mintzberg, 1983). As a 
significant portion of the institutional income, is provided by taxpayers and 
donors, institutional buyers often make use of advertised procurement and 
therefore enjoy less discretion than industrial buyers. They are held 
accountable at virtually any juncture in the procurement cycle (Laios and 
Xideas, 1994). Everything they do must seem to be fair, notably their 
treatment of clients, their hiring of suppliers and promotion of employees. 
Thus, they multiply regulations. 
When an integrated set of simple, repetitive tasks must be performed 
precisely and consistently by human beings, the machine bureaucracy is the 
most efficient structure. However, machine bureaucracies are 
fundamentally non-adaptive structures, ill-suited to changing their strategies 
in unstable environment (Mintzberg, 1983). 
D.2.3 Professional Bureaucracy 
The professional bureaucracy is bureaucratic without being centralised. 
Indeed the operating work is stable and standardised, but it is also complex, 
and therefore, must be controlled directly by the operators themselves. The 
standardisation of skills is thus the coordinating mechanism of choice. The 
professional bureaucracy relies on the skills and knowledge of their 
operating professionals to function and produce standard products or 
services (Mintzberg, 1983). 
This third configuration appears wherever the operating core of an 
organisation is dominated by skilled workers – professionals – who use 
procedures that are difficult to learn, yet are well defined. This results in an 
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environment that is both complex and stable – complex enough to require 
the use of difficult procedures which can be learned only through extensive 
formal training programs, yet stable enough to enable these skills to become 
well defined – in effect, standardised (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Like the machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy is an 
inflexible structure, well suited to producing its standard outputs but ill-
suited to adapting to the production of new ones. Also, the professional 
bureaucracy cannot easily deal with professionals who are either 
incompetent or un-conscientious (Mintzberg, 1983). 
D.2.4 Adhocracy 
In adhocracy, we have a fourth distinct configuration: highly organic 
structure, with little formalisation of behaviour. To innovate means to break 
away from established patterns. So the innovative organisation cannot rely 
on any form of standardisation for coordination. Above all, it must remain 
flexible and the organisation structure fluctuates and changes constantly to 
adapt to current needs. There is a tendency to deploy specialists in small, 
market-based project teams according to their expertise. Coordination 
within and between these teams relies on mutual adjustment, the key 
coordinating mechanism. They are located at various places in the 
organisation and involve various mixtures of line managers, staff and 
operating experts to build new knowledge and skills (Mintzberg, 1983). 
The adhocracy is clearly positioned in an environment that is both 
dynamic and complex. In particular, it is associated with innovative work 
and research based organisations (Mintzberg, 1983). 
No structure is better suited to solving complex, ill-structured problems. 
In addition, no structure can match its sophisticated innovation, or 
unfortunately, the costs of that innovation. Adhocracy is simply not an 
efficient structure. The adhocracy is not competent at doing ordinary things. 
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It is designed for the extraordinary. The root of its inefficiency is the 
adhocracy’s high cost of communication. There is a lot of discussion within 
these structures; that is how they combine their knowledge to develop new 
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Appendix E Semi-structured Interview: 1st 
version 
E.1 Introduction 
I would like to thank you for taking some time on your busy schedule to 
participate in my interview. 
I am collaborating with Paul Davis on a research project to understand 
the relationship between public and private partners. The information 
collected in this interview will be treated in the strictest confidence. It will 
not be possible to identify your responses from the results produced. 
Anyway if you feel uncomfortable with any of the questions you can freely 
decline to answer it.  
If you agree, I would like to record the interview with this tape recorder. 
It would help me concentrating on your answers instead of concentrating on 
my notes. There again you can freely stop the recording anytime you wish.  
I will provide you shortly with the summary of the interview and main 
points discussed. 
So is everything clear? Can I start the recorder and ask the first question, 
it should take us one hour? 
E.2 Interview 
E.2.1 General Questions (brief 10 minutes) 
• Description of your role in the organisation. 
• Short description of the projects you are involved in. 
• Description of a standard project development (phases, milestones...) 
• Structure and organisation of the public organisations to handle the 
project 
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• Standard issues or concerns identified during the different phases of a 
project 
E.2.2 Interaction Between Public Organisations and Private 
Consortium – Take Me Trough an Example 
Partnership 
• What is the partnership management structure? (key roles, 
responsibilities) 
• To what extent is the provider involved, or invited to become involved, 
in internal planning or other activities? 
• Do the public organisations have the expertise and resources to manage 
the supplier relationship? 
• Are they appropriate management controls in place? 
• How well are the partnership management structures seen to be 
operating? Any issues? 
Communication 
• What are the communication channels?  
• How is the information transferred between public and private 
organisations?  
• To what extent is information shared freely and openly between the 
organisations? 
• How successful are communication seen to be? Any issues 
Conflict 
• What are the most common sources of conflict?  
• How are conflicts being avoided or resolved?  
• How effective is it? Any issues? 
• Are there other reference sources available for this example? Where are 
they published 
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E.2.3 Project Management – Again Building on that One 
Example 
Risk 
• How do you identify risks? 
• Are outline plans in place for how risks should be allocated between 
partners? 
• Do you have outline risk management plans? 
Performance Evaluation and Monitoring 
• How is the service monitored and evaluated? 
• Do performance measures include an assessment of the strength and 
responsiveness of the relationship, as well as its more quantifiable 
aspects? 
• To what extent is adequate monitoring information being provided to 
both organisations? 
• How accessible are financial and performance measurement systems to 
both organisations? 
• How high are the levels of user satisfaction and positive perceptions of 
the partnership? Any issues? 
Value for Money 
• How do you evaluate value for money during the full length of the 
project? 
• Are you actively seeking to improve value for money and performance? 
• Is the partnering arrangement delivering clear benefits that would not 
have been realised through a traditional approach? 
E.2.4 Conclusion 
• Do the public organisations have enough skills and resources to manage 
the contract successfully and with continuity of key personal? 
• What are the key features you see as critical to success? 
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• Are there any other points you would like to discuss? 
• Could you recommend any other reference person to meet 
 
Thanks again to answer my questions. I will send you a summary of the 
interview and main points. And as the case is developed I will send it 
through for comments. 
Appendix F  16BSemi-structured Interview: 2nd version 
Appendix F Semi-structured Interview: 2nd 
version 
F.1 Introduction 
I would like to thank you for taking 30 minutes of your time to 
participate in this semi-structured interview.  I attached a copy of the 
intended questions. 
I am collaborating with Paul Davis from DCUBS. I am doing research 
on the impact of organisational structure on supply relationships. The 
information collected in this interview will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. It will not be possible to identify the responses of any 
individual from the results produced, but we will when the work is done 
send you a copy of the findings. 
If you agree, I would like to record the interview with this tape recorder. 
It would help me concentrating on your answers instead of concentrating on 
my notes. There again you can freely stop the recording anytime you wish.  
I will provide you shortly with the summary of the interview and main 
points discussed. 
F.2 Interview 
1. Organisation superstructure: Can you draw for me the 
organisation structure of the procurement department and its place in 
your organisation? 
2. Environment complexity and dynamism: What types of product, 
service or materials are you purchasing? What are the difficulties, 
the uncertainties? 
3. Coordinating mechanism: When a department in your organisation 
whish to purchase a product, service or materials, how do they 
proceed? How do you exchange information between your 
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departments (e.g. informal email, standard forms, liaison position, 
task force, standing committee) 
4. Centralisation: When a department request some products services 
or materials? 
a. Who provide information (what can be done) 
b. Who advise (what should be done) 
c. Who decide (what is intended to be done) 
d. Who authorise (what is authorised to be done) 
e. Who execute (what is in fact done) 
5. Tasks’ complexity and standardisation: How complex is the 
tendering process? Is it possible to break it down into simple, 
specialised tasks? 
6. Job specialisation and behaviour formalisation: What activities or 
tasks occupy most of your working time (e.g. building the tendering 
case, meeting suppliers or reporting to your hierarchy)  
a. Why are these tasks time consuming? 
b. Can you give a very short description of the work involved 
7. External control: Is there any external control affecting the 
handling of your daily tasks? How does it affect the decision process 
and your daily work? 
8. Planning and control system: How do you specify to your suppliers 
the products, material or services  
a. Through some output / result specifications controlled at 
delivery 
b. Through some process specifications: you define and control 
how they are handling the work 
c. Through interactions: the output / result evolve as the work 
progress 
d. Direct supervision 
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e. No tight specifications: they (specialists, professionals) know 
better than us what they are doing 
9. Criteria for unit grouping and span of control: Do you classify 
your suppliers into groups? What are the grouping criteria? How 
many suppliers each group contain? How do you share the groups 
among your taskforce? 
10. Liaison devices: How often do you contact your suppliers? Do you 
encourage liaison contacts between your organisation and your 
suppliers? How do you proceed (e.g. liaison position, task force or 
standing committee)? 
11. Satisfaction: What are the sources of satisfaction and conflict with 
your suppliers? 
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